A story up on Bloomberg may be far more significant than its bland headline, “China to Spur Domestic Demand to Stabilize Economy, Wen Says,” suggests.

In recent posts, we’ve inveighed about the dangers of the path China is now on. Its economy is unbalanced to an unprecedented degree. Exports plus investment account for a full 50% of GDP, an unheard of level. And the investment share, which is now larger than the export contribution, is increasingly unproductive. It now takes $7 of borrowing to create every $1 of GDP growth in China. That’s a terrible ratio for a supposedly emerging economy. Even the US is only $4 or $5 of borrowing for every $1 in GDP growth.

Creditor nations (the ones in China’s position) suffer the most in financial crises. That has not happened yet because the world (including China) has engaged in massive monetary stimulus and China has kept its currency artificially low via currency manipulation. That means it has maintained its trade surplus at the expense of others (most notably Japan, but other developing economies have suffered too).

The rest of the world tolerated China’s mercantilism when everyone was in growth mode. But China has made a monstrous mistake, and it is a fundamental, strategic error. At least until now, it gave no sign of planning to change from a mercantilist model. All the signs from China have been that its leaders think that if it can avoid what happened to Japan , ie being forced to revalue its currency (per the 1985 Plaza accord), all will be well. It actually has been moving to a LOWER consumption share of GDP post crisis, the reverse of what you’d see if it were trying to rebalance the economy.

This movie has ended badly for everyone who has tried China’s game plan. As Michael Pettis has pointed out, China has the largest foreign exchange reserves relative to GDP of any country in modern history. Next two are the US on the eve of the Great Depression and Japan at the end of its bubble era.

So Wen’s remarks, if they are sincere, may signal a fundamental shift in posture, which would be very welcome indeed. As much as the US also badly needs to rebalance its economy too, we cannot get very far if the Chinese do not cooperate.

But Wen’s remarks may simply be another gambit. Recall that China announced its intention to move to a more market based currency on the eve of a G-20 meeting at which it was set to encounter a firestorm of criticism over its sharp rise in exports in the previous month. The move was widely hailed as a major shift; we were virtually alone in dismissing it as a headfake. Events have proven our assessment to be correct. Thus there is good reason to suspect that Wen’s remarks are mere posturing.

First, Wen’s comments are very conveniently timed; they come on the eve of another semi-annual Treasury deadline and in the runup to the Congressional mid-terms, when political scrutiny is at a high level. Even though the House voted to give the President more latitude to impose tariffs on countries that keep their currencies artificially low, Geithner made remarks to try to defuse the situation. Wen’s comments may simply be an empty concession.

  • Is China Getting Religion on Restructuring Its Economy? – 10/03/2010 – Yves Smith
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    While the G20 leaders make reassuring noises about international trade, I think the risk of rising trade tensions have not abated at all. As I see it, everything depends on whether or not domestic Chinese polices had any role in creating the global imbalances, and if they did, then we are still in the early stages of a difficult process of assigning the costs of the global adjustment through trade.

    Beijing hates when anyone suggests that Chinese policies were partly at fault for the current global imbalances, and doesn’t even like people to use the phrase “global imbalances,” but like it or not, we have to figure out whether in fact Chinese policies mattered. As I see it, China’s consumption rate, the lowest ever recorded, and it’s trade surplus, the largest as a share of global GDP ever recorded, could not help but have been caused by policies – such as an undervalued currency regime, excessively low interest rates, sluggish wage growth, unraveling social safety nets, and manufacturing subsidies – that were almost wholly under domestic control.

    According to my understanding of Chinese growth, it was policies that systematically forced households implicitly and explicitly to subsidize often-otherwise-unprofitable investment and manufacturing that led to wide and divergent growth rates between production and consumption, and of course the gap between the two is the savings rate. If that is true, the stimulus package is only likely to exacerbate the domestic imbalance.

    This matters because as the US begins the too-slow but irresistible process of raising its savings rate, something else must change too. At the global level savings must of course balance with investment, and with general expectations that investment will at best remain steady and probably actually decline over the next few, a rising US savings rate must result in one or more of three outcomes:

    1. Total US savings do not rise – which means US GDP must contract as the savings rate rises

    2. The savings rate in the rest of the world declines, or at least grows much more slowly than in the past. Since China is the country with the highest savings rate and the largest trade surplus, this means China’s savings rate will decline, and this is just another way of saying that consumption growth will surge.

    3. China’s GDP grows much more slowly.

    So we are left with the almost inescapable fact that if the US savings rate increases, either China (and the rest of the world, technically, but in practice mainly China) must see much faster consumption growth or the world must experience a slowdown in GDP growth.

    Don’t miss More Trade Tensions, and the Very Limited Advantage of Relative Poverty.

     

    Chinese stocks soared this year after diving off the cliff in 2008.  However, since hitting the high point, Chinese stocks are now down about 20% in the past month or so. Prior to this recent drop, Chinese stocks had had a very good run in 2009.

    Now, we may be getting some inkling of what drove the performance and the answer is Chinese government stimulus.  This report, based on analysis at the Bank of China suggests that massive amounts of cash from stimulus loans may have gone into buying stocks rather than equipment [emphasis added]:

    Mis-Directed ‘Stimulus’ Was Huge Part of China Market Action (Business Insider, September 2, 2009, Vincent Fernando)

    Shanghai stocks have cratered over 20% from their August highs, despite Premier Wen Jiabao’s continued jawboning.

    Most people realize by now that speculative inflows, resulting from easy domestic lending, have fueled the rally year to date. What hasn’t been so clear, until now, was the exact size of these inflows.

    It turns out that as much as 1.2 trillion yuan ($175 billion) of stimulus-related money, intended for fixed asset investment, may have accidentally flowed into Chinese stocks and property as per Bank of China analyst Shi Lei.

    Such a massive quantity amounts to 26% of the entire Shanghai and Shenzen stock market turnover for the first half of the year. It also equates to 76% of real estate turnover over the same period…

    This is interesting, but not terribly surprising I suppose.  The Chinese government engaged in massive financial stimulus and, not surprisingly, a lot of that money was put into financial assets rather than long-term business equipment, factories and so on.

    Assuming that flow of co-opted cash has slowed, it’s no wonder the Chinese stock market action has cooled off.  Question is, is this a short-term phenomenon?

    This report from China Stakes give details on borrowers using cheap government-backed loans to speculate in stocks.

    Chinese Stocks, Bubbles and Bears – Kurt Brouwer, Fundmastery Blog


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