GROWING WORRIES IN ATHENS
A Greek Default Would Hit the ECB Hard
Hopes that Greece can be saved are dwindling. Athens had hoped to reach a deal with its creditors on a 50 percent debt haircut, but banks have now made it clear that efforts to reach an agreement could fail. Should the country go bankrupt, the European Central Bank stands to lose the most.
A lot of people forget that having debt you can’t pay back really sucks. Debt is not just a credit instrument, it is an instrument of political and economic control.
It’s actually baked into our culture. The phrase ‘the man’, as in ‘fight the man’, referred originally to creditors. ‘The man’ in the 19th century stood for ‘furnishing man’, the merchant that sold 19th century sharecroppers and Southern farmers their supplies for the year, usually on credit. Farmers, often illiterate and certainly unable to understand the arrangements into which they were entering, were charged interest rates of 80-100 percent a year, with a lien places on their crops. When approaching a furnishing agent, who could grant them credit for seeds, equipment, even food itself, a farmer would meekly look down nervously as his debts were marked down in a notebook. At the end of a year, due to deflation and usury, farmers usually owed more than they started the year owing. Their land was often forfeit, and eventually most of them became tenant farmers.
They were in hock to the man, and eventually became slaves to him. This structure, of sharecropping and usury, held together by political violence, continued into the 1960s in some areas of the South. As late as the 1960s, Kennedy would see rural poverty in Arkansas and pronounce it ’shocking’. These were the fruits of usury, a society built on unsustainable debt peonage.
Power farming displaces tenants from the land in the western dry cotton area. Childress County, Texas, 1938.
By Matt Stoller, a blogger-turned Congressional staffer. He was a policy advisor to Rep. Alan Grayson on financial policy issues. Cross posted from New Deal 2.0.
Today, we are in the midst of creating a second sharecropper society. I first heard the term “slaves to the bank” from a constituent fighting a fraudulent foreclosure. The details aren’t so important — this couple had been illegally placed in a predatory loan — but at one point, the wife explained that she and her husband were so scared they would have “given their first born to the bank to keep their home”. That was fear speaking, total unadulterated panic. And as we watch debt-holders use the ornaments of fear, such a loan sharking company that set up fake courts to convince debtors they were losing cases, we should recognize that what the creditor class wants is what they’ve always wanted: total dominance of our culture.
Today, the debts do not involve liens against crops. People in modern America carry student loans, credit card debt, and mortgages. All of these are hard to pay back, often bringing with them impenetrable contracts and illegal fees. Credit card debt is difficult to discharge in bankruptcy and a default on a home loan can leave you homeless. A student loan debt is literally a claim against a life — you cannot discharge it in bankruptcy, and if you die, your parents are obligated to pay it. If the banks have their way, mortgages and deficiency judgments will follow you around forever, as they do in Spain.
Young people and what only cynics might call ‘homeowners’ have no choice but to jump on the treadmill of debt, as debtcroppers. The goal is not to have them pay off their debts, but to owe forever. Whatever a debtcropper owes, a wealthy creditor owns. And as a bonus, the heavier the debt burden of American citizenry, the less able we are able to organize and claim our democratic rights as citizens. Debtcroppers don’t start companies and innovate, they don’t take chances, and they don’t claim their political rights. Think about this when you hear the calls from ex-Morgan Stanley banker and current World Bank President Robert Zoellick and his nebulous mutterings pining for the gold standard. Or when you hear Warren Buffett partner Charlie Munger talk about how the bailouts of the wealthy were patriotic, but we mustn’t bail out homeowners for fear of ‘moral hazard’. Or when you hear Pete Peterson Foundation President and former Comptroller General David Walker yearn nostalgically for debtor’s prisons.
Unclogging our constipated economy is not a complex problem — we must simply wipe out the bad debt that cannot be paid back. The complexity of the problem lies in the politics. Debtcroppers have no power, except to stop paying their debts. The constituents I worked with on a fraudulent foreclosure eventually did just that. She and her husband, unshackled by panic, began rebuilding their lives, throwing away their indentured servitude to the bank that abused them. They found their dignity, and used the court system to claim their rights as citizens. They fought the man, successfully, and wiped out their debt. And that is a very scary threat to the creditor class, perhaps the only thing they are really scared of.
10/09/10 Stockholm, Sweden – Just this week an inevitable milestone came to pass, the Federal Reserve surged ahead of Japan as the second largest owner in the world of US debt… second only to China. Of course, the funds used to generate that massive debt position have only been made possible through the smoke and mirrors of quantitative easing. Zero Hedge notes this, and two other generally under-reported US debt facts, in a recent post.
Here’s the short version:
“#1: The US Fed is now the second largest owner of US Treasuries… Setting aside the fact that this is abject lunacy, this policy is trashing our currency which has fallen 13% since June… as in four months ago…
“#2: ‘There are only about $550 billion of Treasuries outstanding with a remaining maturity of greater than 10 years.’ [...] the US has entered a debt spiral: a time in which fewer and fewer investors are willing to lend to us for any long period of time… at the exact same time that we must roll over trillions in old debt and issue an additional $100-150 billion in NEW debt per month in order to finance our massive deficit… So we’re talking about TRILLIONS of old debt coming due in the next decade…
“#3: The US will Default on its Debt… either that or experience hyperinflation. There is simply no other option. We can NEVER pay off our debts. To do so would require every US family to pay $31,000 a year for 75 years… Obviously that ain’t going to happen…”
The last point should be no surprise to any regular…Read more…
Related Article:
By most counts, the U.S. economy started growing in the middle of last year. For many Americans, though, it does not feel as if the Great Recession has ended—unemployment and underemployment are still alarmingly high, and job growth is weak. Many causes have been suggested for both the economic collapse and mediocre recovery, but one that is hardly ever mentioned is income inequality. This is a mistake. Growing income inequality in the United States and the policy responses it has spawned have done tremendous damage to our economy. And because we continue to ignore this underlying problem, the risks of our policies leading to another calamity will not go away, no matter what we do to reform the financial sector.
Since 1968, income inequality has been steadily increasing in the United States. I am not referring to the Croesus-like income of a John Paulsen, the hedge fund manager who in 2008 netted over $3 billion, about 75,000 times the average household income. I refer to a more worrying everyday phenomenon that confronts most Americans, the disparity in income growth rates between a manager at the local supermarket and the typical factory worker or office assistant. Since the 1970s, the wages of the former, typically workers at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution in the United States, have grown much faster than the wages of the latter, the typical median worker. Or consider the table below, which shows that the wages of occupation groups that are paid more than the national average in 2002 have grown much faster since then than the wages of occupation groups below the average:
The Inequality Gap Is Ruining the American Economy—and Bernanke Is Just Making it Worse Raghuram G. Rajan
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| Flagging: a US sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington |
If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is starting to look like an age in geopolitics. Comparing the America that began the 21st century with the America of today is to witness a country that has in some ways quite radically altered its view of itself and its relationship to the world.
In short, the metallic rust of decline has crept into the American soul. “You could argue that the first decade of the 21st century was the last decade of the American century,” says David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and student of US foreign policy. “We are now entering the multipolar century.”
“When an unprecedented amount of taxpayer dollars were lent to financial institutions in unprecedented ways and the Federal Reserve refused to make public any of the details of its extraordinary lending, Bloomberg News asked the court why U.S. citizens don’t have the right to know”
-Matthew Winkler, the editor-in-chief of Bloomberg News.
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I would have been surprised if it went the opposite way.
“Federal Reserve must make records about emergency lending to financial institutions public within five days because it failed to convince a judge the documents should be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.
Manhattan Chief U.S. District Judge Loretta Preska rejected the central bank’s argument that the records aren’t covered by the law because their disclosure would harm borrowers’ competitive positions. The collateral lists “are central to understanding and assessing the government’s response to the most cataclysmic financial crisis in America since the Great Depression,” according to the lawsuit that led to yesterday’s ruling.
The Fed has refused to name the borrowers, the amounts of loans or the assets put up as collateral under 11 programs, saying that doing so might set off a run by depositors and unsettle shareholders. Bloomberg LP, the New York-based company majority-owned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg, sued Nov. 7 on behalf of its Bloomberg News unit.”
The only way this has been historically been allowed is when it imoacts National Security . . .
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Source:
Fed Must Release Reports on Emergency Bank Loans, Judge Says
Mark Pittman and Karen Gullo
Bloomberg, Aug. 25 2009
http://www.bloombergs.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=afi7TJiJFys0
Stanford Professor John Taylor has suggested that monetary policy could be summarized in terms of a simple rule, lowering interest rates when output is too low and raising them when inflation is too high. A number of academic papers have investigated this rule from the perspective of describing what the Federal Reserve has historically done. In a new paper co-authored with Federal Reserve economist Seth Pruitt and Office of Immigration Statistics economist Scott Borger, I take a look at what monetary policy rule the market perceived the Fed to be following over different historical periods.
Our basic idea is that, back in the days before we ran into the zero lower bound on interest rates, if there was a major surprise in a macroeconomic news release, you would see a big change in fed funds futures prices. For example, when the BLS announced on March 8, 1996 that nonfarm payrolls increased by 705,000 workers in February (wouldn’t we love to see another report like that one about now!), the interest rate associated with the August fed funds futures contract jumped from 5.01% to 5.25%. That response reflected a market belief that the development would cause the Fed to choose a higher interest rate than it otherwise would have.
We then built simple forecasting models for how news like this would alter a rational forecast of future inflation and output growth and ask, if market participants were revising their expectations in a way consistent with those forecasting relations, and if they thought that the Fed would respond to those future fundamentals according to a Taylor Rule, what parameters for the Taylor Rule are most consistent with the observed response of fed funds futures prices?
Our estimates are similar to those derived from more conventional econometrics, and suggest that, since 1994, the market believed that monetary policy was consistent with the Taylor Principle, raising the nominal interest rate more than 1-for-1 with an increase in inflation. Output targeting, particularly over the 2000-2007 period, appears to have been assigned secondary importance by the market.
One of the advantages of our approach is that we are also able to come up with estimates for the degree of inertia in perceived monetary policy. For example, while the August 1996 contract experienced a 24-basis-point jump on March 8, the May contract only moved 10 basis points. Since we can describe how the March 8 news should have altered a forecast for both May and August inflation, we can come up with direct measures for how long the market expected it would take the Fed to adjust interest rates fully in response to the news.
We document two important changes in the perceived policy rule over time. After 2000, the market believed that the Fed would eventually have a stronger response to inflation than it had prior to 2000, but also that the Fed would take longer to implement those changes, responding to news more sluggishly than it had before 2000.
We study the consequences of these changes using a simple new-Keynesian model. We find that the first change (a stronger long-run response to inflation) would be something that would have made output less variable, whereas the second change (a smaller immediate response) would have made output more variable. According to these simulations, increased Fed inertia undid some of the benefits it could have otherwise obtained with its anti-inflation policies.
Our conclusion is that the measured pace at which Greenspan increased interest rates over 2004-2005 may have been counterproductive, and that economic performance might have been improved if the Fed instead had raised interest rates more quickly to the higher warranted levels.
The Market-Perceived Monetary Policy Rule by James Hamilton
| Bond Bears Dumping Two-Year Treasuries Defy Fed Rate History Bloomberg … simply because there’s no inflation,” said Michael Cheah, who manages $2 billion in bonds at SunAmerica Asset Management in Jersey City, New Jersey. … |
There is something inherently counterintuitive, if not absurd, in the perception that a 1% increase in the inflation of my flower-pot is more damaging than the enormous swings we have all just experienced in the value of our wealth.
Translating the above into wonk-speak, if there is one major shake-up that this financial crisis should bring about, it is, in my opinion, the re-thinking of monetary policy as we know it… including the role of asset prices in the framing of policy rules and objectives.
To be sure, there have been plenty of papers arguing why asset prices should NOT be the direct focus of policy-makers (rather, an indirect objective, to the extent that they influence the prices of goods and services)—including by our Fed Chairman himself.
But I find these arguments wanting… To start with, they tend to rest on assumptions that have not been conclusively determined by economists (such as the size of wealth effects on consumption); or, they posit an asset bubble process that is exogenous, including to the policy tool itself (admittedly, the latter more reflects economists’ ignorance/ disagreement on how bubbles are formed).
But beyond these “small-scale” criticisms, the most important weakness I see has to do with what is currently a “consensus” about the objective of monetary policy itself. Unless one begins to rethink what monetary policy should be about, and what it should target, the arguments for or against asset-price targeting become frustratingly circular.
Monetary Policy Make-over by Models & Agents
