From Jesse: http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/04/financial-oligarchy-in-us.html
If you do nothing else this week, read the transcript or watch this video.
I have a serious difference of opinion with the speakers with regard to Robert Rubin and his role, but they make up for it with their description of Jamie Dimon as close to the White House and one of the most dangerous men in America today.
And I thought it was interesting that Simon Johnson would say openly that the ONLY Senator who is speaking the truth plainly is Ted Kaufman from Delaware.
Other than that they are substantially putting out a very sound and realistic view of the root of the problems that created the financial crisis, and what requires to be done to rebalance the system and create a sustainable recovery.
BILL MOYERS: And you say that these this oligarchy consists of six megabanks. What are the six banks?
JAMES KWAK: They are Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.
BILL MOYERS: And you write that they control 60 percent of our gross national product?
JAMES KWAK: They have assets equivalent to 60 percent of our gross national product. And to put this in perspective, in the mid-1990s, these six banks or their predecessors, since there have been a lot of mergers, had less than 20 percent. Their assets were less than 20 percent of the gross national product.
BILL MOYERS: And what’s the threat from an oligarchy of this size and scale?
SIMON JOHNSON: They can distort the system, Bill. They can change the rules of the game to favor themselves. And unfortunately, the way it works in modern finance is when the rules favor you, you go out and you take a lot of risk. And you blow up from time to time, because it’s not your problem. When it blows up, it’s the taxpayer and it’s the government that has to sort it out.
BILL MOYERS: So, you’re not kidding when you say it’s an oligarchy?
JAMES KWAK: Exactly. I think that in particular, we can see how the oligarchy has actually become more powerful in the last since the financial crisis. If we look at the way they’ve behaved in Washington. For example, they’ve been spending more than $1 million per day lobbying Congress and fighting financial reform. I think that’s for some time, the financial sector got its way in Washington through the power of ideology, through the power of persuasion. And in the last year and a half, we’ve seen the gloves come off. They are fighting as hard as they can to stop reform.
The Financial Oligarcy in the US – Bill Moyer’s Journal
Bank credit is contracting and getting more expensive
AMERICA’S GDP is growing, employment is finally expanding and the stockmarket is buoyant. Yet one thing has not changed: the Federal Reserve’s monetary pedal remains firmly pressed to the floor. For more than a year it has kept its short-term interest-rate target near zero while pledging to keep it there for an “extended period”. It has also bought $1.7 trillion of long-term bonds, primarily mortgage-backed securities (MBS), to keep long-term interest rates down.
That is unsettling some inside the Fed, fuelling speculation it will soon signal an exit from that ultra-easy monetary policy, perhaps even by altering its “extended period” commitment when its next two-day policy meeting wraps up on April 28th.
The most vocal dissident is Thomas Hoenig, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and the Fed’s longest-serving policymaker, who has twice formally objected to the Fed’s “extended period” language. That commitment plus zero rates, he explained on April 7th, lead “banks and investors to search for yield… take on additional risk [and] increase leverage”. He argued the Fed should soon raise rates to 1% to “end the borrowing subsidy”.
The next day Narayana Kocherlakota, president of the Minneapolis Fed, voiced a different concern: that the excess bank reserves created by the Fed’s MBS purchases create the potential for high inflation. He advocated selling $15 billion-25 billion of MBS a month, which would clear the Fed’s inventory in five years instead of the 30 it would take for the bonds to mature.
The rest of the Fed and its chairman, Ben Bernanke, have listened politely but are not ready to drop or even water down the “extended period” language, much less raise rates. Dropping the commitment would be tantamount to a tightening of monetary policy as bond yields rise in anticipation of short-term rate hikes. Mr Bernanke has already said the Fed would eventually sell some MBS, but not now. By pushing up long-term rates that too would be a tightening of monetary policy.
Bank credit is contracting and getting more expensive. Excess bank reserves will not lead to inflation so long as the Fed can still raise interest rates, which it can. Indeed, the Fed has an embarrassment of ways to tamp down inflationary pressure when the time comes, from raising interest rates on excess reserves to selling bonds to telling banks to tighten lending standards. It has far fewer tools at its disposal for battling deflation, not a remote risk.
Still, as long as the recovery proceeds, the debate cannot be put off forever. The Fed will spend a lot of its policy meeting talking about how to talk about its exit. The Bank of Canada has helpfully provided a tutorial. On April 20th it dropped its own commitment to keeping its short-term rate at 0.25% until the second half of this year, citing stronger growth and firmer inflation than expected. “The need for such extraordinary policy is now passing, and it is appropriate to begin to lessen the degree of monetary stimulus,” it said. Bond yields and the Canadian dollar rose in response.
The Fed also sees its “extended period” commitment as conditional. It does not mean six months, as many seem to think, but only as long as unemployment remains high and inflation (both actual and expected) stays low. If those things change, so will interest rates.