GROWING WORRIES IN ATHENS

A Greek Default Would Hit the ECB Hard

Hopes that Greece can be saved are dwindling. Athens had hoped to reach a deal with its creditors on a 50 percent debt haircut, but banks have now made it clear that efforts to reach an agreement could fail. Should the country go bankrupt, the European Central Bank stands to lose the most.


 

I think the most notable development this week was Thursday’s big release of global factory activity surveys. It wasn’t pretty. Overall, the JP Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI dropped for the third straight month and fell below the 50 level — the line of demarcation between growth or contraction in monthly factory activity — for the first time since recession was descending upon us back in early 2008. Scary stuff.

 

Although U.S. activity was buoyant (no doubt a remnant of the sentiment tailwinds enjoyed from the market rally in October), we cannot remain an island of tranquility as Asia and Europe fall into the abyss.

 

Here are the highlights (any reading under 50 indicates a drop in activity):

 

*Brazil PMI: 48.7 vs. 46.5 prior
*Ireland PMI: 48.5 vs. 50.1 prior
*Sweden PMI: 47.6 v. 49 estimated
*Norway PMI: 48.6 vs. 50.2 estimated
*Denmark PMI: 47.7 vs. 43.6 prior
*Poland PMI: 49.5 vs. 51.7 prior
*Spain PMI:  42.8 vs. 43.9 prior
*Swiss PMI: 44.8 vs. 46.6 estimated
*Czech PMI: 48.6 vs. 51.7 prior
*Italy PMI: 44 vs. 42.8 estimated
*France PMI: 47.3 vs. 47.6 estimated
*Germany PMI: 47.9
*Greece PMI: 40.9 vs. 40.5 prior
*South Korea PMI: 47.1 vs. 48 prior
*Taiwan PMI: 43.9 vs. 43.7 prior

 

And, now for the big boys:

 

*Eurozone PMI: 46.4 — lowest reading since recession ended in July 2009
*U.K. PMI: 47.6 vs. 47 estimated — lowest since June 2009
*China PMI: 49 vs. 49.8 estimated — lowest reading since February 2009
*China HSBC PMI: 47.7 vs. 51 prior — 32-month low

 

In addition to signs of economic weakness — which was enough for a Chinese vice finance minster to say the global economy faces a “worse situation” than in 2008 — there was evidence that the financial system remains under severe stress despite the freak out over Wednesday’s move by the Federal Reserve to lower dollar funding costs for foreign banks (which, as I discussed at the time, wasn’t really a game changer). The European Central Bank reported that eurozone banks borrowed nearly €9 billion in overnight emergency cash — up from €2.7 billion earlier this week. Not good.

 

Other signs of strain could be seen in the way German 12-month bill yields dropped below zero on Wednesday as European investors were willing to pay Berlin for the luxury of lending it money. The motivation is that, if you’re holding a big wad of euros, German short-term debt is one of the few “sure bets” left out there. It’s a sign of extreme risk aversion and fear.

 

Of course, the epicenter for all this is Europe.

 

Adding to concerns were comments this week from new ECB chief Mario Draghi that while downside risks to the economic outlook have increased, he cannot ride to Europe’s rescue by engaging in unmitigated money printing and bond buying; instead, it must adhere to its founding principles, including an inability to engage in monetary financing of government debts (exactly what the likes of Italy would love right now).

 

Draghi’s comments were akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theater before announcing all the fire extinguishers are empty. Whoops.

According to the team at Capital Economics, based in London, the eurozone economy is on track to contract by 1% next year and by 2.5% in 2013, with risks to the downside for both forecasts. Recession will only deepen the budget deficits at the center of the eurozone debt crisis. The only way out is growth. And the only way the likes of Greece, Portugal, and Italy can restore growth is via massive currency depreciation and domestic inflation — something that’s not going to happen as long as they’re in the eurozone.

 

Sure, there will be distractions like Wednesday’s move by the Fed or additional stimulus measures out of places like China and Brazil. That’s just how the market gods like it. All the better to keep the masses confused and complacent as the fundamentals just get worse and worse.

 

To put it differently: When you look around the theater, everyone’s still focused on center stage blissfully unaware what’s happening around them. Turn around. The balcony level is in flames.

The Economy Is About To Get A Lot Worse – Anthony Mirhaydari, MSNBC

 

 

It’s official: The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) plan announced at the EU summit on October 27th is essentially dead prior to arrival.

As a consequence, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy appear to be betraying signs of throwing in the towel on the Euro project as it exists today. They appear to be actively contemplating ways to engineer an orderly breakup of the Euro.

As financial market participants gets wind of their intentions – albeit tentative – expect financial markets to accelerate the unfolding of events. The entire Euro edifice could collapse before the New Year.

EFSF Chief: The Insurance Plan Is Dead Prior To Arrival

When the Chief of the EFSF is pessimistic about the capacity of the EFSF to be leveraged to an extent that is adequate to the task at hand, then you might as well kiss the whole thing goodbye.

In a little noted article in Thursday’s FT, Klaus Regling, head of the EFSF essentially admitted that the plan agreed upon at the EU summit on October summit to use the EFSF as collateral for a first-loss insurance scheme is essentially dead.

As I predicted would occur in an article of mine several weeks ago entitled “Europe’s Inane Idea: Fake Brady Bonds,” the EFSF chief has acknowledged that there is no interest on the part of investors to purchase PIIGS bonds with a first-loss guarantee of only 20%.

Regling believes that a first-loss guarantee of 30% may be required to garner any interest.

Personally, I have serious doubts that there would be sufficient interest. Any issuance that actually requires a 30% loss guarantee in order to be viable simply has an implicit default risk profile that will be unable to garner sponsorship of sufficient size.

Since there are only about 250 billion euros available for the EFSF first-loss insurance scheme, that means that, even assuming 30% were sufficient, the mechanism would only be adequate to cover about 800 billion euros worth of debt issuance by Italy and Spain — and any other euro area country that needed funding.

It has been estimated that roughly two trillion euros of funding are needed to simply merely meet projected roll-over and fresh financing needs through mid 2013. Therefore, the 800 billion projection is totally insufficient to the task at hand.

If $800 billion in guarantees are all that Europe can come up with, Europe would probably better off wasting precious resources on this scheme at all.

That is why the EFSF first-loss guarantee proposal seems to be dead on arrival. The plan is totally insufficient, and therefore is unlikely to be implemented at all.

I believe that this realization is thoroughly discouraging the Eurocrats that are charged with structuring the EFSF insurance facility and selling it to investors. These Eurocrats are relaying their pessimism back to Merkel and Sarkozy in real time. This in turn, is prompting Merkel and Sarkozy to begin to contemplate “exit strategies.”

Imminent Fiasco

Because Merkel and Sarkozy are unwilling or are unable to support the only viable option available to them that is to fund bond purchases via the ECB, they appear to be engaging in preliminary speculations regarding a possible exit plan. The problem is that there is no viable exit plan that would not entail a total economic and financial disaster.

It will be impossible for Merkel, Sarkozy and other European leaders to prepare an exit strategy without their intentions being leaked to the press. Financial markets will therefore unravel any and all plans that they contemplate before they can even commit them to paper.

As soon as markets realize that the original EFSF scheme is being abandoned and that the entire Euro project will be restructured, the Euro will be crushed, the European banking system will become insolvent and global financial markets will freeze up.

Merkozy Musings

Sarkozy is already openly musing about a “two-speed” Europe. He envisions a group of countries that will quickly move towards tight fiscal and economic integration and another group of countries that will remain fiscally and monetarily independent.

Sarkozy has stated that he believes that a tight federation is impossible for a large group of economically, politically and culturally disparate countries. The implication is that the group of 16 nations that currently comprise the Euro is probably too large to be manageable.

At the same time, Merkel is already dreaming about a “New Europe.” Exactly what Germany’s Chancellor means by this is ambiguous. However, it is clear that Merkel has in mind much tighter fiscal and economic integration. In this regard Merkel must know that several current Euro members may be unable or unwilling to join in such a tight federation.

The problem with Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s musings is that they are completely irrelevant and even counterproductive to the current task at hand. The issues that they are touching on were issues that needed to have been resolved at the inception of the Euro. At this point, the question is how the damage can best be undone, not to debate what should have been.

Conclusion

Merkel and Sarkozy will soon learn that an orderly break-up of the Euro is not possible. Even the slightest hint that a breakup is being contemplated will cause a global financial disturbance that is so great that any perceived benefits of a break-up will be completely overwhelmed by the costs that will be imposed by the market.

Prepare For Europe Collapse Before New Year by James A. Kostohryz


 

The American financial system seems ultramodern in its complexity, but it is actually ancient in the brutal ways wealth asserts power over others. The earliest societies were torn by conflicts between lenders and borrowers, the rich versus the poor. They were compelled to fashion hard rules and put restraints on lending to curb the cruelties and promote a moral minimum for social justice. Nearly every country and culture embedded these values in religious tenets that governments enforced. Anthropologist David Graeber asserts provocatively in his book Debt: The First 5,000 Years that the power struggles over debt were probably the starting point for developing civilization’s moral codes. The arguments typically began when kings or landowners lent some of their surplus wealth to peasant farmers, then took away the debtors’ property if they failed to repay the loans. In olden days, the creditor would seize the debtor’s livestock and vineyard, perhaps even his children to be enslaved as household servants, until the debts were repaid. If the failure of borrowers persisted, the wealthy lenders would wind up owning all the property, with the peasants reduced to tenant farmers on the land they had once owned. The negative cycle stopped when the peasants could no longer borrow because they had nothing left for lenders to claim in default. Economic life at that point was frozen or depressed, no longer functioning. In a rough sense, this resembles what happened to our economy in the financial crisis. Debtors were tapped out, up to their eyes in debt, and creditors recognized that they could not lend to them anymore without losing their money. In modern economies, no one takes away their children, but they do seize homes and cars and other assets. The ancient Hebrew society worked out a solution for recurring debt crises—you can find it in the Bible. Every seven years (in some interpretations, every fifty) the cycle of debt accumulation was erased by a declaration of general forgiveness. This was called the year of jubilee, and Christianity embraced the same moral principles (“forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors”). Property was returned to the original owners, and children and slaves were freed. Everyone was redeemed. The economy was freed to start over again. Graeber thinks Judaism’s reform laws were probably influenced by the Babylonians, who issued “clean slate” edicts when excessive debt accumulation threatened social crisis. Graeber notes that nearly every society, ancient and modern, shares moral confusion about debt, with contradictory attitudes. On the one hand, “Paying back money one has borrowed is a simple matter of morality.” On the other hand, “Anyone in the habit of lending money is evil.” Americans share this ambivalence. Here is what Americans can learn from the ancients: severe inequality of wealth and income is not just a question of morality. Inequality is the fundamental source of the disorder that leads to financial crisis and chokes off the economy. Ancient religious principles like the limits on interest rates were a practical way of maintaining balance in economic life. Taking away those rules—as US politicians did when they repealed prudent regulations of banking and finance—in effect authorized the growing inequality that eventually leads to chaos. Modern economists and their supposed “science” generally ignore the ancient wisdom. Most would probably dismiss the connection as folklore. Some economists study inequality and what drives it. Others study financial fragility and macroeconomic volatility. But the two subjects are seldom addressed as underlying cause and effect. Gross concentrations of money at the top help explain why the system eventually stalls out. This is a basic insight that ought to inform the agenda for recovery. Inequality matters.

Economists Michael Kumhof and Romain Rancière wrote a breakthrough paper for the IMF that made the connection between inequality and financial crisis. “The crisis,” they wrote, “is the ultimate result, after a period of decades, of a shock to…two groups of households, investors who account for 5% of the population, and whose bargaining power increases, and workers who account for 95% of the population.” The 5 percent, broadly speaking, lend to the 95 percent, and in so doing gain still greater wealth and power. The shock comes when the creditor class suddenly realizes that the borrowers are drowning in debt and cannot possibly absorb any more. At that point, financial assets connected to consumer debt are dumped and prices crash, much as they did in 2007. The authors add, “To our knowledge, our framework is the first to provide an internally consistent mechanism linking the empirically observed rise in income inequality…and the risk of a financial crisis.” It took three decades of lopsided borrowing to produce the breakdown, Kumhof and Rancière explain, but the ominous trend was evident for years. In the early 1980s the 95 percent had debts equal to about 65 percent of their income. By 2006 that figure had risen to 140 percent. They were devoting so much of their paychecks to making payments on old debt—credit cards, equity lines and mortgages—there was nothing left to make the payments on new debt. Defaults and bankruptcies were already swelling. The collapse came when creditors grasped the danger and started selling off their mortgage bonds and loans to consumers. It seems odd that the financial interests, with their brilliant analysts and high-speed computers, didn’t see the nature of the crisis until it was breaking over their heads. They may have been blinded by the fabulous wealth they were harvesting. Kumhof and Rancière point out that the same ominous combination—a run-up of debt accompanied by gaping inequality—preceded the crash of 1929. Greed may inspire optimism. But why did ordinary debtors fall into this trap? The standard line is that they, too, were blinded by greed, eager for consumer pleasures they couldn’t afford. This is true for some, but the explanation libels most working people. Wage stagnation started in the 1970s and spread widely in the Reagan era. Typically, as incomes faltered, families faced two bad choices—either go deeper into debt or surrender their middle-class standard of living. Naturally, most people tried to hang on to what they had. The responses to this crisis are well-known. People worked more—women and teenagers entered the workforce, family members took two or three jobs. And they borrowed more, paying the bills with credit cards. In these terms, average families were making heroic efforts to maintain their standard of living. They were doomed to fail unless dramatic economic reforms improved their lot. University of California economist Clair Brown predicted nearly two decades ago in her landmark study of American consumption that sooner or later working people would have to retreat to lower levels of consuming. Working harder and borrowing more had sustained them for twenty years, but neither of these remedies was repeatable. At some point the merry-go-round would have to stop. The retreat is now in full flight. Homeownership has declined by 1.1 percent over the past decade. Wages are stagnant or falling. Foreclosures are tearing through communities, and falling home prices are destroying family equity. Americans, as Whalen says, are experiencing the reverse New Deal.

 

At Naked Capitalism:

It is a measure of how un-self critical modern economics has been, that the Marxists are starting to appear to be making the most sense of the current crises. The supine acceptance that “the market is always right” — a truism only to traders and vested interests — means that there has been precious little understanding developed about how markets can go wrong. Or what is wrong, as well as right, with markets and the modern practices of capitalism. An article in the London Review of Books came to my attention recently by Benjamin Kunkel that shows how Marxist analysis is actually looking quite pertinent to the current mess.
Read the Rest…

The Rise of the Wrecking-Ball Right

 A Moral Question - Not A Political One, A State of Distress, BANK RESERVES FOR TBTF, Bilderbergers 1 USA 0, Constitutional Questions, Coup d'etat in America, Deleveraging, Devaluation, Dismal Science-Ignorant Scientists?, Economic Analysis Isn't Science, Federal Reserve-Discussion, Figures don't lie but Liars can figure, Goldman: Underwriter or Undertaker?, Greenspan is kind of stupid, HEY AMERICA-STICK 'EM UP!, History of Finance, Insolvency, Integrity and Responsibility, Is The Market Rally Real?, IT'S ALL ABOUT POWER AND MONEY, Jacksonian Democracy, Moral Hazard, Obama's Hypocrisy, Objectivism, Our phony middle class, Patience is a virtue...Delusion is a vice, Political Chaos, Regulatory Failures, Robert Reich, Small Business-Bedrock of America, Smaller Can Be Better, Subsidiarity, TARP fruit loops, The American Financial Oligarchy, The Big Fat Greek Question, The Consequences of Greed, The Democrats Blew It Again, The Dollar's Demise, The End of American Capitalism As We Know It? - Discuss, The excellent adventures of Ben Bernanke, The Financial Elite, The Geithner Resignation Watch, The Growing American Fascist State, The Habits of Hedge Funds, The Importance of Strategic Planning, The Inherent Disorder of Empires, The Intrusion of UNLAWFUL Authority, The Judeo-Christian Political Coalition, The Obama OMG magic factory, The Sorry State Of American Manufacturing, The Suffering Poor, Time For A New Third Party, Truth In Charity, Unemployment Catastrophe, Unindicted Co-Conspiritors, Unintended Consequences, USA Is the New Japan, Wage Deflation, We Are All Cooked, We Are All Guilty, We Have Become Beggars To The World, Who owns Congress-Still!  1 Response »
Jul 162011
 

One would have thought the last few years of mine disasters, exploding oil rigs, nuclear meltdowns, malfeasance on Wall Street, wildly-escalating costs of health insurance, rip-roaring CEO pay, and mass layoffs would have offered a singular opportunity to explain why the nation’s collective well-being requires a strong and effective government representing the interests of average people.

The Rise of the Wrecking-Ball Right

 

Howard Gold recently noted that the economy’s failure to thrive is a refutation of the work of two dominant 20th-century economists: John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman.

Keynes was the great advocate of massive government spending as an economic “stimulus,” which President Obama tried as his first act in office, and which failed to produce the expected “multiplier effect” that was supposed to boost the economy. So this was a failure of the economics of the left. But what about Friedman? While Friedman is usually remembered as one of the great economic defenders of the free markets–which in some ways, he was–he was also one of the chief advocates of monetarism, which promoted the notion that the central planners at the Federal Reserve could manipulate the economy by adjusting the money supply. And as Gold points out, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke was a self-confessed adherent of Friedman’s theories. So along with the Keynesian stimulus, we got an even bigger monetary stimulus from the Fed, and we got it twice: QE1 and QE2. Yet this also failed to produce the expected multiplier effect.

There is some legitimate mystery as to why. I have inveighed against all forms of bailouts and stimulus, arguing that every dollar pumped into the economy by the government eventually destroys more than a dollar of private economic activity. But the key word is eventually. Money pumped into the economy by the Fed usually goes into “bubbles” of malinvestment, putting the capital to an unproductive use (like building houses that people can’t afford) and creating destructive inflation over the long term. But we would still expect that a tsunami of cheap credit from the Fed would create some short-term credit expansion, even if we have to pay for it later on.

Yet this credit expansion hasn’t happened. The Fed has extended the banks trillions of dollars in easy money, but this hasn’t produced a commensurate expansion of lending. Why not?

The answer is a larger refutation of the theories of monetarist stimulus. The Great Recession demonstrates that the money supply is not the ultimate driver of the economy. The ultimate driver is very simple: has the government created a safe climate for investment?

The Obama administration and the Democratic Congress have done the opposite. They have created a hostile climate for investment, and they have done so through one measure that is directly smothering the economic recovery: the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill. Dodd-Frank has injected a lethal dose of uncertainty into the very heart of the financial sector–and we’re only halfway through the worst of this effect.

The problem is not any specific provision of Dodd-Frank. The problem is the lack of specific provisions. Despite being more than 2,300 pages long, which would be more than enough space to spell out a comprehensive system of regulation in exacting, concrete detail, this is not what Dodd-Frank did. Instead, as the New York Times noted last year when it passed, the bill “is short on the details necessary for enforcement. Enactment has set off a scramble by financial regulators to write the rules needed to put the bill’s broad framework into practice.”

“Richard Murray, chairman of the US Chamber of Commerce’s Center for Capital Markets and Competitiveness, says the burden placed on regulators is unprecedented. ‘It’s a law comprised of goals and objectives much like the preliminary blueprints for the design of a very complex building,’ he said at a July 27 chamber conference on the bill.

“He noted that the law calls for 530 rulemakings, 60 studies, and 90 reports to Congress. ‘The wiring and the piping and the internal decor that will become financial regulation will emerge from that process,’ he said.

A financial consultant quoted in the article described the bill as a “blank slate,” while another provided the best analogy: we’re in “the eye of the storm”: “We have been through a great amount of legislative work…. Now we have to wait for the regulations.”

A year later, we’re still there. Just last week, House Democrats were urging regulators to speed up work on giving actual meaning to the Democrats’ vaporous legislation. This probably won’t help because “much of Dodd-Frank remains tied-up with regulatory agencies that must abide by a standard process laid out by the Administrative Procedures Act, which mandates a string of proposal requirements, commentary periods, and economic impact analyses before new regulations go into effect. Agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, FDIC, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency still need to finalize half of the approximately 387 rules needed to execute Dodd-Frank-related provisions.”

So it will be at least another year at the least before bankers and investors find out what laws they are living under. And it gets worse: the provisions that are yet to be decided are not minor details but go the very heart of the financial industry.

Dodd-Frank formalized the institution of “too big to fail” for companies that are considered large enough to pose a “systemic risk” to the financial sector. In return, these companies are subjected to stringent new requirements intended to prevent them from failing. But it is still not clear which companies will be regarded as “systemically important” and which will not, so hundreds of big financial firms are living under the cloud of restrictive regulation. And to make things worse, Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo suggested a few weeks ago that systemically important banks should have their capital requirements raised from 7% to as much as 14%.

That’s just a wee, tiny little detail that nobody has quite worked out yet.

Capital requirements are the heart of the investment banking business. They determine, directly and mathematically, how much credit bankers can extend. A 7% requirement means that if your bank has $700 million in its own assets, you can lend up to $10 billion of your depositor’s money. But if the capital requirement is raised to 14%, you can only lend $5 billion. Double the capital requirement and you halve the credit.

And what happens if regulators can’t make up their mind, so no one can tell whether their capital requirements will be doubled or not? Everyone sits on their extra cash, just in case. No wonder the economy is just lying there, flopping and gasping like a fish in the bottom of a bass boat.

Dodd-Frank is a monument to the modern practice of anti-legislation. This has been the pattern of the left’s expansion of the regulatory state for decades, but the Obama administration and Democratic leaders in Congress have raised it to an art form. They pass giant, 2,000-page epics which still manage not to spell out any concrete details. What does the legislation do, instead? Mostly, it lays out an organizational chart of regulators and then empowers these unelected bureaucrats to dictate all of the actual details.

Dodd-Frank is not legislation but the abdication of legislative power. In effect, Congress has given up writing laws and instead vested that power in unelected bureaucrats appointed to executive-branch agencies.

Some details may never be fleshed out. One analysis of Dodd-Frank concludes:

“You will soon find that the regulations themselves are secondary to the new measuring stick called ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’ Under the new environment, being in compliance with regulatory requirements is only a piece of the puzzle. That’s the black and white piece so to speak. You will also have to meet the grey matter test of unfair or deceptive acts or practices…. No matter how you slice it, just about any particular act or practice can fall within the grey area of someone’s interpretation.

Why create a system of such mind-boggling, stultifying uncertainty? I will evoke the “Law of Intended Consequences.” They did it on purpose. The goal of Dodd-Frank was to shift the blame for the financial crisis to the private sector. As the analysis I just quoted notes: “The battle cry for unfair and deceptive acts and practices is born from the mortgage crisis as many consumer and community groups cried foul play after the mortgage bubble burst.” In other words, don’t blame the mortgage bubble on the politicians who agitated for easy credit and for the reckless expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac–you know, a couple of guys named Dodd and Frank. No, blame the banks, and then come up with a system to punish those wicked bankers and bring them more fully under the government’s yoke.

That the goal is to exact revenge on the bankers is given away by a nasty little “clawback” provision that allows the government to seize the previous two years of a banker’s pay if he is deemed to be “responsible” for an institution’s failure. It’s an excellent way to increase the risks and decrease the rewards of going into the banking business. Yet when a banker sets out to make decisions about how to run his business successfully, he never knows when a regulator will choose to change his capital requirements or decide that his acts or practices are unfair or deceptive. So if the goal was the bring bankers under the control of bureaucrats, mission accomplished.

But this is not a good way to revive the economy or ensure the nation’s financial health. By overturning the rule of law, Dodd-Frank’s non-legislation legislation has created crippling uncertainty in the heart of the financial sector, neutralizing the Fed’s monetary stimulus and smothering the economic recovery.

Non-Objective Law Is Smothering the Recovery – Robert Tracinski, RCM

 

Washington’s Blog

Greenspan’s big defense is that the financial crisis was caused by a “once-in-a-century” event.

Forget about the fact that the “once-in-a-century event” couldn’t have happened if Greenspan’s Fed hadn’t:

  • Acted as cheerleader in chief for unregulated use of derivatives at least as far back as 1999 (see this and this)
  • Allowed the giant banks to grow into mega-banks. For example, Citigroup’s former chief executive says that when Citigroup was formed in 1998 out of the merger of banking and insurance giants, Greenspan told him, “I have nothing against size. It doesn’t bother me at all”
  • Preached that a new bubble be blown every time the last one bursts
  • Kept interest rates too low
  • And did alot of other hinky things

More importantly, as Nassim Taleb repeatedly points out, financial experts who don’t plan for rare events are like pilots who don’t know about storms.

There are storms out there, Taleb says, and any pilot who doesn’t know how to deal with storms shouldn’t be flying. Similarly, no one should be in a position of financial leadership if they don’t know about – and plan for – the infrequent event:

Greenspan: The Financial Crisis Was Caused By A ‘Once-In-A-Century’ Event • Taleb: Any Pilot Who Doesn’t Know About Storms Shouldn’t Be In the Cockpit

 

Is modern finance more like electricity or junk food?  This is, of course, the big question of the day.

If most of finance as currently organized is a form of electricity, then we obviously cannot run our globalized economy without it.  We may worry about adverse consequences and potential network disruptions from operating this technology, but this is the cost of living in the modern world.

On the other hand, there is growing evidence that the vast majority of what happens in and around modern financial markets is much more like junk food – little nutritional value, bad for your health, and a hard habit to kick.

The issue is not finance per se, i.e., the process of intermediation between savings and investment.  This we obviously need to some degree.  But do we need a financial sector that now accounts 7 or 8 percent of GDP?  (For numbers over time, see slide 19 in my June presentation.)

As far as we know, finance was about 1 or at most 2 percent of GDP during the heyday of American economic innovation and expansion – say from 1850.  The financial system of the nineteenth century worked well, in terms of mobilizing capital for new enterprises.

Those banks had much higher capital-asset ratios than we have today.  Even the dominant players were smaller in absolute terms and relative to the economy – JP Morgan, at his peak, employed less than 100 people.

No one is suggesting we go back to the nineteenth century (although abolishing our central bank would certainly have undesirable consequences in that direction).  But is it really healthy – or even sustainable – to have a finance sector as large as what we face today?  (It is surely not a good idea for finance to account for 40 percent of total corporate profits, see slide 16 – such performance, in an intermediate input sector, suggests someone else in the economy is being severely squeezed.)

There is a great deal of research that finds finance is positively correlated with growth, but this work has a couple of serious limitations – if you want to derive any robust implications for policy.

First, it is about the amount of financial aggregates (e.g., money or credit, relative to GDP) rather than the share of financial sector GDP in total GDP.  I know of no evidence that says you are better off with a financial sector at 8% rather than, say, 4% of GDP.

Second, the research shows correlations not causation.  So all we really know is that richer countries have more financial flows relative to GDP, not that more finance raises GDP in any linear fashion.  Attempts to dig into causation tend to show that financial development is not the bonanza that it is cracked up to be.

Third, we know finance can become “too big” relative to an economy.  Ask Iceland.

The work in this area is still at any early stage.  Given what we’ve seen over the past 12 months, which way should we lean: towards believing in the positive power of finance, until the opposite is proven; or towards being skeptical of finance in its modern form, until we see evidence that this actually makes sense?

Surely out skepticism should extend to financial innovation.  Show me the evidence that this kind of innovation really adds value, socially speaking – rather than providing a very modern way to extract amazing “rents”.

By Simon Johnson

Address of this post: http://baselinescenario.com/2009/09/01/the-nature-of-modern-finance/ (an experiment to help Kindle readers access the comments section more easily)

 

President Obama’s visit to Moscow this week may turn out to be a very good thing. Forget all this jibber-jabber about nuclear disarmament.

There is no better reminder than the former Soviet Union for how the fantasies of a few collectivist zealots can turn into unending nightmares for its people — and for how a state-run economy ends up with no economy at all.

If we’re lucky, a little Russian history on this trip will turn into a welcome wake-up call for Mr. Obama.

It’s not that Mr. Obama is some radical who carries a warm nostalgia for the Soviet Union from his university days. He’s way too young and too smart for that.

But the president believes in the state, certainly more than any other recent American president. He believes the state must actively intervene in the economy and that the state can bring about a better future. And it seems he believes it is his destiny to lead the state to that future.

In that way — and others — Obama reminds me of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state.

CNBC’s Jim Cramer made the Obama-Lenin comparison back in February. And the more I’ve thought about it, the more it holds.

lenin0706_E_20090706121627.jpgAssociated Press

A painting made during the Russian Revolution, showing Vladimir Lenin surrounded by revolutionaries, date unknown.

Of course, Obama is a reformer, not a revolutionary. And he’s certainly no communist.

But just like Lenin, Obama is a supremely self-confident leader — an intellectual heavyweight and a clever political tactician — an elitist moralizer and a populist champion. And just like Lenin, Obama carries the true-believers’ righteous fervor for “change.”

I was thinking of Lenin as I watched the president’s Rose Garden remarks on energy and innovation last Thursday.

After his eight minutes in front of the teleprompter, the president turned to walk away, and a reporter blurted out a question, “Mr. President, do you have a message for the small businesses on health and economy?”

The president should have just walked away. But it was as if he couldn’t stop himself as he launched into a rambling, haughty answer that I found…well, a bit scary.

It was scary because it demonstrated that Mr. Obama — almost half a year in office — still has no grasp of the everyday realities faced by America’s small businessmen. They can’t make payroll, but the president is directing them to buy LED lightbulbs and urging them to contact “clean energy” CEOs.

And it was scary because it showed that the president is still possessed by an unshakable conviction in the power of the state over the individual and of the future over the past.

As he put it in the Rose Garden, we have to change the health-care system. We have to change how we use energy. We have to change how we “train our young people.” “We are not folks who are scared of the future or look backwards. We always meet the challenges by moving forward.”

Political clichés? Of course.

But the president seems to actually believe his clichés. And some of his Rose Garden remarks could have been lifted from Lenin’s speeches circa 1918 – the same hectoring tone and the same mockery of opponents who long for the “status quo”.

Even Mr. Obama’s call to move “forward.” “Forward!” in fact was one of the Soviets’ favorite slogans.

The good news for those of us who are a little freaked out by Mr. Obama is that even Lenin did an about-face after the utter failure of his initial hard-left economic policies.

By early 1921, faced with the ruin and famine wrought by nationalization of the economy, the Bolsheviks re-instituted a quasi-capitalist economy with its New Economic Policy. Ironically, the NEP was aimed to help small businessmen — the very same people that the Obama economy so desperately needs nowadays.

Lenin called the NEP taking “one step backward to take two steps forward.” While he’s in Moscow, President Obama may want to ask someone at the Kremlin, just what Lenin meant by that.

Editor’s Note: Mr. Newmark was a student in Moscow in 1984, worked with George Soros on Russian economic reform in 1988-89 and ran the Goldman Sachs Moscow office from 1992-1994.

Why Barack Obama Is Like Vladimir Lenin – Evan Newmark, Deal Journal

 

Why inflation is around the corner

The government wants inflation to some degree. Congress and the White House have spent nearly $3 trillion recapitalizing U.S. banks, revamping the domestic manufacturing industry and replacing a portion of the consumption spending Americans have not been able to afford. The economy is recovering as a result, but U.S. debts are also ballooning. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office projects that the U.S. deficit will exceed $1.8 trillion this year.

The government doesn’t plan on paying off that debt or the interest on it without some help from the Fed. Earlier this year, the central bank announced it would directly purchase $1.75 trillion worth of U.S. debt in the form of mortgage-backed securities, U.S. Treasurys and agency debt. In essence, the Fed’s action “prints” more money and injects it into the economy.

Is Inflation Our Next Big Worry? – Catherine Holahan, MSN Money

 

Combine Japanese cultural tendencies toward formality, politesse, and indirection with the usual central banker’s love of opacity and econo-jargon, and you’d expect that a meeting with the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan would be a one-way trip into a cloud of vagueness. But in a meeting Monday, Kiyohiko Nishimura, Yale-trained economist, former Tokyo University professor and deputy governor of the Bank of Japan, gave one of the most lucid and useful explications of the credit crisis and its aftermath that I’ve heard– and I’ve heard a lot of them. And even more surprisingly, it was pretty optimistic.

A Japanese central banker is well situated to comment on the current global crisis, given Japan’s own sad history of dealing with the overhang of a credit/real estate bubble—or, more accurately, of not dealing with it. The government and private-sector’s uncertain policies condemned Japan to a traumatic lost decade of slow growth.

Nishimura shared a talk he’s been giving—including at a Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago conference in May—about the comparative post-bust experience of Japan in the 1990s and the U.S. today. It’s titled: “The Past Does Not Repeat Itself, But it Rhymes.” The rhyming can clearly be seen in a chart showing what he dubbed a “remarkable resemblance in developments between the U.S. crisis and Japan’s ‘lost decade.’”

The U.S. is experiencing what Japan did in the 1990s, but seven times faster.

U.S. Crisis is Like Japan’s, Only Seven Times Faster – D. Gross, Newsweek

 

Diane Francis, Financial Post Published: Monday, June 22, 2009

American opponents to President Barack Obama’s announced reregulation of the financial sector are billing the issue as capitalism versus socialism or even communism.

It is not the case. This is not the economic version of the Cold War, and the search for a new architecture does not mark the death of capitalism.

In fact, free enterprise was nearly murdered by Wall Street, AIG and other reckless financial institutions. They did not meet their defined responsibilities. They bent the law to bypass rules governing their behaviour. Many of them abandoned traditional banking and got into the gaming business. And they brought the world to the brink in the fall.

The role of government is appropriate in the financial sector because of its importance to sustaining a healthy capitalist system. Banks, brokers, insurers and others are licensed by the government to benefit society by being astute gatekeepers to success. They deploy their own capital and savings from the public honestly by investing in worthy individuals and entities that will create wealth, then repay their loans.

Government’s role is necessary because these institutions, in turn, exist as a result of deposits from the public and shareholders’ money. They have a fiduciary obligation to responsibly use other people’s money for the benefit of all. The rules dictate who, what and how they lend or insure, as well as how they leverage.

But what Wall Street and the others did was lend, or insure, obscene amounts of money to inappropriate entities for inappropriate reasons without any market discipline. There were no clearing houses for the trillions in derivatives they created, no markets for them, no pricing mechanisms, no leverage restrictions, no capital allocation and no transparency or proper accounting.

They were not players in a free-enterprise system, but were gamblers rigging the system for their own benefit.

America’s financial punters sank the legitimate and regulated credit system. They collected upfront fees and played fast and loose with credit instruments; witness estimates that the notional value of credit default swaps and other risky “derivatives” could total up to US$600-trillion, or 10 times the world’s GDP.

Last fall, Washington was told by AIG and Lehman Brothers that the world had gone bust. Thanks to trillions in bank bailouts, and shotgun marriages, total collapse was averted.

Months later, there are positive signs. Consumer confidence has a pulse, at long last, though this has yet to translate into spending. Some 53 million people have lost their jobs worldwide and governments are in hock to the tune of trillions. Innocent victims include the world’s poorest nations and their citizens, including those who ran their fiscal and monetary houses in a responsible way.

Wall Street’s recklessness, and in some instances criminality, has destroyed credit, which continues to afflict third-party, real-economy businesses from Detroit (which already had problems) to retailers and most others.

The fix will take years, require international co-operation and wasn’t the fault of government or the rest of us. So the next time some Wall Streeter or financial-sector apologist is blabbing about how reregulation will kill capitalism, just remember it was capitalists, so-called “champions” in pinstripes, who nearly destroyed free enterprise by driving it into a wall.

 

The blunt fact is that the economic recoveries that have been rapid and seen fast growth in employment are those that ended when a central bank, following strongly restrictionary policies to fight inflation, eased off and significantly lowered interest rates. No such lowering of interest rates is possible this time—interest rates are already as low as they can possibly go. So I can see no reason to anticipate a rapid recovery and rising employment when the cliff-diving stops. And I do not understand why the Obama administration is following policies that presume such a rapid recovery—a V rather than an L for the shape of the recession—is not just possible but probable.

How Far We’ve Come from Last December – Brad DeLong, Free Exchange

 

Last week, General Motors began the fourth largest bankruptcy proceedings in history, joining the many other large and venerable companies that have sunk to the bottom during this economic crisis. In fact, eight of the 20 largest bankruptcies have happened during the last two years of crisis. Our latest Transparency is a look at the biggest sinking ships in business history.

A collaboration between GOOD and Always With Honor.

Transparency: The 20 Largest Bankruptcies in History – Good Magazine

 

It’s one thing for President Obama to face off against Fox News, the right-wing radio empire and Republican congressional leaders whose names are unfamiliar to much of the public. It’s quite another to confront organized business.

That’s why last week’s announcement by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce of a new “Campaign for Free Enterprise” could be one of the year’s most consequential political developments. Now the real resistance to Obama begins.

As long as the global economy was crumbling, business held back and even welcomed the infusion of hundreds of billions of government dollars to prop up the system. Business leaders, like everyone else, were frightened to death. They welcomed Big Government’s exertions to keep the banks alive and gin up consumer purchasing power.

It is an odd tribute to the short-term success of Obama’s recovery effort that the business lobbies now feel free to return to the old-time religion of bashing government and singing the praises of the unfettered marketplace. You might expect the corporate guys to show a little gratitude to the government that bailed them out. But that’s never been their way. They’d rather pretend that the past nine months were a bad dream.

Thus the Chamber’s new offensive. In his statement announcing its campaign, chamber President Thomas J. Donohue tried to brush past the recent unpleasantness as quickly as possible.

Obama and the Politics of Short Memories – E.J. Dionne, Washington Post

 

President Obama has officially begun the era of bigger big government by proposing to go on a multitrillion dollar borrowing spree that risks doing to the “full faith and credit of the United States” what excessive borrowing during the housing bubble did to private credit.

Under his budget plan for America’s future, spending will average 23.7% of GDP for at least a decade (a whopping 20% higher than in 2000-08).

Near-record deficits increasing at record rates will push the public debt of the U.S. beyond the economy’s plausible capacity to pay — 70% of GDP by 2012, heading quickly to 82% of GDP in 2019 and on pace to be astronomically higher soon thereafter.

The Avalanche

American families over the last year have already lost 8% of their net worth — in part as a result of inept government meddling, past and present. For many of the same reasons, they are also buried under a mountain of mortgages and private-sector debts gone bad. On top of that, if the president has his way, they will soon be hit with more than a 100% increase in public debt (from $8 trillion this year to $17.3 trillion in 2019).

Furthermore, the Treasury (and taxpayers) will soon have to begin repaying to Social Security more than $5 trillion in payroll tax revenues that the government had taken from the trust fund and spent for earmarks and other purposes.

Even without the Obama surge in debt — and taxes to pay it off — taxpayers face the prospect of 60% to 70% income-tax rates in the future to pay for $48 trillion in unfunded liabilities under existing entitlement programs. Now the president plans to burden the economy’s limited taxpaying capacity with a universal health care entitlement.

Foreigners purchased two-thirds of the Treasury debt sold during 2004-08 — and now own 50% of U.S. public debt.

Scholars at the Peterson Institute for International Economics warn that the “net foreign debt” position of the U.S. is becoming unsustainable.

Even if the bond rating of Treasury obligations is not formally downgraded for risk, foreign investors may start to resist buying more U.S. debt and, if the situation gets worse, may start withdrawing from the U.S. economy the trillions of dollars of capital they have already lent us. Then what?

The current level of private saving in the U.S. is grossly insufficient to make up the shortfall. In fact, Washington is doing nearly everything possible to prevent Americans from adding to their savings.

In theory, the U.S. government can always pay its debts by increasing taxes, but the problem with taxes — and ultimately with big-spending government — is that tax increases harm the economy disproportionately and quickly reduce the economy’s taxpaying capacity.

Before she became the chairman of the president’s Council of Economic Advisors, Christina Romer demonstrated in a research paper prepared for the National Science Foundation in 2007 that it costs the private-sector economy $4 ($1 of tax and nearly $3 of economic damage) to provide the government with $1 to spend.

In a research paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research in 2006, former CEA Chairman Martin Feldstein concluded that the private-sector cost of an additional dollar of income-tax revenues for the government is $2.50 ($1 of tax and $1.50 of economic damage).

Paying off Obama’s 10-year string of deficits that add up to $9.3 trillion with income tax increases of $9.3 trillion over 10 years would cost the private sector $23 trillion (Feldstein) to $37 trillion (Romer).

In effect, American families would over time lose an amount greater than an entire year of GDP — a blow far more severe than the damage being done to them by the current recession.

Dubious Direction

It is irresponsible stewardship for Obama and Congress to go on a borrowing spree that puts America in the same unsustainable position as an overstretched boomer with too much debt and too little income and whose only option is to refinance at higher costs just to pay the interest.

The responsible alternative is for Washington to spend less — a lot less. Otherwise, the next Washington-created bubble to burst may be the full faith and credit of the United States.

Christian and Robbins are, respectively, the executive director and the chief economist of the Center for Strategic Tax Reform (cstr.org) in Washington, D.C.

Obama’s Plan For a Debt-Ridden Future – E. Christian & G. Robbins, IBD


 

Onetime presidential hopeful and current Republican congressman Ron Paul has an interesting piece of legislation wending its way through the US capitol. HR1206 calls for “a complete audit of the Federal Reserve and removes any significant barriers towards transparency in our monetary system” says Paul’s website.

This bill now has nearly 170 cosponsors, with support from both Republicans and Democrats.  Senator Bernie Sanders has introduced a companion bill in the Senate S 604, which will hopefully begin to gain momentum as well.  I am very encouraged to see so many of my colleagues in Congress stand with me for greater transparency in government.

Congressman Paul continues:

Fundamentally, you cannot defend the Federal Reserve and the free market at the same time.  The Fed negates the very foundation of a free market by artificially manipulating the price and supply of money – the lifeblood of the economy.  In a free market, interest rates, like the price of any other consumer good, are decentralized and set by the market.  The only legitimate, Constitutional role of government in monetary policy is to protect the integrity of the monetary unit and defend against counterfeiters.

And indeed, continues:

Instead, Congress has abdicated this responsibility to a cabal of elite, quasi-governmental banks who, instead of stabilizing the economy, have destabilized it.  It took less than two decades for the Federal Reserve to bring on the Great Depression of the 1930’s.   It has also inflated away the value of our currency by over 96 percent since its inception.  It has invisibly stolen from the poor and given to the rich through this controlled inflation, and now openly stolen through recent bank bailouts.  It has predictably exacerbated the very problems it was meant to solve.

All of which we’d have been quite likely to dismiss out of hand, were it not for its relevence in light of an excellent essay from historian Simon Schama in last weekend’s FT, on the central-bank hating tendencies of President Jackson, and more broadly, the long and rich seam of bankphobia than cleaves through American history:

Jackson, who was in the White House from 1829-1837, was a new brand of politician in American life. No one would confuse him with the Virginian gentlemen-planters who had dominated high office in the early republic. He had been Indian fighter, scourge of the British and darling of the frontier crowds. But what really got his dander up was the Bank of the United States, the institution granted the monopoly to print paper money. The “Monster”, he declared at the height of his presidential knock-down battle with its president Nicholas Biddle, “wants to kill me but I will kill it”.

And destroy the Bank of the United States Jackson did, vetoing the Senate’s renewal of its charter in 1832 and running for re-election as the champion of People v Monster. The result of the liquidation of monetary regulation was predictable: wildcat speculation. Two months after Jackson left office in March 1837, the second of the great American financial meltdowns was under way (the first was in 1819). Another swiftly followed in 1839 under the administration of Jackson’s hand-picked successor, Martin Van Buren. On the eve of the civil war, Jackson’s wish for monetary decentralisation had come true beyond his wildest dreams There were 7,000 local currencies circulating in the republic and an epidemic of counterfeiting. It took Lincoln’s Banking Act of 1862, born of a desperate need for dependable credit to fight the war, for a modicum of monetary order to be salvaged from what Biddle had accurately prophesied would be monetary anarchy.

Jackson tapped into a pulsing vein of American insecurity about the moral character of money.

In fact, in the unstable conditions of America in the 1830s, the paper of the Bank of the United States was by far the most dependable medium of transactions from Maine to Louisiana. But Jackson was convinced that unless the Bank perished, American democracy would always be infected by its machinations. What was at stake was the battle of rural and urban values for the economic soul of America. In some ways this was almost as momentous as the struggle between the slave south and the free north for it went to the heart of what America was supposed to be: a place where simplicity and transparency ruled in small moral communities, or a self-energising machine of unlimited economic growth and power: Field of Dreams or Citizen Kane?

Interesting times we live in.

America has a long tradition of central bank antagonism. (FT Alphaville)

 

This recession is now the worst since at least 1958, which is as far back as the index of coincident indicators stretches back.

The Conference Board reported today that the index, which is intended to measure how the economy is doing on an overall basis, slipped a little in April. The decline was smaller than in previous months, and two of the four indicators edged up, which could be taken as a sign that the economy is at least getting worse at a slower pace.

As I noted last month, the index was nearing the 5.6 percent decline that it experienced in the 1973-1975 recession. Now it is down 5.7 percent.

One way to put that into perspective is that the decline so far in this recession is more than the maximum falls combined in the two previous recessions, in the early 1990s and then in 2001.

“..the decline so far in this recession is more than the maximum falls combined in the two previous receptions, in the early 1990s and then in 2001.” (Floyd Norris)

 

The UK’s AAA-rating is at risk. (Bloomberg, MarketBeat, EconomPic Data, Zero Hedge)

Bye, bye miss american pie…..

Don’t wait…..buy Gold and Gold Mine Stocks!

 

A good article at Forbes:     http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/19/federal-reserve-ron-paul-fdic-sec-opinions-columnists-bernanke.html

 

From the Economist:

Birth Pains: A New Global System Is Coming

© 2012 New Jersey CFO Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha