June 15 (Bloomberg) — Everyone knows money buys influence. The entire lobbying industry is based on that premise.
Businesses hire teams of people to represent their “interests” to members of Congress. Lawmakers listen, and should they find those interests compelling enough to warrant, say, a tax credit or the insertion of another loophole in the already holey tax code, said lawmakers may find themselves richly rewarded.
Knowing a quid-pro-quo exists and quantifying the value of political connections are two different matters. For example, earlier this month Barney Frank, the powerful Democratic chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, persuaded General Motors Corp. Chief Executive Fritz Henderson to delay the closing of a GM parts distribution center in Norton, Massachusetts, which is in Frank’s district. (Frank also intervened to secure a $12 million cash injection from the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program for OneUnited, a troubled Massachusetts bank.)
It sure looks as if the government’s stake in GM helped to persuade Henderson of the importance of saving the 80 jobs at the Norton center. Is there a way to determine how much it was worth to him?
Academics have tried to put a price tag on political connections, but often the ties between business and politicians are unknown or too hard to uncover. In many countries, information on lobbying and political contributions isn’t available to the public the way it is in the U.S.
Sudden Death Syndrome
Vanderbilt University economics professors David C. Parsley and Mara Faccio use a new approach to quantify political influence. In “Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties,” a paper that will appear in the June issue of the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, the authors put a price on how much local politicians help their local constituencies.
Specifically, they examine the stock price reactions following the sudden death of a local politician.
Parsley and Faccio begin with the premise that politicians favor local enterprises for obvious reasons: They need votes to get re-elected, they have family and friends in the district, they care about local jobs, etc.
Using geographic location as the framework for their analysis, the economists then use an unanticipated event — the sudden death of a politician — to tease out the effect on companies based in the same town. (Because the stock market incorporates all available information, only an unexpected event can be used to measure the reaction.)
‘Statistically Robust’
What they found from their worldwide study of 8,191 companies and 122 sudden deaths since 1973 was a 1.7 percent decline in geographically connected firms, meaning those companies headquartered in the town in which the politician was born or lived.
That didn’t sound like a lot to me, so I called Parsley with some questions.
“Political connections do have an impact, they are measurable, and it’s not just isolated cases,” he said. “By looking at sudden deaths, we get an idea of what the market thinks the connection is worth. Now it’s worthless because the person is dead.”
Is a 1.7 percent decline in the stock prices of those companies relative to the overall market “statistically robust,” as economists like to say?
“We haven’t been able to make it go away even though we tried different specifications and controlled for everything we could think of,” he said.
Zimbabwe Is Last
Parsley said the effect was greater if the politician sat or chaired an important committee. In those cases — if the geographically connected company was a bank, and the politician was chairman of the Senate Banking Committee — sudden death produced an average 4 percent decline in the stock price relative to the overall market.
Not surprisingly, there was wide variation across countries, with sudden death leading to an average 4 percent decline in politically connected companies in the U.S. and 10 percent in Zimbabwe. Connections matter a lot more to publicly traded family-owned businesses, which has implications for the overall economy.
“To the extent that politicians favor inefficient (family) firms by allocating resources to them, long-term economic growth will also be reduced,” according to the paper.
In addition, the authors found that politically connected firms “suffer a statistically significant decline in sales growth” and access to credit between the year prior to the sudden death and the year after.
Health Care Initiative
Is there a message in all this?
“Stock prices should be unpredictable; nobody can predict them,” Parsley said. “Yet we have a model that can predict stock returns.”
He’s not suggesting we commit murder most foul and trade off it. It is possible, based on the results of the study, to stay on top of the obituaries, short some politically connected companies and walk away with a profit.
I started to think about the broader implications, now that many of the nation’s largest companies, including banks, insurance companies and auto manufacturers, are connected not only to their local politician but to the federal government, up to and including the president. What happens if Barney departs for that great domed chamber in the sky?
Given the impact of sudden-death syndrome on a company’s stock price, we might want to mandate and underwrite more health and wellness programs for our elected representatives.
(Caroline Baum, author of “Just What I Said,” is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.)
G8 signals the end of the financial crisis, but what caused it?
The weekend G8 communiqué, coming after four months of stabilisation in most financial markets, seemed to mark the official end of the financial crisis. If so, what lessons should be learnt for economic and financial policies in the months ahead? The history of the crisis in the next few paragraphs may not be the standard version presented by most commentators and economists, yet recent events suggest it to be a plausible account of what went wrong.
The blunders that produced last autumn’s financial crisis had nothing to do with the supposedly inflationary monetary policies of Alan Greenspan, or the fiscal profligacy of Gordon Brown, or with Mervyn King’s lack of practical market experience, or Hu Jintao’s mercantilist approach to currencies and exports. All these and many other factors contributed to the vulnerability of the world economy, but none of them would have been enough to cause its near-collapse last autumn. For that we can blame the unforced errors of a man almost forgotten since he slipped quietly out of office at the beginning of this year: Henry Paulson, the former US Treasury Secretary and ex-chairman of Goldman Sachs.
To understand how a localised financial problem in one segment of the US mortgage market turned into a near-collapse of the global financial system we need to recall Mr Paulson’s astonishing misuse of mark-to-market accounting standards to expropriate the shareholders of Fannie Mae and then to bankrupt Lehman Brothers. What made matters even worse was his inability to understand the systemic consequences of what he was doing. Anyone who doubts the importance of individuals in economic history should recall that the single worst day of last autumn’s entire financial crisis, as measured by the widening of risk spreads on interbank credit, was September 23. That was the day Mr Paulson appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to explain what he wanted to do with the $700 billion he had requested from Congress. This was the moment when everyone realised the world’s most powerful economic official did not know what he was doing.
Once the key role of personalities and financial policies is recognised, it is hardly surprising that things began to improve almost as soon as Mr Paulson was replaced by a competent Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner. A collapse of share prices on Wall Street triggered by the Lehman bankruptcy in September ended the very day after President Obama responded to attacks on Mr Geithner’s personal probity by offering his unqualified support. A week later, the suicidal mark-to-market accounting regulations were dismantled. And it is no coincidence that the financial crisis, at least in America and Britain, effectively ended that week. From that point onwards, the US Government found itself collecting tens of billions of dollars in repayments from supposedly insolvent banks. Far from being forced to nationalise almost every bank and running out of money with which to refinance toxic assets, as predicted by panic-mongering Nobel Laureate economists, the US Treasury now finds itself almost embarrassed by the hundreds of billions of dollars it has budgeted for supporting a banking system that no longer needs state support.
Paulson Caused the Financial Crisis – Anatole Kaletsky, Times of London