GROWING WORRIES IN ATHENS

A Greek Default Would Hit the ECB Hard

Hopes that Greece can be saved are dwindling. Athens had hoped to reach a deal with its creditors on a 50 percent debt haircut, but banks have now made it clear that efforts to reach an agreement could fail. Should the country go bankrupt, the European Central Bank stands to lose the most.


 

One of the things that I suspect has brought many of you to Naked Capitalism is the hard lesson that conventional wisdom in finance and economics has been very costly to ordinary citizens around the world. If you had believed the prevailing world view of early 2007, that markets were efficient and bad actors would of course be found out and shunned, that were were in the midst of a Great Moderation and could expect to enjoy continued prosperity, punctuated by shallow recessions, and that financial innovation was a boon and therefore to be encouraged, you had an ugly awakening. The global financial crisis imposed tremendous costs on investors and society at large, via unemployment, a housing bust, plunging tax revenues, cuts in government services and increasing political discord.

Yet no one in power before the crisis has been punished or even suffered much. In fact, 2009 and 2010 Wall Street bonuses exceeded the record levels of 2007. As former IMF chief economist Simon Johnson described in a May 2009 Atlantic article, the US instead suffered a quiet coup, with the top end of the financial services industry becoming more concentrated, more powerful, even more concentrated and more firmly in charge of the political apparatus.

Most of you understand this. It’s awfully hard not to notice that we have a two-tier system of justice, in which the major financial firms get to flout the law and violate their own contracts, yet are able to get their agreements enforced against seemingly everyone, from credit card, mortgage, and student debt borrowers to municipalities who entered into risk-laden swaps they didn’t understand to nations like Greece, where a clearly insolvent borrower cannot get a deep enough restructuring out of fear of triggering payouts on credit default swaps. But complexity, leverage, and opacity have been the big banks’ best friends in executing this program of looting. You’ve come here to get educated so you won’t be so easily taken next time.

So the lies that the elite financiers have peddled appeared to be free, when in fact, many of them were sold via clever messaging and lobbying.
Read the Rest…

At Naked Capitalism

 

  • Summer Rerun: Geithner Plan Smackdown Wrap – 08/21/2011 – Yves Smith
  •  

    How can so many Americans believe that we’re in a depression, when the stock market and commodity prices have been booming?
    Read the Rest…

     

    The Nobel Prize committee has never withdrawn a prize. It might want to consider it. In Tuesday’s New York Times, prizewinner in economics, Paul Krugman reveals either that he knows nothing about economics…or that there is nothing worth knowing in it. We’re beginning to think it’s the latter.

    “From an economic point of view,” he writes, “World War II was, above all, a burst of deficit-financed government spending, on a scale that would never have been approved otherwise. Deficit spending created an economic boom – and the boom laid the foundation for long-run prosperity….”

    In the 1938 US elections, voters showed what they thought of the New Deal; Democrats lost 70 seats in the House. Then as now, the public had lost faith in public spending, says Krugman. Nearly two out of three of those polled said they were opposed to stimulus efforts. Roosevelt buckled under the pressure; he drew back from further spending to fight the slump.

    Thank God for WWII! No one opposes military spending in time of war. Krugman made his position clear in 2008 in his New York Times blog.

    “The fact is that war is, in general, expansionary for the economy, at least in the short run. World War II, remember, ended the Great Depression.”

    According to this line of thinking, the best form of stimulus spending is money spent on the military. It creates consumer demand without creating consumer supply. Consumer prices rise; people spend. The slump is soon over.

    But if WWII helped the US economy, think what it must have done for Japan; proportionally, its stimulus efforts dwarfed those of the US…and began much earlier. Just this week, Ichiro Ozawa, running for prime minister of Japan, vowed to take “every measure” to lower the yen and promised a stimulus package more than twice as big as the current program. He was just following in the footsteps of Japan’s leaders from the ’30s. It was “economic security” they said they were after. And they thought they could get it by central planning and government spending. Military spending rose from 31% of the budget in the early ’30s to nearly 50% five years later. By the early ’40s it was around 70% and nearly 100% later on. Deficits and debt soared.

    Did that create a boom? You bet it did. Japan was the first nation to get out of the global slump. It boomed…and boomed…and ka-boomed. When it came to warships, planes, and soldiers, Japan was soon among the richest nations in the world. Yes, Americans had more electric fans, automobiles, central heating, aspirin, ice cream, and the rest of the paraphernalia of civilized life at the time. In the mid-’30s, the US produced 40 times as many autos per person as did Japan. Even during the Great Depression, the US out-produced Japan by a factor of 7 and its workers earned 10-times as much money.

    Economists can’t even measure real prosperity, let alone fiddle it. So they put on the GDP and employment numbers the way a bald man puts on a cheap wig. It makes him look ridiculous and fraudulent, but it’s the best he can do. Unemployment disappears in a war economy. Japan put a million men in uniform. Two million more were part-time reservists. Those who weren’t in the army were put to work building tanks and planes. By 1941, Japan could produce 10,000 planes a year. If you were a swallow you wouldn’t want to build your nest in Japan’s factory chimneys; they belched smoke night and day.

    And talk about fiscal stimulus! Krugman would have loved it – stimulus unfettered by real money or even a casual regard for real prosperity. Takahashi Korekiyo was known as the “Japanese Keynes.” Gillian Tett notes in The Financial Times that he was assassinated in 1936 after he came to his senses and tried to bring state finances under control. He was done in by army officers who did not want the stimulus to stop. Not that we’re being judgmental about it. As far as we know, the quality of central banking could probably be improved by an occasional assassination.

    Takahashi wasn’t the first. Before him Junnosuke Inoue had held out for the gold standard and balanced budgets. He was out of office by 1931 and out of luck in 1932, when he was murdered. The gold-backed yen was abolished the day he left office. Then, public spending, deficits, central planning, debt, and inflation ran wild. By 1939, the Japanese were spending $5 million a day on their war with China – a huge sum for the Japanese at the time.

    Was the economy improved by all this spending? No, it was perverted…hammered into a grotesque imposter – a parody of a real economy. Most of the nation’s resources were put to work building things almost no one wanted. Then, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the stimulus efforts were redoubled. Rations were reduced further. Working hours were extended. What few consumer items were available were three times as expensive at the end of the war as they had been when it began. Men were conscripted into factories and the army. Women were expected not only to make the tanks, but to join the home-guard and prepare themselves to repulse the American invaders with sharpened bamboo sticks. What a marvelous economy – operating at full capacity and full employment until General MacArthur finally put it out of its misery.

    You say Obama; I say Ozawa! You say boom; I say ka-boom!

     

    In every recession over the last three decades, it has been America’s small businesses — those Lilliputian companies with fewer than 100 employees — that stepped forward, began hiring and pulled the country out of the mire.

    Not this time.

    Small firms are on the sidelines, and it’s not just because of tight credit from the financial meltdown, as the Obama administration and others have been saying.

    Rather, a host of factors — some well-recognized and others seemingly unnoticed in the national debate over economic policy — are converging to restrain small-business owners from hiring.

    Among them:

    Near-stagnant demand for goods and services as a result of consumers’ reluctance to return to their free-spending ways.

    A disturbing falloff in the creation of new small businesses.

    The devastation of the real estate market.

    Uncertainty about the economic outlook at home and abroad.

    “Small businesses are not hiring, and until then, we will not have a strong, sufficient recovery,” said Rep. Daniel Lipinski (D-Ill.), a member of the House Committee on Small Business. “I think this is why the economic recovery is moving very slowly.”

    It’s a historical change of major proportions. In each of the previous three economic recoveries, small employers accounted for the vast majority of new jobs — the bulk of them coming from firms with fewer than 20 workers, according to Census Bureau data.

    Small business sidelined in slow economic recovery Los Angeles Times.

    +++

    Just image if the illuminati geniuses in Washington had infused 700B directly into the Main Street economy instead of the non-productive, currently lifeless parasites, I mean financial community, to engorge themselves at taxpayer expense! Now the Obama OMG magic factory wants you and me to promote “austerity” through higher taxes and reduced services. -BJS

     

    carl_levin.bl.top.jpg Interview by Paul Smalera, senior editor

    (Fortune) — At Tuesday’s epic Goldman Sachs hearing, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan led a public grilling of Wall Street not seen by a government panel since the Depression-investigating Pecora Commission. Fortune wanted to know what Levin thought of the answers he got from executives, including CEO Lloyd Blankfein, whether Goldman can save its reputation, and what his committee has learned from its hearings on the financial crisis.

    It was surprising how much the Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500) executives talked. How did you get them to reveal what they did?

    By confronting them with their own documents. A lot of time and work goes into getting huge amounts, literally millions, of documents … I think when people are confronted by their own documents by someone who’s really studied those documents; it’s easier to force them to respond.

    They obviously were trying to delay and evade answering. We had a willingness to take them on and not let them talk forever, telling them, “Hey we’ll stay here all night if we have to, but we’re going to get the information we want.”

    And when they did answer?

    When they did answer, some people have asked me, “Were they telling you the truth?” The answer is yeah, and that’s what’s even more troubling than the evasions — they are defending what most people would say are indefensible actions. They shouldn’t be betting against what they’re selling at the same time they’re telling you: “Here, these are our securities, our names are on the prospectus.”

    I think people think that someone selling something believes their product needs to succeed in some general way; that they want it to succeed. But [Goldman Sachs] are betting against [their product] and basically say they are going to profit from its failure. At that point, in most people’s minds, clearly in mine, there’s a conflict of interest. You’re betting against a product that you’re holding out to the public, by fair assumption, as a good product.

    They were trying to turn this into, “We can’t guarantee that people are making money,” but that’s not the point. The point is that at the same time you’re holding this thing out as something that presumably you’d like to see provide something good for your customer, you’re betting against it and making a heck of a lot of money by its failure. And you’re not disclosing that.

    To add insult to injury, in those emails that call it “junk” that they’re selling, “crap,” and I won’t get into the “shitty” word but anyway, that adds insult to injury. When you’re putting together a product, hold that out and then are betting against that same product, I think it’s a conflict and at minimum you have to tell people, not some boilerplate that you might be on the other side, but in clear language that you’re betting against [the security].

    Regulators have taken a lot of blame for the crisis but doesn’t part of this come from the laws — or lack of laws — surrounding these activities? Goldman seemed to testify that its actions were unseemly but not illegal.

    The reaction of one guy when I asked about his reaction to his emails was, “That shouldn’t have been in an email.” There are two different worlds here. My reaction was, “You shouldn’t believe that, you shouldn’t feel that.”

    I could have understood the reaction [by Goldman] that they should not be selling stuff that they’re betting against and think is junk, but they don’t say that because they don’t believe it. They think they can do anything they want, that it’s a dog-eat-dog market and all these sophisticated buyers know they disagree. The sophisticated buyers see an AAA rating on something: they’re not then going to go into the 500 mortgages referred to in a synthetic CDO. There’s no way they can. They’re not the underwriter, they haven’t put it together Of course with Abacus, when you have the fact that [John Paulson]., who was betting against it, helped put the referenced mortgages together, that’s just a second insult.
    It’s not just Wall Street, it’s upstream: We spent a long time getting into the Washington Mutual issue as an example of lenders putting together shoddy mortgages, securitizing them and getting them off their books. These are mortgages, which never should’ve been issued where the regulator failed to enforce the laws in this case.

    The regulators pointed out things in emails and visits to the bank … but they never enforced it. There’s a failure to stop the abuses. Then you have credit rating agencies susceptible to pressure, acknowledge it in emails, and are involved in an inherent conflict of interest. They’re being pressured to put higher ratings on financial documents by the people who will benefit from those ratings and they’re being paid by those people. You have the problem of the person who pays the fiddler calling the tune.

    Then you get down to Wall Street with their vacuuming up these securities and getting the risk off their books without disclosing it. It’s not limited to Wall Street’s unbridled greed, it comes all the way from upstream.

    How Carl Levin Got Goldman Sachs’s Goat – Paul Smalera, Fortune

     

    Washington’s Blog

    Greenspan’s big defense is that the financial crisis was caused by a “once-in-a-century” event.

    Forget about the fact that the “once-in-a-century event” couldn’t have happened if Greenspan’s Fed hadn’t:

    • Acted as cheerleader in chief for unregulated use of derivatives at least as far back as 1999 (see this and this)
    • Allowed the giant banks to grow into mega-banks. For example, Citigroup’s former chief executive says that when Citigroup was formed in 1998 out of the merger of banking and insurance giants, Greenspan told him, “I have nothing against size. It doesn’t bother me at all”
    • Preached that a new bubble be blown every time the last one bursts
    • Kept interest rates too low
    • And did alot of other hinky things

    More importantly, as Nassim Taleb repeatedly points out, financial experts who don’t plan for rare events are like pilots who don’t know about storms.

    There are storms out there, Taleb says, and any pilot who doesn’t know how to deal with storms shouldn’t be flying. Similarly, no one should be in a position of financial leadership if they don’t know about – and plan for – the infrequent event:

    Greenspan: The Financial Crisis Was Caused By A ‘Once-In-A-Century’ Event • Taleb: Any Pilot Who Doesn’t Know About Storms Shouldn’t Be In the Cockpit

    Sic transit America?

     A Growing List Of One Term Presidents, A State of Distress, A Time To Repent, AIG and all that....., “the Greenspan doctrine”, Back to the basics, Collateral Damage, Coming Social Unrest, Commercial Real Estate Bust, Consumption Ran the Old Economy, Coup d'etat in America, Death of the Dollar, Deflation-Inflation-Stagflation, Devaluation, Dismal Science-Ignorant Scientists?, Even the Terminator Can't Help California, Federal Reserve-Discussion, Figures don't lie but Liars can figure, Integrity and Responsibility, Is The Market Rally Real?, It Is Nice To Be Part of the Elite!, It starts with a foundation, IT'S ALL ABOUT POWER AND MONEY, Monetary Policy - Discussion, Our phony middle class, Patience is a virtue...Delusion is a vice, Political Chaos, Politicians, Prostitutes and Pimps All Rhyme, Small Business-Bedrock of America, Sub-Prime anytime, TARP fruit loops, The Arrogance of Power, The Consequences of Greed, The Democrats Blew It Again, The End of American Capitalism As We Know It? - Discuss, The excellent adventures of Ben Bernanke, The Financial Elite, The Global Economy, The Habits of Hedge Funds, The Importance of Strategic Planning, The Inherent Disorder of Empires, The Intrusion of UNLAWFUL Authority, The Judeo-Christian Political Coalition, The New American Socialism, The Sorry State Of American Manufacturing, Time For A New Third Party, Truth In Charity, Unemployment Catastrophe, US Trade Imbalance, USA Is the New Japan, We Are All Cooked, We Are All Guilty, We Have Become Beggars To The World  No Responses »
    Jan 162010
     
    An American sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington
    Flagging: a US sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington

    If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is starting to look like an age in geopolitics. Comparing the America that began the 21st century with the America of today is to witness a country that has in some ways quite radically altered its view of itself and its relationship to the world.

    In short, the metallic rust of decline has crept into the American soul. “You could argue that the first decade of the 21st century was the last decade of the American century,” says David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and student of US foreign policy. “We are now entering the multipolar century.”

    Self-doubt tarnishes Brand America

     

    One of the federal government’s most opaque methods for bailing out the banking system allowed a handful of giant institutions to save up to $25 billion on their borrowing costs, a Congressional panel estimated on Friday.

    Seven companies received about 82 percent of those benefits, the panel estimated. General Electric Capital was able to reduce its borrowing costs by about $1.9 billion, while Goldman Sachs saved an estimated $606 million. The other big beneficiaries were Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo & Company.

    The savings came in the form of federal guarantees on more than $300 billion of bonds issued by banks and other financial institutions, and they were merely one component of a $4.3 trillion safety net of guarantees orchestrated last year by the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

    In one of the first systematic efforts to analyze the maze of guarantees and hidden subsidies, the Congressional panel that oversees the Treasury’s $700 billion rescue program said the guarantees had provided a cheap but risky tactic for fighting the financial crisis last year.

    The good news for taxpayers, the panel said, is that the government has actually turned a profit thus far on the guarantees. The government has collected $9 billion in fees for guaranteeing bonds issued by the big financial institutions and a total of $17 billion in fees for all its emergency guarantees. Thus far, it has lost only about $2 million.

    At the height of the financial crisis late last year, the government provided guarantees to financial institutions, from money-market funds to expanded deposit-insurance for banks and $300 billion in troubled assets held by Citigroup. By providing guarantees instead of direct loans, the Treasury could avoid spending money upfront.

    But Elizabeth Warren, director of the oversight panel, warned that the guarantees also exposed taxpayers to potentially huge costs and had created new risks by encouraging financial institutions to count on future bailouts and take bigger risks.

    “The guarantees, when they work, provide big market stability at very low cost,” Ms. Warren said. “But they come with a very high risk to the taxpayer and a powerful distortion of market pricing and moral hazard.”

    The panel’s most striking finding was about the size of the effective subsidy that G.E. Capital and Wall Street giants like Goldman reaped in the form of below-market borrowing costs.

    The panel estimated that the federal guarantees lowered those firms’ borrowing costs by about 39 percent. Using two different approaches to measure the value of the subsidy, the panel said the savings ranged from $12.8 billion to $25 billion.

    The oversight panel said it found “no significant flaws” in how Treasury officials and banking regulators designed the guarantees. But Ms. Warren warned that they were a “dangerous tool,” adding that “next time we may not be so lucky.”

    Big Breaks for Companies in Bailout’s Fine Print – New York Times

     

    I think Calvin Trillin–or at least his bar-room companion–is really on to something here:

    “The financial system nearly collapsed,” he said, “because smart guys had started working on Wall Street.” …

    I reflected on my own college class, of roughly the same era. The top student had been appointed a federal appeals court judge — earning, by Wall Street standards, tip money. A lot of the people with similarly impressive academic records became professors. I could picture the future titans of Wall Street dozing in the back rows of some gut course like Geology 101, popularly known as Rocks for Jocks. …

    “Two things happened. One is that the amount of money that could be made on Wall Street with hedge fund and private equity operations became just mind-blowing. At the same time, college was getting so expensive that people from reasonably prosperous families were graduating with huge debts. So even the smart guys went to Wall Street, maybe telling themselves that in a few years they’d have so much money they could then become professors or legal-services lawyers or whatever they’d wanted to be in the first place. That’s when you started reading stories about the percentage of the graduating class of Harvard College who planned to go into the financial industry or go to business school so they could then go into the financial industry. That’s when you started reading about these geniuses from M.I.T. and Caltech who instead of going to graduate school in physics went to Wall Street to calculate arbitrage odds.”

    I’d put it just slightly differently (and I realize Trillin is only about three-quarters serious): The key change on Wall Street was more sociological than intellectual. That is, it wasn’t so much that the smart guys went to Wall Street–though the intellectual caliber of the financial sector certainly increased with all those quants running around. The relevant change was that a lot of “outsiders” suddenly came to Wall Street, which had previously been dominated by insiders.

    Was Wall Street Safer in the Hands of Stodgy WASPs? Noam Scheiber

     

    Strategerizing: Military intellectuals envision a 50-year “Long War” against al Qaeda consisting of counterinsurgency operations spanning Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and beyond, Tom Hayden discusses in The Nation. “Comparing al Qaeda in AfPak to al Qaeda in Iraq . . . illustrates both the pros and cons of building U.S. strategy in South Asia around a counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan,” Brian Fishman suggests in Foreign Policy. If Obama submits to Veep Joe Biden’s campaign to shift the focus from the Taliban in Afghanistan to al Qaeda in Pakistan, “as I suspect he will, is there any reason to think America won’t simply preside over the rebirth of al Qaeda? Probably not,” Thomas P.M. Barnett blogs for Esquire Magazine. “Al Qaeda is implementing its game plan in the South Asian war theater as a part of its broader campaign against American global hegemony that began with [9/11],” the organization’s “guerilla chief” tells Asia Times.

     

    An Inside Look at How Goldman Sachs Lobbies the Senate, by Matt Taibbi: …Later on this week I have a story coming out in Rolling Stone that looks at the history of the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapses. The story ends up being more about naked short-selling and the role it played in those incidents than I had originally planned…, but it turns out that there’s no way to talk about Bear and Lehman without going into the weeds of naked short-selling…

    It’s the conspicuousness … that is the issue here, and the degree to which the SEC and the other financial regulators have proven themselves completely incapable of addressing the issue seriously, constantly giving in to the demands of the major banks to pare back (or shelf altogether) planned regulatory actions. There probably isn’t a better example of “regulatory capture” … than this issue.

    In that vein, starting tomorrow, the SEC is holding a public “round table” on the naked short-selling issue. What’s interesting about this round table is that virtually none of the invited speakers represent shareholders or companies that might be targets of naked short-selling, or indeed any activists of any kind in favor of tougher rules against the practice. Instead, all of the invitees are either banks, financial firms, or companies that sell stuff to the first two groups.

    In particular, there are very few panelists — in fact only one, from what I understand — who are in favor of a simple reform called “pre-borrowing.” Pre-borrowing is what it sounds like; it forces short-sellers to actually possess shares before they sell them.

    It’s been proven to work, as last summer the SEC, concerned about predatory naked short-selling of big companies in the wake of the Bear Stearns wipeout, instituted a temporary pre-borrow requirement…

    The lack of pre-borrow voices invited to this panel is analogous to the Max Baucus health care round table last spring, when no single-payer advocates were invited. So who will get to speak? Two guys from Goldman Sachs, plus reps from Citigroup, Citadel (a hedge fund that has done the occasional short sale, to put it gently), Credit Suisse, NYSE Euronext, and so on.

    In advance of this panel and in advance of proposed changes to the financial regulatory system, these players have been stepping up their lobbying efforts… Goldman Sachs in particular has been making its presence felt.

    Last Friday I got a call from a Senate staffer who said that Goldman had just been in his boss’s office, lobbying against restrictions on naked short-selling. The aide said Goldman had passed out a fact sheet about the issue that was so ridiculous that one of the other staffers immediately thought to send it to me. When I went to actually get the document, though, the aide had had a change of heart.

    Which was weird, and I thought the matter had ended there. But the exact same situation then repeated itself with another congressional staffer, who then actually passed me Goldman’s fact sheet.

    Now, the mere fact that two different congressional aides were so disgusted by Goldman’s performance that they both called me on the same day — and I don’t have a relationship with either of these people — tells you how nauseated they were.

    I would later hear that Senate aides between themselves had discussed Goldman’s lobbying efforts and concluded that it was one of the most shameless performances they’d ever seen from any group of lobbyists, and that the “fact sheet” … was, to quote one person familiar with the situation, “disgraceful” and “hilarious.” …

     

    The consumer retreats

    The world economy entered the current crisis in a badly lopsided condition, with the American consumer borrowing massively to buy products from Chinese and European manufacturers who happily socked away all their extra cash while producing more than their home markets could absorb. Now, pressed by rising unemployment and the need to rebuild shrunken household wealth, the American shopper is tapped out.

    The consumer’s retreat is making itself felt around the world. The first six months of this year, Americans bought $18 billion fewer German-made goods than during the same period in 2008. For German factories, that meant the loss of more than 35% of their U.S. orders. It was the same story for Japan, which saw $31 billion worth of sales vanish — 42% of its total.

    Major auto-producing countries weren’t the only ones to feel the chill. Chinese factories shipped almost $21 billion fewer goods to the U.S. during the first half of this year than during the same period last year. And with consumers still confronting several years of paying down debt and repairing their balance sheets, many economists say the world confronts a permanent shift in economic drivers.

    “The world is going to be adjusting for years to slow growth from the U.S. consumer,” says economist Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University. “The U.S. consumer has been the engine of world growth for the last quarter century; that engine has stalled.”

    Not everyone agrees. Christian Broda, head of international economic research for Barclays Capital, says the world may be headed for slower growth, but that doesn’t mean no growth. Substantial monetary and fiscal easing that has been put in place has yet to make itself felt. As it does, growth will improve. Stories of a complete change in Americans’ behavior, he says, have been overdone.

    “Savings will go up, but these processes will take years. …You won’t rebuild your wealth in a year,” he says.

    Something has to give

    Rather than seeking to restart the same engine in the same way, U.S. policymakers say, they want to construct a more durable economic foundation. Lawrence Summers, head of the president’s National Economic Council, said last month that the U.S. economy “must be more export-oriented and less consumption-oriented” as it emerges from the crisis.

    That’s a sensible goal, but unfortunately, the U.S. isn’t alone in embracing it. German Chancellor Angela Merkel says there is “no alternative” to continuing her country’s longstanding reliance upon exports rather than boosting demand at home. Japan, too, shows no signs of making a fundamental shift. And Chinese officials, while acknowledging a desire to promote greater domestic consumption in the long run, are wary of moving too quickly for fear of killing jobs in their export factories.

    “The world can’t cope with the U.S. and China both acting like China,” Magnus says. “What’s going to give?”

    That’s not clear. Chinese consumption could accelerate faster than expected, though there’s no sign that is imminent. Through July, Chinese savings deposits rose at an annual rate of 29%, vs. 11.3% in the same period in 2008, according to DBS Group Research in Singapore. Alternatively, China might continue binging on investment. But that’s only a short-run fix, which would ultimately swell both production capacity and inventories, depressing global prices. Or the world recovery could limp along at an especially anemic pace for years.

    The difficulties in achieving the sort of global rebalancing required are evident in the U.S.-China relationship. U.S. exports in June ticked up for the second-consecutive month, but by a modest 2.2% from the month before. And the value of total shipments remains deeply depressed compared with the year-ago period.

    Rising exports, aided by the slumping dollar, have whittled away at the U.S. trade deficit. China’s corresponding trade surplus also is shrinking, but bigger reductions depend on getting Chinese consumers to buy more.

    Chinese household consumption is among the lowest in the world, amounting to roughly 35% of economic output, vs. nearly 70% in the U.S. Chinese consumers save rather than spend, in part, to guard against unexpected medical expenses in a country that lacks a health insurance system.

    Until China can put in place a national health care system, household consumption is unlikely to rise. “We need to be aware of the difficulties and should not be over-idealistic,” central banker Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the People’s Bank of China, said in a July 3 speech.

    But reorienting China’s producers to serve local consumers rather than distant markets also would require far-reaching changes in several other national policies. An undervalued currency, rock-bottom interest rates set by government fiat and a lack of labor rights all effectively subsidize producers at the expense of consumers.

    “There’s a whole bunch of policies that constrain consumption and boost production,” says Pettis, a former investment banker.

    Quarterbacks Abound: Exports Can’t Fuel Global Recovery – USA Today

     

    Socialism in America

    A great deal has been made in recent weeks about Ronald Reagan‘s critique of nationalized or socialized health care from 1961: We can go back a bit further, though, and take a look at an intriguing piece from 1848, a dialogue on socialism and the French Revolution and the relationship of socialism to democracy, which includes Alexis de Tocqueville‘s critique of socialism in general…

     

    Walking Away When You Can Pay By Kelsey VanOverloop

    Homeowners are turning to the “strategic default” — walking away from a mortgage even when there are funds available to keep paying. “Increasingly, the determination of when to default is not guided by the moral question: Is this the right thing to do? It is guided by the pragmatic concern: Am I too far underwater on my mortgage?” writes Kelsey VanOverloop. Read more »

     

    Jamie Dimon has won big.  JP Morgan Chase now stands alone, both in financial position and political clout – including special access to the White House and, as explained in today’s NYT, Rahm Emanuel’s likely attendance at his next board meeting tomorrow.

    Dimon’s semiotics have been brilliant throughout the crisis – it wasn’t his fault, he was forced to take TARP money, and – in phrasing that will make the history books – bankers should not be “vilified”.  But now he has a problem.

    Larry Summers forcefully stated Friday that high recent profit levels for big banks (i.e., JPMorgan and Goldman) are based on the support they received and still receive from the government (listen to his answer to the second question, from about the 6:10 to 10:30 mark).  At that level of generality, in a period of financial stabilization and consequent reduction in executive branch discretion, this statement does not threaten Dimon or anyone else.

    And Summers’ statement on the dangers of “too big to fail” was “too vague to succeed”.  Dimon saw this one coming and is very much aligned with Tim Geithner on the technocratic fixes that will supposedly take care of this – the mythical “resolution authority”, which will not actually achieve anything because it has no cross-border component, so the next time a major multinational bank (e.g., JP Morgan) fails, the choice again will be “collapse or bailout” (as Summers put it in the same Q&A Friday).  Yes, I know the G20 is supposedly working on this; no, I don’t think they are making progress.

    But Summers also drew a line in the sand on consumer protection.

    Reformists within the administration really need a new consumer protection agency for financial products – there is little else they will be able to point to as an achievement on banking issues.  Summers did not, for example, on Friday even mention the need for stronger regulation over derivatives; Dimon has likely already prevailed on this.

    Consumer protection is easy for people to understand.  If the banking lobby really defeats or defangs it this year – as it almost certainly can – won’t that make meaningful re-regulation of banking a big issue for the midterm elections in 2010 and beyond?

    And does Dimon really want to publicly confront and defeat Larry Summers?

    It must be tempting for Dimon to now press home his advantage, including at the White House.  But as JP Morgan Chase stands alone at the top of our banking hierarchy, how far should he push his luck?

    Summers has an unparalleled ability to move the consensus.  And if he is now running from the left to become chair of the Fed – which was my impression on Friday – this will shift all candidates, including Ben Bernanke, towards being tougher on banks.

    Why doesn’t Dimon instead seize on greater consumer protection as a way to rebuld legitimacy for finance – and to shape the new rules so as to create barriers to entry and growth for future rivals?

    What would John Pierpont Morgan have done?

    Jamie Dimon vs. Larry Summers – Simon Johnson, Baseline Scenario


     

    The death of Robert McNamara has confronted the architects of another massive national catastrophe with a challenge: Will they, like McNamara in his post-Vietnam agony, acknowledge their failings and confess the error of their ways? Will they come up with a list, as McNamara did, of what to do differently next time?

    There has already been speculation aplenty about whether Donald Rumsfeld will ever reassess his performance in the Iraq war. But I’m not thinking about Rumsfeld or the other men who brought us the war in Iraq. I have in mind the architects — every bit as cerebral and self-certain as McNamara — of the financial world that imploded last year. The real latter-day McNamara may not be Rumsfeld but Robert Rubin, Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton.

    In fact, the similarities between the men who crafted the Iraq war and the men who crafted Vietnam aren’t that strong. McNamara’s hubris was that of a hyper-rationalist. He and his whiz kids, his systems analysts and efficiency experts, stormed into an intellectually sleepy capital determined to subject what had been the haphazard realm of policy to scientific measurement. The Air Force flyboys may have wanted to bomb the bejesus out of the commies, but McNamara’s boys could tell you precisely what tonnage would destroy precisely what industrial capacity. Victory was just an equation or two away.

    The hubris of the late and unlamented Bush presidency was of a different order. If it was McNamara’s math that made it hard for him to grasp how a peasant army could resist half a million American troops, it was a simple refusal to take seriously the utterly predictable consequences that Saddam Hussein’s removal would have on a fractured Iraq that led Bush and his crew to plunge us, and Iraq, into a needless war. As once the hyper-rationalists had failed to factor for human complexity, so too, four decades later, did the ideologues who disdained the reality-based community do the same. Brought low by the hubris of the brilliant, we were brought low again by the hubris of fools.

    Our time is no stranger to the hubris of the brilliant, though. To find it, we need to look not to Washington but to Wall Street. The real successors to McNamara’s whiz kids are the economic geniuses, the “quants,” who figured out how to build a tower of investment on a dot of assets, arbitrage everything, and hedge any risk, except, of course, the ones that plunged us into a depression.

    The devastation they wrought may not have reached the level of the Vietnam War, which embittered this nation for decades and cost the lives of tens of thousands of Americans and many times more Vietnamese. But considering that they were merely economists, bankers and their ideologues, the damage is impressive enough. It’s not just the millions of jobs lost, the retirement savings wiped out, the homes foreclosed on. It’s also the offshoring of American manufacturing and the concomitant creation of mountains of consumer debt (which the American people owed to Wall Street) so that their compatriots could continue to consume even though their incomes had stagnated. It’s the transformation of a nation that once invested in productive enterprise into a nation sustained by asset bubbles.

    Will the creators of this crisis wander through an intellectual and moral desert as McNamara did for decades? As yet, the mea culpas have been few and, like McNamara’s, incomplete. Alan Greenspan did admit to a congressional committee that his belief in the rational behavior of financial institutions had been shattered. But the confessions of failure and assumptions of responsibility from Chicago School economists, leading Wall Street bankers and lax governmental regulators, all of whom assured us that the very profitable financial vehicles they had devised also reduced the risk to the rest of us, are almost nowhere to be found.

    If there’s an analogous figure to McNamara in this mess, then, it’s probably Rubin — socially liberal, like McNamara; concerned with the world’s poor, like McNamara; architect, like McNamara, of a system perfected by the best minds of his time, a system that should have worked but that failed catastrophically. Rubin’s repentance is a private matter, but the lessons that his protégés Larry Summers and Tim Geithner derive from the failure of deregulated hypercapitalism are of the utmost public concern. Whiz kids themselves, do they still believe in the capacity of their fellow whizzes to concoct financial devices so mathematically sound that strong regulation would be superfluous? Their reluctance to tightly regulate credit-default swaps suggests that they haven’t really been disenthralled of their faith in self-regulating markets. If we’re lucky, the image of Bob McNamara calculating the war on his slide rule, and spending the subsequent decades trying to understand where he went wrong, may bring them to their senses. It certainly should do that for us.

    meyersonh@washpost.com

    Is Robert Rubin Today’s McNamara? – Harold Meyerson, Washington Post

     

    Returning from China last month, U.S. Congressman Mark Kirk had a bearish take on a high-level visit by American officials.

    Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner claimed the U.S.’s biggest creditor voiced great confidence in its debt. Kirk, an Illinois Republican, came back with the opposite impression.

    “China is beginning to cancel Congress’s credit card,” he told Fox News on June 10. It “doesn’t want to lend much more money to the United States and especially is worried about the Fed’s policy of printing money to buy new debt.”

    A month later, there’s no doubt about whose assessment was more accurate. Chinese leaders are clearly very concerned about the dollar. How they will react is a key question hanging over markets, and it’s time to take the discussion to the next level.

    Everyone knows China wants to reduce its dollar holdings. Little is known about how that process may unfold and how much work and preparation needs to go into it. Lots, in fact.

    Think of China and the U.S. in history’s most expensive divorce. The two economies total $17 trillion of output, and polls in China show little support for adding to almost $800 billion of U.S. Treasuries.

    This argument can be broadened to the rest of Asia. The idea that China or Japan — with $686 billion of Treasuries — can just start selling massive blocks of dollars is ridiculous. It would devastate markets the world over and the fallout would boomerang back on Asia. If you think markets are shaky now, just wait until word of a central-bank fire sale gets around.

    Copycat Selling

    Sure, Singapore (with $40 billion of Treasuries), India ($39 billion) or South Korea ($35 billion) could try to dump dollars on the stealth. Good luck in this highly connected, around-the-clock world. News that a key economy seeks a first- mover advantage over peers would inspire copycat selling. Expect investors and traders to respond with massive sell orders.

    Warren Buffett can discreetly trim Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s interest in a company or a currency. How a central bank divests itself of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars on the sly is another matter.

    Governments that may be concerned about getting stuck with their dollars for good have a point. And by curtailing investments in dollars today, Asia is ensuring that the U.S. currency will be worth less a year from now. Bernard Madoff can tell you a thing or two about how this process works.

    Dollar Accord

    What may be necessary is a global framework or pact to end the dollar’s dominance. A “Plaza Accord” of sorts may be needed to dismantle the so-called Bretton Woods II system of tying currencies to the dollar that emerged after the global crises of 1997 and 1998. A Dollar Accord, anyone?

    Just as stocks take a hit when additional shares are issued, Asia faces a debt-dilution dynamic for which it never bargained. The Federal Reserve’s zero-interest-rate policies don’t help. And Asia can’t do a lot on its own here.

    This process will require considerable cooperation, be it through the International Monetary Fund, the Group of 20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or a yet-to-be-created entity. Goals must be set, mechanics discussed and timing negotiated. If ever there were a time for a currency summit, it’s now.

    Politics will be a stumbling block. It’s hard to envision the U.S. signing on to scrap the dollar as the reserve currency. Neither the euro nor the yen is ready to replace it. And China’s designs on currency domination are a decade away — or longer.

    IMF Solution

    The amount of scrutiny the dollar’s successor would face makes you wonder who would want to print the reserve currency. That explains why the most credible argument making the rounds involves the IMF’s so-called Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs.

    They are really an account of exchange, rather than legal tender, and are calculated according to a basket of currencies consisting of the dollar, euro, yen and pound. Chinese central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan wants the IMF to move toward creating a “super-sovereign reserve currency.”

    Or, here’s another suggestion: Brady bonds for less- troubled economies. The idea behind bonds created in the 1980s as part of Latin America’s debt restructuring was to let investors swap their claims on nations in turmoil for tradable instruments. A similar process may work with the dollar.

    Rumors of the dollar’s demise are no longer exaggerated. What is being exaggerated, though, is how easy it will be for Asia to get out of the quandary it’s in. Cutting off the U.S. government’s credit card, for example, means American consumers can’t buy your goods. And any sudden divorce between the world’s two main economic powers won’t be pretty. Far from it.

    It’s time to figure out what the next step is, and policy makers need to get serious. Complaining about our dollar-based system won’t get us there. Some brainstorming about where to go from here would be far more constructive.

    (William Pesek is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

    Our $17 Trillion Chinese Split Won’t Be Pretty – William Pesek, Bloomberg

     

    President Obama’s visit to Moscow this week may turn out to be a very good thing. Forget all this jibber-jabber about nuclear disarmament.

    There is no better reminder than the former Soviet Union for how the fantasies of a few collectivist zealots can turn into unending nightmares for its people — and for how a state-run economy ends up with no economy at all.

    If we’re lucky, a little Russian history on this trip will turn into a welcome wake-up call for Mr. Obama.

    It’s not that Mr. Obama is some radical who carries a warm nostalgia for the Soviet Union from his university days. He’s way too young and too smart for that.

    But the president believes in the state, certainly more than any other recent American president. He believes the state must actively intervene in the economy and that the state can bring about a better future. And it seems he believes it is his destiny to lead the state to that future.

    In that way — and others — Obama reminds me of Vladimir Lenin, the founder of the Soviet state.

    CNBC’s Jim Cramer made the Obama-Lenin comparison back in February. And the more I’ve thought about it, the more it holds.

    lenin0706_E_20090706121627.jpgAssociated Press

    A painting made during the Russian Revolution, showing Vladimir Lenin surrounded by revolutionaries, date unknown.

    Of course, Obama is a reformer, not a revolutionary. And he’s certainly no communist.

    But just like Lenin, Obama is a supremely self-confident leader — an intellectual heavyweight and a clever political tactician — an elitist moralizer and a populist champion. And just like Lenin, Obama carries the true-believers’ righteous fervor for “change.”

    I was thinking of Lenin as I watched the president’s Rose Garden remarks on energy and innovation last Thursday.

    After his eight minutes in front of the teleprompter, the president turned to walk away, and a reporter blurted out a question, “Mr. President, do you have a message for the small businesses on health and economy?”

    The president should have just walked away. But it was as if he couldn’t stop himself as he launched into a rambling, haughty answer that I found…well, a bit scary.

    It was scary because it demonstrated that Mr. Obama — almost half a year in office — still has no grasp of the everyday realities faced by America’s small businessmen. They can’t make payroll, but the president is directing them to buy LED lightbulbs and urging them to contact “clean energy” CEOs.

    And it was scary because it showed that the president is still possessed by an unshakable conviction in the power of the state over the individual and of the future over the past.

    As he put it in the Rose Garden, we have to change the health-care system. We have to change how we use energy. We have to change how we “train our young people.” “We are not folks who are scared of the future or look backwards. We always meet the challenges by moving forward.”

    Political clichés? Of course.

    But the president seems to actually believe his clichés. And some of his Rose Garden remarks could have been lifted from Lenin’s speeches circa 1918 – the same hectoring tone and the same mockery of opponents who long for the “status quo”.

    Even Mr. Obama’s call to move “forward.” “Forward!” in fact was one of the Soviets’ favorite slogans.

    The good news for those of us who are a little freaked out by Mr. Obama is that even Lenin did an about-face after the utter failure of his initial hard-left economic policies.

    By early 1921, faced with the ruin and famine wrought by nationalization of the economy, the Bolsheviks re-instituted a quasi-capitalist economy with its New Economic Policy. Ironically, the NEP was aimed to help small businessmen — the very same people that the Obama economy so desperately needs nowadays.

    Lenin called the NEP taking “one step backward to take two steps forward.” While he’s in Moscow, President Obama may want to ask someone at the Kremlin, just what Lenin meant by that.

    Editor’s Note: Mr. Newmark was a student in Moscow in 1984, worked with George Soros on Russian economic reform in 1988-89 and ran the Goldman Sachs Moscow office from 1992-1994.

    Why Barack Obama Is Like Vladimir Lenin – Evan Newmark, Deal Journal

    © 2012 New Jersey CFO Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha