From the NYT:     http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/your-money/20money.html?_r=1&hp

At first glance, the sweeping credit card legislation that passed the Senate on Tuesday looks like a huge victory for consumers. The bill, after all, contains relief from penalty fees and certain interest rate spikes.

But for people who pay off their bills each month, and milk the card rewards programs for everything they’re worth, there is some cause for concern.

For months now, the card companies have been threatening to cut rewards programs sharply to make up for revenue lost because of the new restrictions.

My guess, however, is that this talk is just so much saber-rattling.

Card companies want to make money, and big spenders help them do it, even if those cardholders do not go into debt.

First, let’s lay out the things we know will change because of the new legislation. The bill is chock-full of new rules, which will take effect at various points in the year after President Obama signs the final legislation.

¶There are new restrictions on when card companies can increase the interest rate on balances you’ve already run up. The bill says that banks generally must wait until you’re 60 days late in making the minimum payment before applying a penalty interest rate to your existing debt.

While an earlier bill in the House of Representatives suggested less strict rules, House members have agreed to adopt the Senate version and intend to vote on it on Wednesday. On Tuesday, senators voted 90-5 in favor of the measure.

¶Card companies will have to give 45 days’ notice before raising their interest rates. There’s also a notice requirement for any significant change to a card’s terms, which may keep companies from surprising customers who have been saving their loyalty points for years with huge alterations in rewards programs.

¶Banks must send out your bill no later than 21 days before the due date. They cannot send it with, say, 14 days to go, hoping that you won’t get a check to the bank in time to avoid a late fee.

¶If the card company gets your payment by 5 p.m. on the due date, it’s on time, according to the new rules. No more of this early morning deadline nonsense, which led to late fees for payments that arrived with the afternoon mail. Also, no more late fees if the due date is a Sunday or holiday and your payment doesn’t arrive until a day later.

¶Let’s say you’re paying different interest rates on the debt on a single card — one for a cash advance, another for a balance transfer and a third for new purchases. Now, when you make a payment over the minimum balance, banks will have to apply it to the highest-interest debt first. I bet you can guess how some banks used to handle this sort of situation.

¶Banks will need your permission before allowing you the “privilege” of spending more than your credit limit and paying a fat $39 fee for that privilege. The card companies should be ashamed that they needed a law to make this “opt in” requirement a reality.

¶If you’re a student, it will become harder to get a credit card. No one under 21 can have a card unless a parent, legal guardian or spouse is the primary cardholder. Students with their own income can submit proof and ask for an exception to the co-signer requirement.

The senators, in an apparent endorsement of helicopter parenting, also require written permission from the parent, guardian or spousal co-signer for any increase in a card’s credit line. You can read all the gory details through links to the Senate bill.

¶Hate gift cards? Me, too. There will be some helpful new rules regarding those absurd dormancy fees, which punish people who let the cards sit around before using them.

Under the Senate’s rule, retailers and others that issue Visa, MasterCard, American Express or Discover gift cards or certificates will have to print explicit dormancy fee information on the card. Sellers of the cards will also have to inform the buyer of the fee. That’s a smart twist, since the gift giver can then become aware of the noxious nature of the fee — and elect to give cash or some other gift.

The bill also bans expiration dates on gift cards and certificates any sooner than five years after the card’s original issue date. And the retailer or card issuer will have to print the terms of any expiration date in capital letters in at least 10-point type. Call it the fine print rule.

It will be fascinating to see which retailer or card issuer has the nerve, after having free use of your money for five years, to tell you it will lose the money altogether if you don’t use up their gift card. I dare them to try.

So will credit card companies kill reward programs or drastically scale most of them back? Of course not.

“If you strip away the reward component of a credit card, it’s essentially a commodity,” said Rick Ferguson, editorial director at the loyalty marketing company LoyaltyOne. “The reward is what gives it its personality. It works from a branding perspective as well as a mechanism to influence customer behavior and consolidate spending on a particular card.”

That last part is crucial. People who spend a ton generate fees galore from merchants, and that money helps the card company stay in business. So you may soon see card companies giving away more goodies or lowering annual fees for people who hit certain spending thresholds each year. American Express already does this on a number of cards.

Also, keep in mind that you may have more control over what the card companies do to you than you may think.

If you don’t like the new fees and other things that banks will soon be testing as they grapple with their new economic reality, then make some noise. Send a note to me at rlieber@nytimes.com, so I can write about the latest foolishness — or consumer-friendly twist. At the very least, all of our complaints to the higher-ups at the banks may help persuade the companies to head in another direction.

“Work your way up the chain,” said Dennis C. Moroney, research director for bank cards at TowerGroup, a MasterCard-owned financial services consultant. After all, it may cost less to appease you than it would to replace you.

 

From Market Watch:

Microsoft Corp. /quotes/comstock/15*!msft/quotes/nls/msft (MSFT 20.27, -0.04, -0.20%) is expected to show off its new Internet search engine to the public next week, according to a report late Tuesday in the online edition of The Wall Street Journal. Reports of the imminent unveiling of Microsoft’s search engine, called “Kumo,” have surfaced in recent weeks, as company employees have begun testing it and some Internet users have apparently begun receiving previews at random. The new search engine is intended to help Microsoft mount a challenge to market leader Google Inc. /quotes/comstock/15*!goog/quotes/nls/goog (GOOG 401.80, +2.92, +0.73%) According to data released by comScore Inc. on Tuesday, Google had 64.2% of the U.S. search market in April, compared to Microsoft’s 8.2%.

 

From the WSJ:

For a man who sells the chip “brains” that power millions of TVs, cameras and other gadgets, Levy Gerzberg found himself surprisingly unplugged last fall. In just a few short weeks, business virtually stopped.

He still marvels at the speed of the collapse. “I think about it today, and ask, ‘Why did it happen so fast?’ ” says Mr. Gerzberg, CEO of chip designer Zoran Corp.

The reason is now starting to become clear. The world’s complex “just in time” manufacturing supply chains are making it increasingly tough for Zoran, and any other single link in the chain, to know what’s going on just a few links away. Sometimes, Zoran itself doesn’t even know how its own chips are used: One batch it thought was destined for DVD players instead turned up in digital picture frames.

The recession has exposed a harsh side effect of the supply-chain system. Because modern industry rewards suppliers with the leanest inventories and fastest reaction times, when economic crisis struck, tech companies up and down the line contracted as sharply as possible in hopes of being the ones to survive.

View Full Image

Phred Dvorak/The Wall Street Journal
Quick technology cutbacks blindsided Angelo Grestoni’s machine shop.
Forced to guess at demand for their products in a plummeting market, everyone hit the brakes, hard. An examination of the electronics supply chain — from retailers all the way back to makers of factory machinery — shows that, at almost every stage, companies were flying blind as they cut.

“We’re still not sure what happened,” says Angelo Grestoni, owner of a California machine shop that mills aluminum parts for chip-making machines. He is many steps away from Zoran on the chain, but his clients, too, evaporated around the same time. Today Mr. Grestoni employs 150 people, down from 600 just 18 months ago.

The cumulative result: The tech pullback may have been overdone. In March, Best Buy Co. said it could have sold more electronics equipment in the three months ended Feb. 28, but its suppliers’ deep cuts made it tough to keep shelves stocked. Suppliers “all decided to build a lot less,” says Best Buy merchandizing chief Michael Vitelli.

As the contraction raced down the supply chain, its effects became amplified. Rick Tsai, CEO of chip manufacturer Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., has said that, in last year’s final quarter, consumer purchases of electronics gear in the U.S. fell 8% from the prior year. But product shipments fell 10%, and shipments of the chips that go into the gear dropped 20%.

The speed of the cuts are a big change from previous economic slumps. As recently as the early 2000s, companies compiled orders only monthly or quarterly; now they often do it every week. Their quicker reflexes this time kept their inventories from swelling dangerously, as happened last time, supply-chain experts say.

This has consequences for economic recovery. Although U.S. gross domestic product fell 6.1%, on an annual basis, in the first quarter, nearly half of that was due to inventory reductions. Since consumer spending actually grew 2.2%, some factories might need to increase output, economists say.

Production is starting to snap back, at least a little. Taiwan Semiconductor, or TSMC, in March boosted first-quarter earnings, and Zoran last month reported a jump in forecast orders.

Still, “It’s easier to turn the switch off than turn it back on,” says David Pederson, Zoran’s vice president of corporate marketing. Growth forecasts also get muddied because several of Zoran’s customers may be optimistically competing for the same manufacturing contract, he says, and they can’t all win it.

Zoran is the kind of niche firm spawned by the widely dispersed global tech industry: It designs specialized video- and audio-processing chips for products such as cameras, TVs and cellphones. Its customers are mainly little-known Asian companies — rent-a-factories, basically — that manufacture the world’s gizmos on behalf of brand-name giants like Toshiba Corp.

Complexities in the global supply chain make it tough to divine broad market trends, says Randy Bane, an economist for Applied Materials Inc., which makes factory equipment used to build chips like Zoran’s. Applied Materials had a loss of $133 million in its fiscal first quarter and a loss of $255 million in the second quarter, ended April 26 — its first quarterly losses since 2003. It told employees to take four weeks of unpaid leave in the first half of this year, something it’s never done before.

Just a decade ago, the supply chain had far fewer links, Mr. Bane says. Chip sales were driven largely by personal computers, and just a handful of companies were bellwethers for the industry. Today, everything has a chip in it, dramatically multiplying the complexity. Behavior is “much more difficult to predict,” he says.

At one end of the information flow are retailers such as Best Buy. For the U.S. market, it sends orders to its suppliers once a week, along with private forecasts for the coming 52 weeks, based on sales at its 1,000 U.S. stores and broader economic data. Manufacturers scrutinize reports like these to decide what parts they need to order.

The system is geared to respond quickly to changes in consumer behavior. But that puts risk on suppliers’ shoulders.

Take DVD players: Best Buy orders them about six weeks before it wants them on shelves. However, a player’s guts may take twice that long to make — forcing gadget makers and their suppliers further down the chain to guess at demand for the various pieces.

Companies all along the supply chain live in mortal fear of piling up inventory. Profit margins are razor thin, and unsold inventory only loses value as newer technologies hit the market.

Last fall, as the financial crisis struck Wall Street in full force, shoppers at Best Buy became an endangered species. By early October — the deadline to place orders for the all-important Thanksgiving shopping season — Mr. Vitelli, the merchandising chief, abandoned Best Buy’s prior forecasts and slashed orders to electronics giants such as Japan’s Toshiba and South Korea’s Samsung Electronics Co.

Demand was shrinking so rapidly, he says, he wasn’t even sure how deeply to cut. “You actually had to pick a number with no knowledge whatsoever, because nobody knows anything,” he recalls. For the three months ended Nov. 29, Best Buy’s net income fell 77%.

If Best Buy felt ambushed, its suppliers had even less insight into consumer demand. The slashing began.

Two or three links down the chain, chip designer Zoran quickly felt the pain. Even before last fall’s crisis hit, Zoran’s customers were getting nervous, executives say. When Best Buy and other retailers cut their orders in October, it turned into a rout.

“Everyone was looking at others, asking, ‘How much money do they have? Can they survive?’ ” recalls Mr. Gerzberg, Zoran’s CEO.

Manufacturers cut deeply, then cut some more. Shipments of audio-visual products such as TVs and MP3 players fell 19% in November, 21% in December and 58% in January, the Consumer Electronics Association says. Zoran’s fourth-quarter revenue fell 42%, the steepest drop since the company went public in 1995.

“There was a lot of guessing going on,” says Mr. Pederson of Zoran. “Everybody under-bet to a certain extent.”

The effects ricocheted across Asia. In Japan, the economy shrank at an annualized pace of 12.7% in the final three months of last year, the fastest drop in nearly 35 years.

In China, many of Zoran’s factory customers furloughed their workers, says Mr. Gerzberg. In recent months, some 20 million Chinese migrant workers have lost their jobs.

Zoran doesn’t actually make the chips it designs. Instead, it subcontracts with TSMC. Zoran slashed its chip orders — as did many of TSMC’s hundreds of other customers.

TSMC’s chip factories fell quiet, says Rick Cassidy, head of North American operations. In December, its plants ran at an estimated 35% of capacity, the lowest in at least eight years, according to market researcher iSuppli Corp.

In subsequent months, TSMC asked around 20,000 of its workers to take as many as five days of unpaid leave a month. In January and February, TSMC said revenue fell 58% from a year earlier. And it said it will slash its 2009 purchases of factory equipment by some 20% from a year earlier. Across Taiwan, plunging demand for electronics led to record declines in Taiwanese industrial output.

“Usually the guy at the rearmost end suffers the most,” says Morris Chang, TSMC’s chairman.

In Santa Clara, Calif., those cuts came as a rude shock at the offices of Applied Materials, which builds factory equipment used to etch circuits and bake chemicals onto semiconductors.

As recently as last summer, Applied’s in-house economist, Mr. Bane, had expected second-half business to grow. Instead, it laid off 2,000 workers and asked all remaining 12,000 employees to take unpaid leaves.

Mr. Bane gives presentations on what’s happening in the market to some of Applied’s immediate suppliers — including Mr. Grestoni, the owner of the California machine-tool shop who’s had to lay off hundreds of his employees.

In fact, Applied is one of Mr. Grestoni’s biggest customers. One of Mr. Grestoni’s shops, D&H Manufacturing Co., won Applied Materials’ supplier-excellence award for 2007 and 2008.

The downturn is brutalizing Mr. Grestoni’s business. He’s now sitting on a year’s supply of some products, rather than the typical three months. “We’ve got millions of dollars of inventory we can’t sell, and we’re paying storage fees on it,” he says.

One recent morning, Mr. Grestoni walked by empty rows and stilled machines at D&H. In one section stands six powerful milling machines in which sharp, whirling blades carve blocks of metal. Fifty people used to work there. Today, only one remains.

He paused by a pile of aluminum blocks, each roughly the size of a microwave oven. One has large round holes milled out of the center, for wafer-processing chambers. “In October, we get an order to do six of these,” he says. Then, the customer delayed the order. “You’re looking at 60 grand here.”

Mr. Grestoni expects sales for his three machine shops this year to total less than $50 million, compared with $100 million in a typical year.

There are a few hopeful signs. Best Buy has seen improved sales. Zoran on April 28 said it expects business to pick up in coming months, even though first-quarter sales fell 37%. And TSMC ended its factory furloughs in April.

But Mr. Grestoni is still waiting. “We’ve probably hit the bottom,” he says. “Now the question is, how long are we going to stay here.”

—Ian Johnson and Ting-I Tsai contributed to this article.
Write to Phred Dvorak at phred.dvorak@wsj.com

 

The traditional middle class of the United States has been sacrificed to the financial elites in the past 20 years. Unless we re-establish a “new” middle class through investment in infrastructure i.e. factories, state of the art tech, world class education, premier achievement in science research and development etc. we are goners….

To wait is to LOSE!

Brian J. Schuettler, Administrator

+++++++++++++++++++++

Along these lines read The Decline of Monetarism at Jesse’s: http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2009/05/currency-wars-next-financial-crisis.html

 

Why Are We Bailing Out Insurers? – Barry Ritholtz, Big Picture

Will someone please explain to me why we are giving $22 Billion to Insurers?

“The Treasury Department will make federal bailout funds available to a number of U.S. life insurers, acting on the embattled sector’s long-running effort to get government help. The Treasury is prepared to inject up to $22 billion into the insurers under the rescue plan launched last fall as the Troubled Asset Relief Program, said a person familiar with the matter.

The capital infusions mark the first new round of federal rescue funding since the biggest banks got more help around the turn of the year. Aid for the struggling life-insurance industry was expected, but the companies had been waiting for weeks since The Wall Street Journal reported in early April that the Treasury had decided to give federal money to qualified companies in the industry. As far back as November, some companies were taking steps such as agreeing to buy savings and loans in order to become eligible . . .

Many life-insurance companies, like others in the financial sector, got caught carrying too much risk when the financial crisis hit. Some were hurt by their variable-annuity businesses, under which they sold products often linked to equity markets that promised minimum payouts even if markets fell. Insurers also lost money on investments in bonds, real estate and other assets that back their policies.”

Why?

Why do insurers, who have fiduciary obligations to manage their assets prudently, require taxpayer largesse?

Yet even more moral hazard is being heaped upon us.

This is totally unacceptable. If you did not manage your assets prudently, if you failed to employ appropriate risk management procedures, and if you come to the government teat for aid, there must be a heavy cost and major strings attached:

  1. Bailout Monies need to be eventually repaid;
  2. Entrenched management needs to be fired;
  3. Excess bonuses must be clawed back;
  4. Shareholders (both public and mutual) need to suffer for their bad investment;
  5. Competitive firms that ran their business properly should not be disadvantaged.

Why would we give money  managers with a demonstrated inability to manage it properly? Why would we reward shareholders who made losing bets? Why are we punishing well managed, prudent funds? THIS IS OUTRAGEOUS.

These are independent companies who should be able to raise capital on their own. At the very worst, the most I believe that should be authorized for these firms are loan assistance/guarantees. Even that is problematic.

Here is where $22 billion in Corporate Welfare is going:

Hartford Financial Services

Prudential Financial Inc.,

Principal Financial Group Inc.

Lincoln National Corp.

Allstate

Ameriprise Financial

>

Source:
U.S. Slates $22 Billion for Insurers From TARP
ANDREW DOWELL and JAMIE HELLER
WSJ, May 15, 2009

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124234565889921705.html

 

The Biggest Stimulus Won’t Come from Obama – Randall Forsyth, Barron’s

THE BIGGEST STIMULUS to the economy in the next 12 months won’t come from the Obama administration’s vaunted fiscal plans but from the rather arcane operations of the Federal Reserve.

David Greenlaw, chief fixed-income economist at Morgan Stanley, estimates that mortgage refinancings will put nearly twice as much money in the pockets of U.S. consumers as the fiscal stimulus over the next 12 months.

Meanwhile, the slowing of the wealth losses of Americans will also be a major swing factor over the next year, he estimates.

The rebound in prices of equities and corporate and municipal bonds, along with the deceleration in house-price declines, owe much to the Fed’s massive provision of liquidity, along with the federal government’s efforts to shore up the financial system.

But incomes will continue to fall as employment declines, albeit at a slightly slower rate. Net-net, various factors affecting consumers’ spending power should be slightly in the black in the next 12 months, a reversal from the deep negative over the last year, according to the Morgan Stanley economist’s projections.

In assessing the consumer, Greenlaw estimates that job losses drained some $250 billion from consumers’ wallets over the past 12 months. Even more severe was the drop of $400 billion from the loss of wealth from the decimation of securities and property values.

The decline in energy prices was equal to a $150 billion boost to consumers’ purchasing power, according to Greenlaw’s sums. But that didn’t come close to offsetting the hit to their income from job losses or drop in wealth.

That helps demonstrate the silliness of the notion that falling energy and commodity prices would rescue the economy last year when that deflation was the result of the same credit collapse that produced massive job cuts and wealth losses.

Be that as it may, Greenlaw estimates mortgage refinancings and tax refunds kicked in $25 billion each in the last 12 months. Unemployment benefits provided consumers an additional $60 billion. Bottom line: he reckons the net effect of all these factors was a $390 billion loss of spending power for U.S. consumers in the past 12 months.

Looking ahead, the economist forecasts job losses will drain $175 billion from consumers’ purchasing power while wealth losses will deduct $80 billion over the next 12 months. The latter is based on the assumptions stock prices will be flat while house prices drop another 10%.

Unemployment benefits will add $75 billion over the next 12 months while fiscal stimulus will provide $65 billion, according to Greenlaw’s estimates.

But mortgage refinancings will nearly equal impact of those fiscal boosts, totaling some $125 billion of increased purchasing power, according to his projections. That’s based on relatively conservative assumptions about who can actually take advantage of the decline in conforming mortgage rates, from an average of over 6% to the high 4% range.

Significantly, Greenlaw is not assuming that homeowners with all sorts of wacky, aggressive subprime loans are suddenly going to get safe, conforming, Ozzie-and- Harriet-style fixed-rate mortgages. He assumes many of the latter cohort will be able to take advantage of current, historically low fixed rates. But not everybody, given the stringent terms being imposed by lenders these days, as evidenced in the Fed’s most recent loan-officer survey.

Greenlaw says this boost to consumers is consistent with the Fed’s objectives in bringing down mortgage rates via its program to purchase Treasury and agency obligations and mortgage-backed securities.

 

From the Economist:

Birth Pains: A New Global System Is Coming

 

From Jesse’s Cafe Americain:     http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/
William Seidman on culprits of the financial crisis
By George White
November 10, 2008 at 4:50 PM

L. William Seidman, former chairman of the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corp., was the lunch speaker at the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association’s Summit on the Troubled Asset Relief Program Monday afternoon. As chair of the FDIC during the last financial crisis, Seidman started off by reassuring the audience that the crisis would pass, but he quickly focused on the seriousness of the situation.

“These things do go by,” he said, “but that’s not to take away from the fact that this is the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. In one sense it’s worse than the Great Depression, since it’s far more complicated for governments to handle.” (Hey didn’t Greenspan call a bottom last week? LOL – Jesse)

Seidman then went on to list the main reasons (in no particular order) for the crisis:

1. The Securities and Exchange Commission for loosening capital requirements
2. Fannie Mae for entering into subprime lending
3. Rating agencies for rating paper with which they had no experience
4. Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan, who went to bat to prevent the commodities exchange from regulating derivatives (add Phil Gramm and wife here)
5. The Federal Reserve for increasing the money in the system and refusing to regulate mortgage brokers
6. Securitization and himself

The nuclear weapon of this situation has been securitization. This was invented by myself and the RTC, so I add my name to this list as well,” Seidman said. “The exception is that we kept a piece of it ourselves back then; that part was lost when others started doing it.”
Bill is being far too humble and self-effacing by naming himself for merely developing the concept of securitization as part of his work at the Resolution Trust Corporation during the S&L crisis. Taking the blame for what followed at the turn of the century is like blaming the inventor of television for CNBC. Wall Street is capable of perverting almost anything into a vehicle for financial chicanery and fraud.

 

Stanford Law Review has a great interview with Warren Buffett’s longstanding partner, Charlie Munger. Munger offers much less corn pone and more direct opinion than Buffett does.

The entire piece is very much worth reading, but I wanted to hone in on some key topics. One is the neglect of the role of what amounts to accounting fraud in this mess. Much of this is technically not fraud under the current regime but would be if the standards of 20 years ago were still in place. We now live in a world where everyone knows that the authorities simply will not take down any of the Big Four. Four is now deemed to be the minimum number of big accounting firms permissible. So we de facto have accounting firms “too big to fail”, which means “too big to be asked to eat much liability, not matter how indefensible their conduct.” So if they do something bad, they might have to fire a few partners and pay a moderate fine.

So effectively, we live in a world that echoes the Nixon Presidency. If the Big Four does it, it must be legal.

From the Stanford Law Review (hat tip reader Hubert):

As we look at the current situation, how much of the responsibility would you lay at the feet of the accounting profession?

I would argue that a majority of the horrors we face would not have happened if the accounting profession developed and enforced better accounting. They are way too liberal in providing the kind of accounting the financial promoters want. They’ve sold out, and they do not even realize that they’ve sold out.

Would you give an example of a particular accounting practice you find problematic?

Take derivative trading with mark-to-market accounting, which degenerates into mark-to-model. Two firms make a big derivative trade and the accountants on both sides show a large profit from the same trade.

And they can’t both be right. But both of them are following the rules.

Yes, and nobody is even bothered by the folly. It violates the most elemental principles of common sense. And the reasons they do it are: (1) there’s a demand for it from the financial promoters, (2) fixing the system is hard work, and (3) they are afraid that a sensible fix might create new responsibilities that cause new litigation risks for accountants….

Very few people realize how much we’ve screwed up. Even in leading law schools and business schools very few people realize that the mess at Enron never could have happened if accounting customs hadn’t been changed. What we have now is a bigger, more widespread Enron.


Munger also has some interesting observations about the decay in values:

Read the entire article at Naked Capitalism:     http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/05/munger-on-phony-accounting-cultural.html

 

From Bloomberg:

Foreclosure filings in the U.S. rose to a record for the second consecutive month in April as banks increased efforts to seize homes from delinquent borrowers.

A total of 342,038 properties received a default or auction notice or were seized last month, RealtyTrac Inc. of Irvine, California, said today in a statement. One in 374 households got a filing, the highest monthly rate since the property data service began issuing such reports in 2005.

“What you’re seeing is the inevitable result of severe job losses,” Nicolas Retsinas, director of housing studies at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, said in an interview. “Until we stem the job losses, we can expect to see continuing foreclosures.”

Unemployment is hampering the housing market as property prices fall. The U.S. jobless rate rose to 8.9 percent, the highest in more than a quarter century, the Labor Department said May 9. Home prices fell the most on record in the first quarter to a median $169,000 amid sales of foreclosure properties, the National Association of Realtors said yesterday.

Foreclosure filings jumped 32 percent from the year-earlier period, RealtyTrac said. Filings were little changed from March as some states delayed seizures. Ten states accounted for three- quarters of all foreclosures in April, with California leading the nation.

Declines Slowing?

U.S. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan and former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said yesterday there are signs the real estate market is recovering.

“Since January we’ve seen both home sales moving up and down around a relatively stable number and we are seeing the first signs that the rapid decline in home prices is starting to abate,” Donovan said at an NAR conference in Washington.

March prices fell less than in February and 17 states showed sales increases, yesterday’s NAR report showed, as buyers took advantage of mortgage rates below 5 percent. The Federal Reserve is purchasing mortgage-backed securities to spur lower rates.

While price declines are slowing, it’s likely bank seizures will increase in the coming months, RealtyTrac Chief Executive Officer James Saccacio said.

“Lenders and servicers are beginning foreclosure proceedings on delinquent loans that had been delayed by legislative and industry moratoria,” Saccacio said.

California was No. 1 in April with 96,560 filings, a 42 percent increase from a year earlier, RealtyTrac reported. Florida climbed 75 percent to 64,588, Nevada rose 111 percent to 16,266 and Arizona rose 40 percent to 16,245.

State Rankings

Illinois ranked fifth in filings with 13,647, up 54 percent from a year earlier. Other states among the top 10 were Ohio with 12,324, Georgia with 11,521, Texas with 11,314, Michigan with 10,830 and Virginia with 6,254.

Nevada had the highest foreclosure rate as one in 68 households there received a filing, more than five times the national average. Bank seizures dropped 44 percent from the previous month, RealtyTrac said.

Florida had the second highest rate at one in 135 households, almost three times the national average, and bank seizures fell 7 percent from March. California ranked third at one in 138 households, and Arizona was fourth at one in 164.

Utah, Georgia, Illinois, Colorado and Ohio were among the other with the 10 highest foreclosure rates.

Connecticut had the 19th highest rate, one in 662 households. Filings rose 25 percent from a year earlier to 2,174.

New Jersey’s Rate

New Jersey had the 22nd highest rate, one in 695 households, and filings fell 4 percent to 5,034. New York ranked 36th at one in 1,420 households, and filings fell 1 percent to 5,591.

Las Vegas had the highest rate for metropolitan areas with populations of 200,000 or more. A total of 14,073 properties, or one in 56 households, received a filing, almost seven times the national average, RealtyTrac said.

Cape Coral-Fort Myers in Florida ranked second at one in 57 households. The city also had the steepest price decline in the first quarter, down 59 percent from a year ago, the NAR said yesterday. Miami and Orlando ranked ninth and tenth.

California cities ranked third through eighth: Merced, Modesto, Riverside-San Bernardino, Bakersfield, Vallejo- Fairfield, and Stockton, according to RealtyTrac, which collects default data from 2,200 U.S. counties representing about 90 percent of the population.

“The housing problem is now an economic problem,” Retsinas said. “On the margins you have some investors who think they may have found the bottom, but on the other side are foreclosures.”

 

Politicians will also like it. They will be able to claim that they are helping their constituents.

And they will be able to say that the banks and lenders, and not the taxpayers, will pay for it (even if those same banks are being kept alive with taxpayer money). One has to wonder, did the investigation look at the actual loan files?

From the NYT:

The net of this story is that Goldman has agreed to pay the state of Massachusetts $60 million to settle a dispute regarding Goldman’s “predatory lending” practices in and around Boston. $50 million will be made available to reduce the loan principle on 714 individual mortgages. Of note is that the agreement called for reductions in principal of as much as 30% for traditional mortgages and up to 50% on second mortgages. Also of note is that the State of Massachusetts gets to keep $10mm for their efforts. Not bad for Attorney General Martha Coakley.

This means next to nothing for Goldman Sachs. However, a very dangerous precedent has been set. In the critical years 2005-2007 Goldman was ranked 15th in the League Tables for sub prime and Alt-A origination/securitization. Goldman’s management must be pleased as punch with that poor showing today. Those that ranked high on that list are no doubt consulting with their attorneys.

If Goldman gets its hand slapped for $60mm over 714 mortgages what does this mean for Countrywide Financial? They were very big in Boston. Merrill Lynch was at the top of those securitization tables. That is what got Stan O’Neal fired. If the settlement in Boston is representative of what will be forthcoming then Bank of America is going to be facing a very big number. And that is just Massachusetts. The AGs in the all of the other states, especially Florida, Nevada, Arizona and California must be licking their chops at this news.

One hears a lot about loan modifications these days. So far there are two basic approaches.

I) The borrower is given relief in the form of a lower interest rates and stretched-out maturities. The homeowner stays in the home.

II) The bank will accept a deed in lieu of the mortgage. The homeowner is out of the home.

There have been very few cases where a homeowner is allowed to stay in the home and achieve a principal reduction. The Boston settlement opens the floodgate for principal reduction. It is the essence of the agreement. All 714 borrowers are now eligible for principal reduction and the money is just sitting there waiting to be collected.

One can imagine the conversations between neighbors in Boston:

A: “Good news finally! I just got 35% net off my first and second mortgage.”

B: “Wow! How did you manage that?”

A: “I was lucky enough to get my mortgages through Goldman Sachs. They did a deal with the Mass AG and I win the lotto!

B: “I have my mortgages with Indy Mac Bank can I get reduction too?

A: Sure. Here is the number to call. Now lets party!

This is lining up badly for the banks. The States are broke. They will see this as a source of revenue. Politicians will also like it. They will be able to claim that they are helping their constituents. Word on this will spread quickly from borrower to borrower. Every one of them will be looking for a break.

The settlement makes an important distinction between first and second mortgages. The rights of the second mortgages are clearly subordinated in the deal. This is how a bankruptcy court would treat the two classes of debt. This provides a clue on how these ‘seconds’ will be treated in the future.

One of the largest sources of these second mortgages is the Mortgage Insurance Industry. They provide a guaranty of payment on the first loss of 20%. This product competed with the second mortgage industry. It created the same result for the borrower, the ability to buy a home with no money down. Precisely what Goldman is paying up for. In this case what quacks, walks and swims like a duck is likely to be treated like a duck.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hold tens of billions of these insured or ‘enhanced’ mortgages. FHFA recently reported that the Agencies collectively held or guaranteed 30.2 million mortgages. Of that amount 16%, or 4.8 million are identified as “Non Prime”. Put differently, the Agencies hold 6,000 times more non-prime mortgages then Goldman originated in Boston.

At this point it is not at all clear what the broader implications of the Goldman settlement will be. This development has put the issues of lender liability and principal reduction on the table. It is unlikely they will come off the table anytime soon.

 

Opinion from The Economist :  http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13610871

An Offer You Can’t Refuse

NO ONE who lent money to General Motors (GM) or Chrysler can have been unaware of their dire finances. Nor can workers have failed to notice their employers’ precarious futures. These were firms that barely stayed afloat in the boom and both creditors and employees were taking a punt on their promise to pay debts and generous health-care benefits.

The bet has failed. The recession has tipped both firms into the abyss—together they lost $48 billion last year. Chrysler has entered bankruptcy, from which it may emerge under Fiat’s control (see article). GM could soon follow if efforts to hammer out a voluntary restructuring fail. America’s government, keen to protect workers, is providing taxpayers’ cash to keep the lights on at both firms. But in its haste it has vilified creditors and ridden roughshod over their legitimate claims over the carmakers’ assets. At a time when many businesses must raise new borrowing to survive, that is a big mistake.

Bankruptcies involve dividing a shrunken pie. But not all claims are equal: some lenders provide cheaper funds to firms in return for a more secure claim over the assets should things go wrong. They rank above other stakeholders, including shareholders and employees. This principle is now being trashed. On April 30th, after the failure of negotiations, Chrysler entered Chapter 11. Under the proposed scheme, secured creditors owed some $7 billion will recover 28 cents per dollar. Yet an employee health-care trust, operated at arm’s length by the United Auto Workers union, which ranks lower down the capital structure, will receive 43 cents on its $11 billion-odd of claims, as well as a majority stake in the restructured firm.

The many creditors who have acquiesced include banks that themselves rely on the government’s purse. The objectors have been denounced as “speculators” by Barack Obama. The judge overseeing the case has consented to a quick, “prepackaged” bankruptcy, which seems to give little scope for creditors to argue their case or pursue the alternative of liquidating the company’s assets. In effect Chrysler and the government have overridden the legal pecking order to put workers’ health-care benefits above more senior creditors’ claims, and then successfully argued in court that the alternative would be so much worse for creditors that it cannot be seriously considered.

The Treasury has also put a gun to the heads of GM’s lenders. Unsecured creditors owed about $27 billion are being asked to accept a recovery rate of 5 cents, says Barclays Capital, whereas the health-care trust, which ranks equal to them, gets 50 cents as well as a big stake in the restructured firm. If creditors refuse to co-operate, the government will probably seek to squash them using the same fast-track legal process.

Chapter and verse

The collapse of Detroit’s giants is a tragedy, affecting tens of thousands of current and former workers. But the best way to offer them support is directly, not by gerrymandering the rules. The investors in these firms are easily portrayed as vultures, but many are entrusted with the savings of ordinary people, and in any case all have a legal claim that entitles them to due process. In a crisis it is easy to put politics first, but if lenders fear their rights will be abused, other firms will find it more expensive to borrow, especially if they have unionised workforces that are seen to be friendly with the government.

It may be too late for Chrysler’s secured creditors and if GM’s lenders cannot reach a voluntary agreement, they may face a similar fate. That would establish a terrible precedent. Bankruptcy exists to sort legal claims on assets. If it becomes a tool of social policy, who will then lend to struggling firms in which the government has a political interest?

 

http://audiovideo.economist.com/?fr_story=24e8eab39d99d178b5f2a8300edbe7d3a9f7f5b2&rf=bm&source=hptextfeature

 

TO GET a takeover right is extraordinarily hard. The majority of deals fail: managers overpay, overestimate the savings deals will generate and often clobber their firms’ balance-sheets by trying to make a great leap forward. So what to make of the deals that have taken place so far this year, against the worst economic backdrop for a generation? The surprise is that there is any activity at all. Deal volumes are down but not out. They have stabilised since the nadir of the fourth quarter of 2008 and the run rate is about 80% of the average over the past decade, according to Dealogic, a financial-analysis firm.

About a third of the volume of big deals relates to restructuring banks. Much of the remainder is composed of what might be called “housekeeping” in which two firms rejig an existing relationship, usually with the dominant partner taking full control. This accounts for five of the ten biggest deals. Enel, an Italian utility, is buying out a large minority shareholder in Spain’s Endesa, for example, and PepsiCo has bid for full control of its two biggest bottling affiliates.

In uncertain economic times these sorts of deals make particularly good sense, for several reasons. The buyer knows the target well, minimising the risk of nasty surprises; most share prices have fallen; and in a bear market minority shareholders may be keener for an exit.

Read the rest at:     http://www.economist.com/business/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13610969&source=hptextfeature

 

The Federal Reserve is focused “like a laser beam” on an exit strategy to ensure its extraordinary efforts to stimulate the economy do not end up fuelling inflation, Ben Bernanke said on Tuesday.

“We have a plan in place,” the Fed chairman said. “We are trying to strengthen and improve it.” He said Fed policymakers spent much of their last two-day policy meeting “thinking very heavily and extensively about exit strategy”.

Gold, anyone?

I see inflation big time….as in HYPER

 

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b0/Cornelius_GCT_jeh.JPG

Looking north at statue of Cornelius Vanderbilt at the head of the ramp to en:Grand Central Terminal on a sunny late morning

A review at the NY Times:     http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/books/review/Kazin-t.html?_r=1&ref=books

Cornelius Vanderbilt spent little of his long life fretting over his image. If Americans were not grateful for the many steamships he built, the major railroad lines he integrated into a common system, the stock market panics he soothed and the Grand Central Terminal he constructed with his own millions, that was their fault, not his. Vanderbilt was the richest man in 19th-century America; at his death in 1877, he possessed, at least on paper, one-ninth of all the American currency in circulation. But like other corporate giants of his era and ours, he saw no reason to apologize for manufacturing and managing commodities everyone wanted and needed. “Vanderbilt was many things, not all of them admirable,” T. J. Stiles says in this perceptive and fluently written biography, “but he was never a phony. Hated, revered, resented, he always commanded respect, even from his enemies.”

That respect stemmed, in part, from how he earned his fortune. During the early years of the republic, most rich Americans had inherited their wealth from mercantile or planter ancestors. Like their fellow patricians across the Atlantic, they tended to equate good breeding with the right to rule. Vanderbilt left school at the age of 11. But as a self-taught, self-made entrepreneur, he had no equal.

Vanderbilt grew up on Staten Island, the son of ambitious farmers who were determined to profit from the commercial bounty being frantically pursued in the booming city across the bay. Cornelius routinely took his father’s boat to Manhattan and back; sometimes, he spent all night in the small vessel in order to grab the first job the next morning. By his 20th birthday, Vanderbilt had made enough cash to compete for trade up and down the coast. While a tiny number of men his age were leisurely studying the classics in Cambridge and Princeton, Vanderbilt became a prosperous “shopkeeper of the sea.” He was also one of the first Americans to learn to construct and operate steamships — the greatest innovation in transport since the invention of sail.

Vanderbilt erected a continental empire on his love and mastery of the age of steam. It was a perilous industry: captains eager to destroy the competition routinely pushed engines beyond their limits. Boilers exploded. Ships crashed into one another. Deaths were common. Vanderbilt often challenged other owners to races, piloting boats of his own design with ferocious cunning, if not always to victory.

But the Commodore (a name he cherished) accomplished his most impressive feats away from the steering wheel. By slashing fares and buying out rival firms, Vanderbilt achieved a near monopoly on steamship travel between New York and Boston. During the California gold rush, he hacked out a passage through Nicaragua to carry the forty-niners and their mail from ocean to ocean. Midway through the Civil War, he loaned his largest and fastest ship to the Union Navy to chase down Confederate raiders. Once victory was won, he switched his energies to the railroad business and soon controlled a network of lines that ran from New York to Chicago.

Like a great athlete, Vanderbilt lived to compete. As a septuagenarian, he still relished racing a team of fancy horses on the outskirts of Gotham. His “resolution is indomitable,” The New York Herald gushed. But Henry J. Raymond, the editor of The Times, introduced a new metaphor by likening Vanderbilt to a robber baron. Similar to the medieval German nobles who “swooped down upon the commerce” of the Rhine “and wrung tribute from every passenger that floated by,” Vanderbilt gained maximum profits by gaining maximum control of whatever market he entered.

Use the link to read the entire review.

 

The Problem With Our Regulatory Process


There have been and still are three obvious problems with our regulatory structure.

1. Influence Peddling

2. Conflicts of Interest

3. Corruption

Reorganizing to more fully centralize the regulatory process is exactly the wrong thing to do.

It was often individuals and the individual States, standing against the pressure of federal regulators, which exposed unethical and illegal practices.

And as for the idea that the Fed can take on more of these functions, just remember what will happen the next time a Greenspan gets in that position.

The Fed is a private organization owned by the banks, too often opaque, and with a highly questionable independence and objectivity.

Reorganization to centralize bad decision making and conflicts of interests is right out of the 1990′s corporate playbook.

If Obama has a pair of his own he will appoint someone like Eliot Spitzer, Ron Paul, or Dennis Kucinich as the new Chairman of the SEC or the CFTC.

 

The Banks Are No Longer The Problem

From THE INSTITUTIONAL RISK ANALYST

http://us1.institutionalriskanalytics.com/pub/IRAstory.asp?tag=358

“You think that’s air you’re breathing?” Morpheus to Neo
The Matrix
We are gratified to see that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke take our suggestion of several weeks ago on CNBC not to allow the TARP banks to repay the government debt until they prove the ability to function in the debt markets without reliance upon a government guarantee. Washington has indeed fixed the solvency problems of the large zombie banks — not with additional capital or stress tests, as many of us seem to think. Rather, the banks have been stabilized by turning them into GSEs via FDIC guarantees on their debt. Those banks which can end their dependence on federal guarantees will be the visible winners in the post stress test market, and valuations and spreads will reflect this divergence between zombies and viable private banks. Seen from this perspective, Chrysler, General Motors (NYSE:GM) and the large banks are GSEs rather than private companies, parestatales as they know them in Mexico. To talk about a rally in the equity of large US financials seems truly ridiculous, at least to us, especially true when you look at how the public sector subsidies being applied to the banks have distorted their financial statements. Maybe by the end of next year, when we know which banks can or cannot shed the need for government subsidies, then we can talk about investible equity in these GSEs. To that point, turning Bank of America (NYES:BAC), Wells Fargo (NYSE:WFC) and Citigroup (NYSE:C) into GSEs was just the first battle, Vol. II of the Lord of the Rings, to use another cinematic metaphor. Next comes dealing with the dysfunction in the non-bank market for securitization and financing, the real battle to save the US economy from a truly dreadful year-end 2009 and beyond. By the way, is it not remarkable that the FDIC has run dozens of resolutions and bank sales processes over the past 18 months without a single leak or breach of confidentiality of these sensitive transactions, including both the WaMu and Wachovia transactions? Yet the Fed and Treasury run a confidential stress test process via overt leaks the press! One thing we learned years ago working at the Fed of New York, the senior man never talks to the media and never goes to the meeting. Maybe our friend Nouriel Roubini could whisper this into Secretary Geithner’s ear next time they spend quality time. We hear from the Big Media, BTW, that Tim Geithner’s growing corps of handlers directs media inquiries to Roubini for “an objective view” of the Secretary’s handling of the financial crisis. One Democrat asks: Could it be Larry Summers to the Fed, Roubini to the White House? And speaking of the fall of the elites, FRBNY Chairman Steve Friedman finally resigned yesterday, ending a scandalous period when the greater community of present and past employees of Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS), JPMorgan Chase (NYSE:JPM) and other dealers was arguably in control of the most important arm of the US central bank. The fact that the Board of Governors appointed former GS ibanker Freidman as a “C” class director, who are meant to represent the public interest and not be past officers of regulated banks, was scandal enough. But then, when GS formally became a bank holding company last year, the Board failed to remove Friedman when his conflict became acute. The Board also failed too to appoint another “C” class director, making it almost seem that the Board wanted to assist in the GS operation to influence the operations of a Federal Reserve Bank. Remember that the board of directors of the FRBNY selected Tim Geithner as President, who then bailed out AIG to the benefit of GS and the other OTC derivatives dealers that were facing AIG. That is why a congressional inquiry is needed to understand just why the Fed Board and, in particular, Fed Vice Chairman Don Kohn, tolerated the Freidman conflict and arguably neglected their statutory duty to ensure the proper governance and operation of a Federal Reserve Bank. But hold that thought. Earlier this week, IRA released to subscribers to our Advisory Service preliminary Q1 ratings for the 7,000 or so banks that have submitted their call reports to the FDIC. Users of the IRA Bank Monitor professional edition may view the preliminary ratings for the units of their BHCs as the reports are released by the FDIC. Once we are finished testing this preliminary dataset, we will also enable these displays in the consumer version of the IRA Bank Monitor. Click here to go to our Picking Nits blog where IRA CEO Dennis Santiago provides his take on the preliminary data from the FDIC and some observations about what the data suggests for 2009. While the idea of public stress testing is a new concept in Washington, we’ve been conducting a census of all US banks for years, first via our public Basel II benchmarks and Economic Capital model, and more recently with the bank ratings from our Bank Stress Index. Each quarter, we ask two basic questions about all US banks: Stressed View: First, how did you do this past quarter? Looking at factors such as capital, lending, realized losses, income and efficiency, we grade all US banks on a six notch scale, which forms the basis for our “A+” through “F” ratings. Risk Adjusted View: Second, we calculate Economic Capital or “EC” factors for all US banks, and compare the “stressed,” maximum probable loss from trading, investing and lending to their current capital, from tangible common equity up through the various regulatory measures. By looking at EC, we provide users of the IRA Bank Monitor with a second, risk-adjusted perspective on the safety and soundness of the institution. Based on the institutions for which data has been released by the FDIC, it is pretty clear in our latest stress test that the condition of the US banking industry is continuing to deteriorate and that we are still several quarters away from the peak in realized losses for most banks. The key telltale in the Q1 FDIC data is that ROE degradation, not charge-offs, still leads the rising stress evidenced by the IRA Banking Stress Index. Remember that provisions are a leading indicator, while charge-offs lag the credit cycle. Once you see ROE performance improving, meaning a decline in the need to build loss reserves to buffer future losses, and charge-offs are the leading factor in our index, then you’ll be able to test the thesis that the worst is over for US banks and valuations are beginning to stabilize. So based on what we see now, is it time to be being financials? One IRA reader in SF named Jonathan asks: “This market for financial stocks must have some of your clients scratching their heads. What do you make of things? Is this irrational exuberance or have we turned?” We’ll be addressing the Q1, post stress test valuations for the largest banks as the rest of the units in the bank universe fill in their FDIC CALL reports. No, in our opinion we have not turned the corner in financials. The current FDIC data suggests that bank loss rates may not peak until next year. We are not yet even on the right block to make the turn, in our view. Suffice to say that the composition of the Q1 loss data we see from the FDIC makes us believe that the peak in terms of losses for the US banking industry will be closer to Q4 2009 than our original target of Q2 2009. Given where large bank loss rates were in Q1 2009, just imagine where we’ll be by Q4. Or put another way, now you know why regulators are pushing BAC and WFC to raise additional capital. The bank stress tests conducted by regulators are not so much about capital adequacy through the current economic cycle as identifying enough capital to get the large zombie banks through the end of the year. While Larry Summers and the other economic seers who populate the Obama Administration actually believe that we’ll see an economic bounce in Q3 2009 – a key assumption that also underlies the regulators’ approach to designing the bank stress tests – we see nothing in the credit channel that suggests improvement in the real economy. Both residential real estate or “RES” and commercial real estate or “CRE” markets in the NY area, for example, are starting to see an acceleration in price declines, this as the swelling population of frustrated sellers is starting to capitulate in the face of few or no buyers. But the chief reason for this sad tale above is that there is no financing for jumbo loans in the RES market. Indeed, as one of the bankers who participated in the “Market & Liquidity Risk Management for Financial Institutions” conference sponsored by PRMIA at the FDIC University on Monday noted, banks are not originating any RES paper that cannot be sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, soon to be merged into “Frannie Mae,” as we noted earlier. During a luncheon keynote address at that event, Josh Rosner of Graham Fisher & Co. noted much of the “growth” in non-conforming real estate markets during the final years of the boom was fueled by speculative buying and that the lack of financing in the jumbo, non-conforming RES markets is forcing price compression in markets like the urban RES and CRE markets of NY, CA, MA, etc. “The lack of attention paid to the creation of industry wide standards and a more solid legal basis for securitzation has only hindered the recovery of a financial intermediation in a market that once funded about 50 percent of all consumer revolving and non-revolving credit,” Rosner told The IRA. While regulators think that stabilizing the banks was the real battle, is it in fact the dysfunction of the non-bank securitization markets and the effect of this dysfunction on valuations in the RES and CRE real estate markets that is now driving the US economic meltdown? While the Fed as a good bit to the toxic securitizations in cold storage on its balance sheet, the central bank’s best efforts at adding liquidity facilities cannot replace this multi-trillion dollar market if banks won’t originate paper. If you want to learn more about the problems in the non-bank sector and how products like ARMs are about to push the US economy into a meltdown, take a look at the presentation from the PRMIA event on Monday by Alan Boyce, the former CFC executive and now chief executive officer of Absalon, a joint venture between George Soros and the Danish financial system that is assisting in the organization of a standardized mortgage-backed securities market for Mexico. Go to the last slide. This is an illustration of the Option Adjusted Duration (“OAD”) of the US mortgage markets. Notice that the OAD calculated by Boyce has grown from a low of $23 trillion in Sep 05, which just happens to be the nadir of loan defaults for the US mortgage market, to $45 trillion in Mar 09. The OAD is set to grow significantly as US interest rates rise or as the slope of the interest rate curve steepens. OAD is essentially a way to measure the economic weight of debt, basically time x money or the price response for a given move in interest rates. Using existing data and some clever suppositions, Boyce constructed an alternate explanation of “the conundrum” of 2003 to 2006. This was driven by the Fed’s very predictable interest rate policy, which flattened the interest rate curve and compressed interest rate volatility. Homeowners were encouraged to refinance into ARMs and there was significant cash out refinancing into premium fixed rate mortgages. Interest rate risk was transferred to US consumers and created a ticking time bomb for US markets in terms of the future duration of the total corpus of outstanding mortgage debt. During the PRMIA conference, Boyce echoed the view of other participants that the failure to act on securitization ensures further RES and CRE price compression. In a rising rate environment the OAD of this RES exposure in particular will grow exponentially and dwarf the “weight” or OAD of the UST debt issuance. The US homeowner will be trapped in their homes, unable to sell as nominal mortgage debt exceeds house values. Of note, in the Danish system, rising interest rates do not create negative equity for home owners, performing borrowers may redeem their mortgage by purchasing the associated bond at the prevailing market rate. Credit risk is kept out of the bond market, making the mortgage bonds a pure reflection of the associated interest rate risks. By efficiently splitting credit and interest rate risk, there are no surprises as each risk resides where it is best analyzed and hedged. Bottom line is that securitization machine operated by Wall Street doubled the outstanding stock of mortgages during the last five years of the boom, but the falling OAD driven by Fed rate policy hid the growth. Unfortunately, in their wisdom, federal regulators actually encouraged US mortgage originators to use ARMs and other products to push interest rate risk onto the backs of homeowners and bond market investors ill-equipped to understand let along manage such risks. Boyce and many others believe that without a complete refinancing for all performing mortgage borrowers, the US real estate markets – and thus the financial industry – will in trapped in a deflationary environment for years to come. The only way to fix this mess, Boyce suggested at the conference, is to refinance the entire performing mortgage market into standardized, transparent, callable, fixed rate loans, which allow the homeowner to value his liability at the market price. The interest of the mortgage originator needs to closely aligned to that of the borrower via a minimum 10% first loss risk sharing. Rosner told The IRA he doubts that America’s political and business sectors are ready or willing to embrace the transparency and consumer-friendliness of Denmark’s mortgage sector, but the fact that Boyce and George Soros are advancing this example as a solution may be significant – especially as the year-end deadline for resolving the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac approaches. Rosner and Boyce believe that the restructuring of the housing GSEs presents an opportunity to set a new, consistent standard for securitization in the US. More on this issue of “reformation” of the non-bank financial sector in a future issue of The IRA.
H/T TO JESSE”S CAFE AMERICAIN
 

On the Finance & Markets Monitor, The PPIP: keep banks out by Lucian Bebchuk presents key arguments for why banks that have toxic assets on their books should not be allowed to either buy directly or manage the buying of toxic assets on behalf of other parties in the PPIP.

Rethinking Central CDS Counterparties by Charles Davi goes over some of the technicalities that come into play with the creation of CCPs in the CDS market. Davi analyses the results that have recently been presented by Darrell Duffie and Haoxiang Zhu on this issue and presents his own views on the topic.

Is Everyone Confused Yet? (Bank Stress Tests) by Simon Johnson deconstructs the administration’s approach to revealing the stress tests results. Johnson goes over some of the factors that are impacting the government’s thinking and why it is in the interest of the government to obfuscate the answers that they are providing to the public.

 

US Home Prices May Be Lost for a Generation: John F. Wasik
Bloomberg – USA
In contrast, just 5571 units were approved in New York and New Jersey combined. While building permits don’t mean that housing will be built,

‘Great Recession’ Will Redefine Full Employment as Jobs Vanish
Bloomberg – USA
“Some sectors of the economy seem to have clearly gotten well overbuilt,” says Orley Ashenfelter, an economist at Princeton University in New Jersey and

TREASURIES-Stronger economic data, supply hit bond prices
Alibaba News Channel – New York,NEW YORK,USA
week’s supply and setting up for next week’s refunding,” said John Canavan, analyst at Stone & McCarthy Research Associates in Princeton, New Jersey.

 

New Jersey Tax Amnesty

Need a rescue from the penalties of unpaid taxes?

If your business is sinking into debt from accruing penalties of unpaid State taxes, let New Jersey Tax Amnesty come to your rescue. Now through June 15, you can wipe the slate clean and settle your State tax debt with no penalties, and with less interest.

It’s a program that has the potential to save your business thousands of dollars in 2009.

But if you want to take advantage of this offer, you’ll have to act fast, because when the Tax Amnesty period ends, additional fees, interest and collection costs will be imposed, and the New Jersey Division of Taxation will pursue these outstanding debts aggressively, as authorized by law.

Getting started

To learn more about New Jersey Tax Amnesty, as well as finding all the necessary paperwork to get started, visit the New Jersey Tax Amnesty Web site, TaxAmnesty.nj.gov. You can also get specific questions answered at our toll-free Tax Amnesty Hotline, 800-781-8407. Hotline hours of operation are 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM, Monday through Friday, and 8:00 AM to 4:00 PM on Saturdays.

Virtually everyone throughout the country is impacted by the current tough economic environment. More and more, businesses and individuals are struggling to stay afloat with the accrual of high penalties and interest because of unpaid State taxes. That is one of the main reasons for this limited Tax Amnesty—to bring relief to those experiencing economic anxiety and uncertainty.

Below are the answers to some New Jersey Tax Amnesty Frequently Asked Questions:

What tax periods are included?

Tax liabilities incurred for tax returns due on or after January 1, 2002 and prior to February 1, 2009, are eligible for Amnesty.

If I participate in Tax Amnesty, do I become an audit target or do my chances for audit increase?

No. Participation in Tax Amnesty neither increases nor decreases your chances for audit selection.

How do I obtain Amnesty?

You must read and execute a Payment/Waiver Statement and file any outstanding tax return(s) and pay the Amnesty Amount Due (all taxes and required interest) on or before June 15, 2009. The Payment/Waiver Statement is your agreement that you owe the tax and acknowledges understanding that you waive your right to appeal.

What taxes are not eligible for Amnesty?

Any tax not administered and collected by the Division of Taxation is not eligible for Amnesty. Some examples of taxes not eligible for Amnesty are:

  • SOIL (Set-Off of Individual Liability) debts from agencies other than the Division of Taxation
  • Local Property Taxes
  • Fees imposed by the Secretary of State’s Office, such as the annual fee for corporations, and reinstatement fees
  • Payroll taxes owed to the Department of Labor [Note: Although employers report Unemployment Insurance (UI), Disability Insurance (DI), Healthcare Subsidy (HC) and Workforce Development (WF) payroll taxes on the Employer’s Quarterly Report (NJ-927), these payroll taxes are owed to the Department of Labor and are not eligible for NJ Tax Amnesty. The only employer-withheld payroll tax for which liabilities are Amnesty-eligible is the New Jersey Gross Income Tax (reported on line 7 of NJ-927).]
  • Federal Liabilities
  • Motor Carriers Road Use Taxes
  • Realty Transfer Fee

Our mailing address is:
New Jersey Division of Taxation
50 Barrack Street
Trenton, New Jersey 08695

 

A total of 1 million people get help every day from Germany’s “Deutsche Tafel” food banks — and that number is set to increase because of the recession. The organization’s head, Gerd Häuser, talks to SPIEGEL ONLINE about Germany’s new poverty and the dangers of social unrest.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,622965,00.html#ref=nlint

 

From Bloomberg:

May 7 (Bloomberg) — The current global crisis is “vastly worse” than the 1930s because financial systems and economies worldwide have become more interdependent, “Black Swan” author Nassim Nicholas Taleb said.

“This is the most difficult period of humanity that we’re going through today because governments have no control,” Taleb, 49, told a conference in Singapore today. “Navigating the world is much harder than in the 1930s.”

The International Monetary Fund last month slashed its world economic growth forecasts and said the global recession will be deeper than previously predicted as financial markets take longer to stabilize. Nouriel Roubini, 51, the New York University professor who predicted the crisis, told Bloomberg News yesterday that analysts expecting the U.S. economy to rebound in the third and fourth quarter were “too optimistic.”

“Certainly the rate of economic contraction is slowing down from the freefall of the last two quarters,” Roubini said. “We are going to have negative growth to the end of the year and next year the recovery is going to be weak.”

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told lawmakers May 5 that the central bank expects U.S. economic activity “to bottom out, then to turn up later this year.” Another shock to the financial system would undercut that forecast, he added.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=avf2KVFwU8xQ

 

I don’t think there’s an outcome here that is all that helpful. If banks pass the test, for the most part – as government officials are assuring us they will – people will argue the test was too easy, or biased, or invalid for some other reason. If many banks fail (an unlikely event given the rosy talk from Fed and Treasury officials), that will cause even more fear and uncertainty in markets and the tests, which were supposed to bring certainty and calm to financial markets, will backfire (a reason to avoid this outcome as you are scoring the stress test results). I hope I’m wrong and Treasury can, in fact, convince people that the tests are credible, and the outcome is optimistic, but with all the uncertainty surrounding this process, that won’t be easy to do.

Geithner: How We Tested the Big Banks

Timothy Geithner explains how the stress tests were conducted.

 
Global trade is collapsing at an unprecedented rate, but not evenly across the globe. This column argues that ‘vertical specialisation’ – the internationalisation of manufacturing supply chains – accounts for the amplification of Japan’s drop in trade. The good news is that once OECD countries start to recover, the amplification should work in reverse, boosting Japanese exports and imports at an accelerating rate.

The US subprime mortgage crisis inflicted high capital losses for domestic and foreign financial firms that had invested in securities backed with US real estate loans. This triggered a severe credit crunch in the US, which grew into a full-blown financial crisis of global proportions and later ended up affecting the entire global economy. The prime characteristics of the current global economic crisis have so far been plummeting stock and equity prices, skyrocketing bank failures, and a sudden collapse in international trade.

http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3537

© 2012 New Jersey CFO Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha