GROWING WORRIES IN ATHENS
A Greek Default Would Hit the ECB Hard
Hopes that Greece can be saved are dwindling. Athens had hoped to reach a deal with its creditors on a 50 percent debt haircut, but banks have now made it clear that efforts to reach an agreement could fail. Should the country go bankrupt, the European Central Bank stands to lose the most.
Opinion: GOP’s ‘alternate universe’ Matt Stoller, Politico
An intellectually honest conservative faction might be arguing that this is what it seeks — a revolutionary change.
Meanwhile, Republicans assert that unemployment benefits are what’s stopping the nation’s jobless from finding work, though the U.S. lost millions of jobs in the economic crisis and employment is now higher than 9 percent.
So there is little discussion about extending unemployment insurance, even as benefits run out, because the deficit is the GOP’s gravest economic emergency. There’s no debate about ways to address high unemployment — just deny reality and enforce it with the Leninist-style propaganda arm of Fox News, Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck.
But there is a big problem. America is simply not set up to handle one political party that bases its political organizing on an alternate reality and the raw power of propaganda. The U.S. government, and our public debates, are organized around the idea that there’s some measure of good faith in both parties, some common basis on which to make decisions.
I do not think most Republicans realize this is how their party operates — but the more cynical high-level operatives certainly do.
When George W. Bush ran for president in 2000, one of his campaign promises was to avoid nation-building. His presidency, of course, shifted America toward endless war and occupation of foreign countries — based on overt deceptions, like implying there was a link between the Sept. 11 terrorists and Saddam Hussein. Bush had his secretary of state, Colin Powell, hold up a vial of powder at the U.N. to show we had allegedly solid intelligence about Hussein’s weapons capabilities.
Back in 2004, a Bush administration official laid out what is now clearly the Republican Party’s guiding philosophy. The official spoke to a journalist as though he were from a foreign land — since he hailed from “what we call the reality-based community.”
“When we act,” the official said, “we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality — judiciously, as you will — we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors … and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”
It’s unclear whether the Republicans want to, or even can, leave this alternate universe that they have constructed. Unfortunately, it’s also unclear whether our society can survive it.
Matt Stoller worked on the Dodd-Frank financial reform law and Federal Reserve transparency issues as a staffer for Rep. Alan Grayson (D-Fla.). He is now a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute.
During the Depression bankers became so unpopular that bank robbers, such as Bonnie and Clyde, became folk heroes.[54]
A lot of people forget that having debt you can’t pay back really sucks. Debt is not just a credit instrument, it is an instrument of political and economic control.
It’s actually baked into our culture. The phrase ‘the man’, as in ‘fight the man’, referred originally to creditors. ‘The man’ in the 19th century stood for ‘furnishing man’, the merchant that sold 19th century sharecroppers and Southern farmers their supplies for the year, usually on credit. Farmers, often illiterate and certainly unable to understand the arrangements into which they were entering, were charged interest rates of 80-100 percent a year, with a lien places on their crops. When approaching a furnishing agent, who could grant them credit for seeds, equipment, even food itself, a farmer would meekly look down nervously as his debts were marked down in a notebook. At the end of a year, due to deflation and usury, farmers usually owed more than they started the year owing. Their land was often forfeit, and eventually most of them became tenant farmers.
They were in hock to the man, and eventually became slaves to him. This structure, of sharecropping and usury, held together by political violence, continued into the 1960s in some areas of the South. As late as the 1960s, Kennedy would see rural poverty in Arkansas and pronounce it ’shocking’. These were the fruits of usury, a society built on unsustainable debt peonage.
Power farming displaces tenants from the land in the western dry cotton area. Childress County, Texas, 1938.
By Matt Stoller, a blogger-turned Congressional staffer. He was a policy advisor to Rep. Alan Grayson on financial policy issues. Cross posted from New Deal 2.0.
Today, we are in the midst of creating a second sharecropper society. I first heard the term “slaves to the bank” from a constituent fighting a fraudulent foreclosure. The details aren’t so important — this couple had been illegally placed in a predatory loan — but at one point, the wife explained that she and her husband were so scared they would have “given their first born to the bank to keep their home”. That was fear speaking, total unadulterated panic. And as we watch debt-holders use the ornaments of fear, such a loan sharking company that set up fake courts to convince debtors they were losing cases, we should recognize that what the creditor class wants is what they’ve always wanted: total dominance of our culture.
Today, the debts do not involve liens against crops. People in modern America carry student loans, credit card debt, and mortgages. All of these are hard to pay back, often bringing with them impenetrable contracts and illegal fees. Credit card debt is difficult to discharge in bankruptcy and a default on a home loan can leave you homeless. A student loan debt is literally a claim against a life — you cannot discharge it in bankruptcy, and if you die, your parents are obligated to pay it. If the banks have their way, mortgages and deficiency judgments will follow you around forever, as they do in Spain.
Young people and what only cynics might call ‘homeowners’ have no choice but to jump on the treadmill of debt, as debtcroppers. The goal is not to have them pay off their debts, but to owe forever. Whatever a debtcropper owes, a wealthy creditor owns. And as a bonus, the heavier the debt burden of American citizenry, the less able we are able to organize and claim our democratic rights as citizens. Debtcroppers don’t start companies and innovate, they don’t take chances, and they don’t claim their political rights. Think about this when you hear the calls from ex-Morgan Stanley banker and current World Bank President Robert Zoellick and his nebulous mutterings pining for the gold standard. Or when you hear Warren Buffett partner Charlie Munger talk about how the bailouts of the wealthy were patriotic, but we mustn’t bail out homeowners for fear of ‘moral hazard’. Or when you hear Pete Peterson Foundation President and former Comptroller General David Walker yearn nostalgically for debtor’s prisons.
Unclogging our constipated economy is not a complex problem — we must simply wipe out the bad debt that cannot be paid back. The complexity of the problem lies in the politics. Debtcroppers have no power, except to stop paying their debts. The constituents I worked with on a fraudulent foreclosure eventually did just that. She and her husband, unshackled by panic, began rebuilding their lives, throwing away their indentured servitude to the bank that abused them. They found their dignity, and used the court system to claim their rights as citizens. They fought the man, successfully, and wiped out their debt. And that is a very scary threat to the creditor class, perhaps the only thing they are really scared of.
10/09/10 Stockholm, Sweden – Just this week an inevitable milestone came to pass, the Federal Reserve surged ahead of Japan as the second largest owner in the world of US debt… second only to China. Of course, the funds used to generate that massive debt position have only been made possible through the smoke and mirrors of quantitative easing. Zero Hedge notes this, and two other generally under-reported US debt facts, in a recent post.
Here’s the short version:
“#1: The US Fed is now the second largest owner of US Treasuries… Setting aside the fact that this is abject lunacy, this policy is trashing our currency which has fallen 13% since June… as in four months ago…
“#2: ‘There are only about $550 billion of Treasuries outstanding with a remaining maturity of greater than 10 years.’ [...] the US has entered a debt spiral: a time in which fewer and fewer investors are willing to lend to us for any long period of time… at the exact same time that we must roll over trillions in old debt and issue an additional $100-150 billion in NEW debt per month in order to finance our massive deficit… So we’re talking about TRILLIONS of old debt coming due in the next decade…
“#3: The US will Default on its Debt… either that or experience hyperinflation. There is simply no other option. We can NEVER pay off our debts. To do so would require every US family to pay $31,000 a year for 75 years… Obviously that ain’t going to happen…”
The last point should be no surprise to any regular…Read more…
Related Article:
By most counts, the U.S. economy started growing in the middle of last year. For many Americans, though, it does not feel as if the Great Recession has ended—unemployment and underemployment are still alarmingly high, and job growth is weak. Many causes have been suggested for both the economic collapse and mediocre recovery, but one that is hardly ever mentioned is income inequality. This is a mistake. Growing income inequality in the United States and the policy responses it has spawned have done tremendous damage to our economy. And because we continue to ignore this underlying problem, the risks of our policies leading to another calamity will not go away, no matter what we do to reform the financial sector.
Since 1968, income inequality has been steadily increasing in the United States. I am not referring to the Croesus-like income of a John Paulsen, the hedge fund manager who in 2008 netted over $3 billion, about 75,000 times the average household income. I refer to a more worrying everyday phenomenon that confronts most Americans, the disparity in income growth rates between a manager at the local supermarket and the typical factory worker or office assistant. Since the 1970s, the wages of the former, typically workers at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution in the United States, have grown much faster than the wages of the latter, the typical median worker. Or consider the table below, which shows that the wages of occupation groups that are paid more than the national average in 2002 have grown much faster since then than the wages of occupation groups below the average:
The Inequality Gap Is Ruining the American Economy—and Bernanke Is Just Making it Worse Raghuram G. Rajan
When asked what advice he would give to residents of Ashtabula County Ohio because of cutbacks in official law enforcement budgets, Judge Alfred Mackey said they should:
“arm themselves. Be very careful, be vigilant, get in touch with your neighbors, because we’re going to have to look after each other.”
http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/04/ohio-judge-tells-residents-to-arm.html
Over the past year the global economy has experienced a massive contraction, the deepest since the Great Depression of the 1930s. But this spring, economists started talking of “green shoots” of recovery and that optimistic assessment quickly spread to Wall Street. More recently, on the anniversary of the Lehman Brothers crash, Ben Bernanke, Federal Reserve chairman, officially blessed this consensus by declaring the recession is “very likely over”.
The future is fundamentally uncertain, which always makes prediction a rash enterprise. That said there is a good chance the new consensus is wrong. Instead, there are solid grounds for believing the US economy will experience a second dip followed by extended stagnation that will qualify as the second Great Depression. Some indications to this effect are already rolling in with unexpectedly large US job losses in September and the crash in US automobile sales following the end of the “cash-for-clunkers” programme.
That rosy scenario thinking has returned to Wall Street should be no surprise. Wall Street profits from rising asset prices on which it charges a management fee, from deal-making on which it earns advisory fees, and from encouraging retail investors to buy stock, which boosts transaction fees. Such earnings are far larger when stock markets are rising, which explains Wall Street’s genetic propensity to pump the economy.
As for mainstream economists, their theoretical models were blind-sided by the crisis and only predict recovery because of the assumptions in the models. According to mainstream theory, it is assumed that full employment is a gravity point to which the economy is pulled back.
Empirical econometric models are equally questionable. They too predict gradual recovery but that is driven by patterns of reversion to trends found in past data. The problem, as investment professionals say, is that “past performance is no guide to future performance”. The economic crisis represents the implosion of the economic paradigm that has ruled US and global growth for the past thirty years. That paradigm was based on consumption fuelled by indebtedness and asset price inflation, and it is done.
There is a simple logic to why the economy will experience a second dip. That logic rests on the economics of deleveraging which inevitably produces a two-step correction. The first step has been worked through, and it triggered a financial crisis that caused the worst recession since the Great Depression. The second step has only just begun.
Deleveraging can be understood through a metaphor in which a car symbolises the economy. Borrowing is like stepping on the gas and accelerates economic activity. When borrowing stops, the foot comes off the pedal and the car slows down. However, the car’s trunk is now weighed down by accumulated debt so economic activity slows below its initial level.
With deleveraging, households increase saving and re-pay debt. This is the second step and it is like stepping on the brake, which causes the economy to slow further, in a motion akin to a double dip. Rapid deleveraging, as is happening now, is the equivalent of hitting the brakes hard. The only positive is it reduces debt, which is like removing weight from the trunk. That helps stabilise activity at a new lower level, but it does not speed up the car, as economists claim.
Unfortunately, the car metaphor only partially captures current conditions as it assumes the braking process is smooth. Yet, there has already been a financial crisis and the real economy is now infected by a multiplier process causing lower spending, massive job loss, and business failures. That plus deleveraging creates the possibility of a downward spiral, which would constitute a depression.
Such a spiral is captured by the metaphor of the Titanic, which was thought to be unsinkable owing to its sequentially structured bulkheads. However, those bulkheads had no ceilings, and when the Titanic hit an iceberg that gashed its side, the front bulkheads filled with water and pulled down the bow. Water then rippled into the aft bulkheads, causing the ship to sink.
The US economy has hit a debt iceberg. The resulting gash threatens to flood the economy’s stabilising mechanisms, which the economist Hyman Minsky termed “thwarting institutions”.
Unemployment insurance is not up to the scale of the problem and is expiring for many workers. That promises to further reduce spending and aggravate the foreclosure problem.
States are bound by balanced budget requirements and they are cutting spending and jobs. Consequently, the public sector is joining the private sector in contraction.
The destruction of household wealth means many households have near-zero or even negative net worth. That increases pressure to save and blocks access to borrowing that might jump-start a recovery. Moreover, both the household and business sector face extensive bankruptcies that amplify the downward multiplier shock and also limit future economic activity by destroying credit histories and access to credit.
Lastly, the US continues to bleed through the triple haemorrhage of the trade deficit that drains spending via imports, off-shoring of jobs, and off-shoring of new investment. This haemorrhage was evident in the cash-for-clunkers program in which eight of the top ten vehicles sold had foreign brands. Consequently, even enormous fiscal stimulus will be of diminished effect.
The financial crisis created an adverse feedback loop in financial markets. Unparalleled deleveraging and the multiplier process have created an adverse feedback loop in the real economy. That is a loop which is far harder to reverse, which is why a second Great Depression remains a real possibility.
Thomas Palley is former chief economist of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission and is currently Schwartz Economic Growth Fellow at the New America Foundation
A Second Great Depression Is Still Possible Thomas Palley
The consumer retreats
The world economy entered the current crisis in a badly lopsided condition, with the American consumer borrowing massively to buy products from Chinese and European manufacturers who happily socked away all their extra cash while producing more than their home markets could absorb. Now, pressed by rising unemployment and the need to rebuild shrunken household wealth, the American shopper is tapped out.
The consumer’s retreat is making itself felt around the world. The first six months of this year, Americans bought $18 billion fewer German-made goods than during the same period in 2008. For German factories, that meant the loss of more than 35% of their U.S. orders. It was the same story for Japan, which saw $31 billion worth of sales vanish — 42% of its total.
Major auto-producing countries weren’t the only ones to feel the chill. Chinese factories shipped almost $21 billion fewer goods to the U.S. during the first half of this year than during the same period last year. And with consumers still confronting several years of paying down debt and repairing their balance sheets, many economists say the world confronts a permanent shift in economic drivers.
“The world is going to be adjusting for years to slow growth from the U.S. consumer,” says economist Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University. “The U.S. consumer has been the engine of world growth for the last quarter century; that engine has stalled.”
Not everyone agrees. Christian Broda, head of international economic research for Barclays Capital, says the world may be headed for slower growth, but that doesn’t mean no growth. Substantial monetary and fiscal easing that has been put in place has yet to make itself felt. As it does, growth will improve. Stories of a complete change in Americans’ behavior, he says, have been overdone.
“Savings will go up, but these processes will take years. …You won’t rebuild your wealth in a year,” he says.
Something has to give
Rather than seeking to restart the same engine in the same way, U.S. policymakers say, they want to construct a more durable economic foundation. Lawrence Summers, head of the president’s National Economic Council, said last month that the U.S. economy “must be more export-oriented and less consumption-oriented” as it emerges from the crisis.
That’s a sensible goal, but unfortunately, the U.S. isn’t alone in embracing it. German Chancellor Angela Merkel says there is “no alternative” to continuing her country’s longstanding reliance upon exports rather than boosting demand at home. Japan, too, shows no signs of making a fundamental shift. And Chinese officials, while acknowledging a desire to promote greater domestic consumption in the long run, are wary of moving too quickly for fear of killing jobs in their export factories.
“The world can’t cope with the U.S. and China both acting like China,” Magnus says. “What’s going to give?”
That’s not clear. Chinese consumption could accelerate faster than expected, though there’s no sign that is imminent. Through July, Chinese savings deposits rose at an annual rate of 29%, vs. 11.3% in the same period in 2008, according to DBS Group Research in Singapore. Alternatively, China might continue binging on investment. But that’s only a short-run fix, which would ultimately swell both production capacity and inventories, depressing global prices. Or the world recovery could limp along at an especially anemic pace for years.
The difficulties in achieving the sort of global rebalancing required are evident in the U.S.-China relationship. U.S. exports in June ticked up for the second-consecutive month, but by a modest 2.2% from the month before. And the value of total shipments remains deeply depressed compared with the year-ago period.
Rising exports, aided by the slumping dollar, have whittled away at the U.S. trade deficit. China’s corresponding trade surplus also is shrinking, but bigger reductions depend on getting Chinese consumers to buy more.
Chinese household consumption is among the lowest in the world, amounting to roughly 35% of economic output, vs. nearly 70% in the U.S. Chinese consumers save rather than spend, in part, to guard against unexpected medical expenses in a country that lacks a health insurance system.
Until China can put in place a national health care system, household consumption is unlikely to rise. “We need to be aware of the difficulties and should not be over-idealistic,” central banker Zhou Xiaochuan, head of the People’s Bank of China, said in a July 3 speech.
But reorienting China’s producers to serve local consumers rather than distant markets also would require far-reaching changes in several other national policies. An undervalued currency, rock-bottom interest rates set by government fiat and a lack of labor rights all effectively subsidize producers at the expense of consumers.
“There’s a whole bunch of policies that constrain consumption and boost production,” says Pettis, a former investment banker.
Quarterbacks Abound: Exports Can’t Fuel Global Recovery – USA Today
Amity Shlaes, a senior fellow in economic history at the Council on Foreign Relations, has an excellent primer on public choice in the August 3 edition of Forbes, “The New PC.” Shlaes is also the author of the 2007 book, The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. Shlaes, who will be featured in the upcoming issue of Religion & Liberty, writes, “Government reformers view themselves as morally superior, but that is an illusion. They are just like private-sector operators, who do things that are in their own interest, not society’s…
Barely six months in office, President Obama already finds himself in an economic box. For despite his aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, the jobs market shows no sign of healing. At the same time, the housing market foreclosure crisis continues apace, while renewed questions are again surfacing about the soundness of the U.S. banking system. To complicate matters, financial markets are now starting to fret about the longer-run inflationary consequences of the unusually large budget deficits in prospect for as far as the eye can see.
In January 2009, on presenting its $780 billion fiscal stimulus package, the Obama administration assured the public that because of that stimulus package U.S. unemployment would not exceed 8 percent. Yet already by June 2009, unemployment had risen to 9.5 percent; including part-time workers, who would prefer to be working full time, unemployment rose to a staggering post-war high of over 16 percent. Worse still, the jobs market shows every sign of being far from bottoming out.
The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach.
The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach. These questions pertain not simply to the very poor design of the fiscal stimulus package. Rather they pertain to the adequacy of the measures aimed at stabilizing the housing market and at resolving the country’s most wrenching credit crisis in the post-war period.
At the most basic level, one has to question how much sense it made for President Obama to allow the fiscal package to become excessively back-loaded at time when the economy needed immediate large scale support. If a large fiscal stimulus was indeed needed, why has only $60 billion of that package been dribbled out by June? And why is less than a third of the package scheduled to come into effect in 2009, the year when the package is most sorely needed?
Similarly one has to wonder about the heavy price that the Obama administration paid for effectively outsourcing the package’s design to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the rest of the Democratic congressional leadership. Should it really have come as a surprise to us that the resulting stimulus package would be laden with pork and with expenditures that are going to be very difficult to roll back? Or should we now be shocked that the package fell sadly short of including fast acting and effective fiscal stimulus measures that might have gotten the most bang for the buck?
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Obama fiscal stimulus package is the serious way in which it compromises the country’s long-run public finances and fans long-run inflationary expectations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Obama budget not only implies unusually large budget deficits over the next two years but it implies that, even when the economy eventually fully recovers, the deficit will remain in the region of between 4 and 6 percentage points of GDP. As a result, over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime, from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.
Over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.
The rising tide of unemployment must also raise questions about the Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the housing market, which the administration correctly views as a necessary condition for producing a meaningful economic recovery. One has to expect that a weaker job market will only exacerbate the country’s present foreclosure crisis, which is adding supply to an already glutted housing market. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that 2.4 million homes could be in foreclosure in 2009 and as many as 8.1 million homes over the next four years. Yet, the Obama administration’s loan modification program announced earlier this year has to date only resulted in 190,000 offers at mortgage loan modification.
Rising unemployment also has to raise questions about whether the Obama administration is not being overly sanguine about the health of the U.S. banking system. For it would seem that unemployment will now well exceed the worst-case scenario in the bank stress test presented by the administration earlier this year. Yet, despite a weakening unemployment outlook that is sure to boost bank losses, the Obama administration is now cavalierly backing away from its earlier initiatives to reduce the toxic assets that remain on the banks’ balance sheets.
Less than six months into his term, President Obama already faces difficult economic policy choices. He can choose, as he now seems to be doing, to counsel patience and assure us that all is well at considerable cost to his credibility on economic policy management. Or he can own up to the facts that he misread the economy in January and that his economic team now needs to go back to the drawing board. For the sake of the U.S. economy, one has to hope that he has the courage to review the overall coherence of his policy approach before it is too late.
Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was managing director and chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s policy and review department.
Obama Is Stuck In an Economic Box – Desmond Lachman, The American
War leads to prosperity!…Think again.
The Nobel Prize committee has never withdrawn a prize. It might want to consider it. In Tuesday’s New York Times, prizewinner in economics, Paul Krugman reveals either that he knows nothing about economics…or that there is nothing worth knowing in it. We’re beginning to think it’s the latter.
“From an economic point of view,” he writes, “World War II was, above all, a burst of deficit-financed government spending, on a scale that would never have been approved otherwise. Deficit spending created an economic boom – and the boom laid the foundation for long-run prosperity….”
In the 1938 US elections, voters showed what they thought of the New Deal; Democrats lost 70 seats in the House. Then as now, the public had lost faith in public spending, says Krugman. Nearly two out of three of those polled said they were opposed to stimulus efforts. Roosevelt buckled under the pressure; he drew back from further spending to fight the slump.
Thank God for WWII! No one opposes military spending in time of war. Krugman made his position clear in 2008 in his New York Times blog.
“The fact is that war is, in general, expansionary for the economy, at least in the short run. World War II, remember, ended the Great Depression.”
According to this line of thinking, the best form of stimulus spending is money spent on the military. It creates consumer demand without creating consumer supply. Consumer prices rise; people spend. The slump is soon over.
But if WWII helped the US economy, think what it must have done for Japan; proportionally, its stimulus efforts dwarfed those of the US…and began much earlier. Just this week, Ichiro Ozawa, running for prime minister of Japan, vowed to take “every measure” to lower the yen and promised a stimulus package more than twice as big as the current program. He was just following in the footsteps of Japan’s leaders from the ’30s. It was “economic security” they said they were after. And they thought they could get it by central planning and government spending. Military spending rose from 31% of the budget in the early ’30s to nearly 50% five years later. By the early ’40s it was around 70% and nearly 100% later on. Deficits and debt soared.
Did that create a boom? You bet it did. Japan was the first nation to get out of the global slump. It boomed…and boomed…and ka-boomed. When it came to warships, planes, and soldiers, Japan was soon among the richest nations in the world. Yes, Americans had more electric fans, automobiles, central heating, aspirin, ice cream, and the rest of the paraphernalia of civilized life at the time. In the mid-’30s, the US produced 40 times as many autos per person as did Japan. Even during the Great Depression, the US out-produced Japan by a factor of 7 and its workers earned 10-times as much money.
Economists can’t even measure real prosperity, let alone fiddle it. So they put on the GDP and employment numbers the way a bald man puts on a cheap wig. It makes him look ridiculous and fraudulent, but it’s the best he can do. Unemployment disappears in a war economy. Japan put a million men in uniform. Two million more were part-time reservists. Those who weren’t in the army were put to work building tanks and planes. By 1941, Japan could produce 10,000 planes a year. If you were a swallow you wouldn’t want to build your nest in Japan’s factory chimneys; they belched smoke night and day.
And talk about fiscal stimulus! Krugman would have loved it – stimulus unfettered by real money or even a casual regard for real prosperity. Takahashi Korekiyo was known as the “Japanese Keynes.” Gillian Tett notes in The Financial Times that he was assassinated in 1936 after he came to his senses and tried to bring state finances under control. He was done in by army officers who did not want the stimulus to stop. Not that we’re being judgmental about it. As far as we know, the quality of central banking could probably be improved by an occasional assassination.
Takahashi wasn’t the first. Before him Junnosuke Inoue had held out for the gold standard and balanced budgets. He was out of office by 1931 and out of luck in 1932, when he was murdered. The gold-backed yen was abolished the day he left office. Then, public spending, deficits, central planning, debt, and inflation ran wild. By 1939, the Japanese were spending $5 million a day on their war with China – a huge sum for the Japanese at the time.
Was the economy improved by all this spending? No, it was perverted…hammered into a grotesque imposter – a parody of a real economy. Most of the nation’s resources were put to work building things almost no one wanted. Then, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the stimulus efforts were redoubled. Rations were reduced further. Working hours were extended. What few consumer items were available were three times as expensive at the end of the war as they had been when it began. Men were conscripted into factories and the army. Women were expected not only to make the tanks, but to join the home-guard and prepare themselves to repulse the American invaders with sharpened bamboo sticks. What a marvelous economy – operating at full capacity and full employment until General MacArthur finally put it out of its misery.
You say Obama; I say Ozawa! You say boom; I say ka-boom!
By Bill Bonner