Interview by Paul Smalera, senior editorApril 30, 2010: 3:21 PM ET
(Fortune) — At Tuesday’s epic Goldman Sachs hearing, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan led a public grilling of Wall Street not seen by a government panel since the Depression-investigating Pecora Commission. Fortune wanted to know what Levin thought of the answers he got from executives, including CEO Lloyd Blankfein, whether Goldman can save its reputation, and what his committee has learned from its hearings on the financial crisis.
It was surprising how much the Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500) executives talked. How did you get them to reveal what they did?
By confronting them with their own documents. A lot of time and work goes into getting huge amounts, literally millions, of documents … I think when people are confronted by their own documents by someone who’s really studied those documents; it’s easier to force them to respond.
They obviously were trying to delay and evade answering. We had a willingness to take them on and not let them talk forever, telling them, “Hey we’ll stay here all night if we have to, but we’re going to get the information we want.”
And when they did answer?
When they did answer, some people have asked me, “Were they telling you the truth?” The answer is yeah, and that’s what’s even more troubling than the evasions — they are defending what most people would say are indefensible actions. They shouldn’t be betting against what they’re selling at the same time they’re telling you: “Here, these are our securities, our names are on the prospectus.”
I think people think that someone selling something believes their product needs to succeed in some general way; that they want it to succeed. But [Goldman Sachs] are betting against [their product] and basically say they are going to profit from its failure. At that point, in most people’s minds, clearly in mine, there’s a conflict of interest. You’re betting against a product that you’re holding out to the public, by fair assumption, as a good product.
They were trying to turn this into, “We can’t guarantee that people are making money,” but that’s not the point. The point is that at the same time you’re holding this thing out as something that presumably you’d like to see provide something good for your customer, you’re betting against it and making a heck of a lot of money by its failure. And you’re not disclosing that.
To add insult to injury, in those emails that call it “junk” that they’re selling, “crap,” and I won’t get into the “shitty” word but anyway, that adds insult to injury. When you’re putting together a product, hold that out and then are betting against that same product, I think it’s a conflict and at minimum you have to tell people, not some boilerplate that you might be on the other side, but in clear language that you’re betting against [the security].
Regulators have taken a lot of blame for the crisis but doesn’t part of this come from the laws — or lack of laws — surrounding these activities? Goldman seemed to testify that its actions were unseemly but not illegal.
The reaction of one guy when I asked about his reaction to his emails was, “That shouldn’t have been in an email.” There are two different worlds here. My reaction was, “You shouldn’t believe that, you shouldn’t feel that.”
I could have understood the reaction [by Goldman] that they should not be selling stuff that they’re betting against and think is junk, but they don’t say that because they don’t believe it. They think they can do anything they want, that it’s a dog-eat-dog market and all these sophisticated buyers know they disagree. The sophisticated buyers see an AAA rating on something: they’re not then going to go into the 500 mortgages referred to in a synthetic CDO. There’s no way they can. They’re not the underwriter, they haven’t put it together Of course with Abacus, when you have the fact that [John Paulson]., who was betting against it, helped put the referenced mortgages together, that’s just a second insult.
It’s not just Wall Street, it’s upstream: We spent a long time getting into the Washington Mutual issue as an example of lenders putting together shoddy mortgages, securitizing them and getting them off their books. These are mortgages, which never should’ve been issued where the regulator failed to enforce the laws in this case.
The regulators pointed out things in emails and visits to the bank … but they never enforced it. There’s a failure to stop the abuses. Then you have credit rating agencies susceptible to pressure, acknowledge it in emails, and are involved in an inherent conflict of interest. They’re being pressured to put higher ratings on financial documents by the people who will benefit from those ratings and they’re being paid by those people. You have the problem of the person who pays the fiddler calling the tune.
Then you get down to Wall Street with their vacuuming up these securities and getting the risk off their books without disclosing it. It’s not limited to Wall Street’s unbridled greed, it comes all the way from upstream.
How Carl Levin Got Goldman Sachs’s Goat – Paul Smalera, Fortune
The rights of Irish sovereignty
Sovereignty is the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a geographic area, such as a territory.
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European Council
The European Council gives direction to the EU, and convenes at least four times a year. It comprises the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and one representative per member state; either its head of state or head of government. The European Council has been described by some as the Union’s “supreme political authority”.[58] It is actively involved in the negotiation of the treaty changes and defines the EU’s policy agenda and strategies.
The European Council uses its leadership role to sort out disputes between member states and the institutions, and to resolve political crises and disagreements over controversial issues and policies. It acts externally as a “collective Head of State” and ratifies important documents (e.g. international agreements and treaties).[59]
On 19 November 2009, Herman Van Rompuy was chosen as the first permanent President of the European Council. On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force and he assumed office. Ensuring the external representation of the EU,[60] driving consensus and settling divergences among members are tasks for the President both during the convocations of the European Council and in the time periods between them.
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The EU became illegitimate when it refused to accept the rejection of theEuropean Constitution by French and Dutch voters in 2005. There can be no justification for reviving the text as the Lisbon Treaty and ramming it through by parliamentary procedure without referenda, in what amounted to an authoritarian Putsch. (Yes, the national parliaments were themselves elected – so don’t write indignant comments pointing this out – but what was their motive for denying their own peoples a vote in this specific instance? Elected leaders can violate democracy as well. There was a corporal from Austria … but let’s not get into that).
Ireland was the one country forced to hold a vote by its constitutional court. When this lonely electorate also voted no, the EU again disregarded the result and intimidated Ireland into voting a second time to get it “right”.
This is the behaviour of a proto-Fascist organization, so if Ireland now – by historic irony, and in condign retribution – sets off the chain-reaction that destroys the eurozone and the European Union, it will be hard to resist the temptation of opening a bottle of Connemara whisky and enjoying the moment. But resist one must. The cataclysm will not be pretty.
The horrible truth starts to dawn on Europe’s leaders Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph