It’s official: The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) plan announced at the EU summit on October 27th is essentially dead prior to arrival.

As a consequence, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy appear to be betraying signs of throwing in the towel on the Euro project as it exists today. They appear to be actively contemplating ways to engineer an orderly breakup of the Euro.

As financial market participants gets wind of their intentions – albeit tentative – expect financial markets to accelerate the unfolding of events. The entire Euro edifice could collapse before the New Year.

EFSF Chief: The Insurance Plan Is Dead Prior To Arrival

When the Chief of the EFSF is pessimistic about the capacity of the EFSF to be leveraged to an extent that is adequate to the task at hand, then you might as well kiss the whole thing goodbye.

In a little noted article in Thursday’s FT, Klaus Regling, head of the EFSF essentially admitted that the plan agreed upon at the EU summit on October summit to use the EFSF as collateral for a first-loss insurance scheme is essentially dead.

As I predicted would occur in an article of mine several weeks ago entitled “Europe’s Inane Idea: Fake Brady Bonds,” the EFSF chief has acknowledged that there is no interest on the part of investors to purchase PIIGS bonds with a first-loss guarantee of only 20%.

Regling believes that a first-loss guarantee of 30% may be required to garner any interest.

Personally, I have serious doubts that there would be sufficient interest. Any issuance that actually requires a 30% loss guarantee in order to be viable simply has an implicit default risk profile that will be unable to garner sponsorship of sufficient size.

Since there are only about 250 billion euros available for the EFSF first-loss insurance scheme, that means that, even assuming 30% were sufficient, the mechanism would only be adequate to cover about 800 billion euros worth of debt issuance by Italy and Spain — and any other euro area country that needed funding.

It has been estimated that roughly two trillion euros of funding are needed to simply merely meet projected roll-over and fresh financing needs through mid 2013. Therefore, the 800 billion projection is totally insufficient to the task at hand.

If $800 billion in guarantees are all that Europe can come up with, Europe would probably better off wasting precious resources on this scheme at all.

That is why the EFSF first-loss guarantee proposal seems to be dead on arrival. The plan is totally insufficient, and therefore is unlikely to be implemented at all.

I believe that this realization is thoroughly discouraging the Eurocrats that are charged with structuring the EFSF insurance facility and selling it to investors. These Eurocrats are relaying their pessimism back to Merkel and Sarkozy in real time. This in turn, is prompting Merkel and Sarkozy to begin to contemplate “exit strategies.”

Imminent Fiasco

Because Merkel and Sarkozy are unwilling or are unable to support the only viable option available to them that is to fund bond purchases via the ECB, they appear to be engaging in preliminary speculations regarding a possible exit plan. The problem is that there is no viable exit plan that would not entail a total economic and financial disaster.

It will be impossible for Merkel, Sarkozy and other European leaders to prepare an exit strategy without their intentions being leaked to the press. Financial markets will therefore unravel any and all plans that they contemplate before they can even commit them to paper.

As soon as markets realize that the original EFSF scheme is being abandoned and that the entire Euro project will be restructured, the Euro will be crushed, the European banking system will become insolvent and global financial markets will freeze up.

Merkozy Musings

Sarkozy is already openly musing about a “two-speed” Europe. He envisions a group of countries that will quickly move towards tight fiscal and economic integration and another group of countries that will remain fiscally and monetarily independent.

Sarkozy has stated that he believes that a tight federation is impossible for a large group of economically, politically and culturally disparate countries. The implication is that the group of 16 nations that currently comprise the Euro is probably too large to be manageable.

At the same time, Merkel is already dreaming about a “New Europe.” Exactly what Germany’s Chancellor means by this is ambiguous. However, it is clear that Merkel has in mind much tighter fiscal and economic integration. In this regard Merkel must know that several current Euro members may be unable or unwilling to join in such a tight federation.

The problem with Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s musings is that they are completely irrelevant and even counterproductive to the current task at hand. The issues that they are touching on were issues that needed to have been resolved at the inception of the Euro. At this point, the question is how the damage can best be undone, not to debate what should have been.

Conclusion

Merkel and Sarkozy will soon learn that an orderly break-up of the Euro is not possible. Even the slightest hint that a breakup is being contemplated will cause a global financial disturbance that is so great that any perceived benefits of a break-up will be completely overwhelmed by the costs that will be imposed by the market.

Prepare For Europe Collapse Before New Year by James A. Kostohryz


 

  • Summer Rerun: Geithner Plan Smackdown Wrap – 08/21/2011 – Yves Smith
  •  

    My comrade Jonah Goldberg compares America’s present situation to that of a plane with one engine out belching smoke. But, if anything, he understates the crisis. Air America doesn’t need a busted engine because it’s pre-programmed to crash.

    Our biggest problem is Medicare and other “entitlements.” They’re the automatic pilot of Big Government. Whoever’s in the captain’s seat makes no difference. The flight is pre-programmed to hit the iceberg, if you’ll forgive me switching mass-transit metaphors in midstream.

    For some reason, Obama, Reid, Pelosi, Harkin & Co. don’t seem to mind this. If you recall the smile on the face of the “automatic pilot” in “Airplane!” as he’s being inflated, that’s pretty much the Democrats’ attitude to binge-spending as a permanent fact of life.

    Hey America, It’s Your Fault! How’s That For Change? – Mark Steyn, IBD

    The Committee to Defraud the World

     A Moral Question - Not A Political One, A Shareholder-Not Just a "Stakeholder", A Time To Repent, AIG and all that....., Analysis & Commentary, Bilderbergers 1 USA 0, Collateral Damage, Coming Social Unrest, Consumption Ran the Old Economy, Coup d'etat in America, Death of the Dollar, Deflation-Inflation-Stagflation, Devaluation, Did they ever hear of GAAP?, Dismal Science-Ignorant Scientists?, Economic Analysis Isn't Science, Even the Terminator Can't Help California, Goldman: Underwriter or Undertaker?, Greenspan is kind of stupid, Insolvency, It Is Supposed to be a Republic!, Jacksonian Democracy, Let's Call What It Is - DEPRESSION, Moral Hazard, No Bank Is Indispensable, Obama's Hypocrisy, Our phony middle class, Patience is a virtue...Delusion is a vice, Small Business-Bedrock of America, Smaller Can Be Better, Social Security Time bomb, Socialism, TARP fruit loops, The American Financial Oligarchy, The Arrogance of Power, The Consequences of Greed, The End of American Capitalism As We Know It? - Discuss, The excellent adventures of Ben Bernanke, The Financial Elite, The Importance of Strategic Planning, The Inherent Disorder of Empires, The Intrusion of UNLAWFUL Authority, The Judeo-Christian Political Coalition, The New American Socialism, The Obama OMG magic factory, The Sorry State Of American Manufacturing, The Suffering Poor, Those Quarky Accounting Rules, Time For A New Third Party, Truth In Charity, Unemployment Catastrophe, Unindicted Co-Conspiritors, Unintended Consequences, USA Is the New Japan, Wage Deflation, We Have Become Beggars To The World, Who Guarantees the Guarantor?-You Do!, Who owns Congress-Still!  No Responses »
    Aug 012010
     

    To say now that ‘No one knew’ or ‘I was mistaken’ or ‘I was just doing as I was told’ is another in a series of lies and deceptions that have supported one of the greatest frauds in the history of the world.

    But this is not history. This episode of fraud is still playing itself out now. And to fail to understand the depth and breadth of this madness is to place oneself in peril, and in the power of those who are twisting the Western economic and political system even now to satisfy their lust for wealth and power. You are only successful if you can keep what you kill.

    Glass-Steagall fell after a decade long campaign involving hundreds of millions in lobbyist money spread lavishly around the Congress, led by Sanford Weil of Citibank, supported by key banking and political figures in the Congress and at the Fed. It involved Senator Phil Gramm, who helped to put a stake in the heart of the financial regulatory process under the Reagan free markets banner, and who recently said the problem is that the middle class were a bunch of whiners. As did his wife Wendy, who as the chairperson of the CFTC had exempted Enron from regulatory oversight, and then left to take a position there on its board of directors.

    Like the Mortgage Backed Securities scandal it involved surprisingly few principal players, like Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin, who used their power and influence to silence and ostracize critics, and promote a climate of reckless disregard for the public trust under the meme of ‘efficient markets’ and deregulation. This might have been an innocent policy error if it did not involve premeditated theft on a massive scale, followed by cover ups, denials, and a control fraud that exists even today.

    But it also involved literally thousands of collaborators and enablers, from mainstream media people, economists, analysts, and other thought leaders to politicians and regulators who saw that it was to their advantage to at least passively support this scheme which they knew very well was a fairy tale, a fraud, class warfare by a new name, but were able to hide their own guilty consciences behind self-serving rationalization and the shield of plausible deniability.

    History, and hopefully the justice system, will sort this all out. It is difficult, even now, to get one’s mind around the enormity of it. This is its most powerful weapon. Who could be such monsters, so amoral, so destructively sociopathic? Future generations will regard it as an episode of madness, driven by a few people in a tight circle of self-reinforcing thought, people with remarkably similar cultural and educational backgrounds, driven by a consuming lust for power, that were able to dupe and delude an entire nation made vulnerable by propaganda, a co-opted press, and apathy.

    In the meanwhile all the great mass of people can do is to watch, and wait, and seek to protect themselves from these ravening wolves grown increasingly desperate, as their arrogance comes to a tragic fall. They can vote out incumbents, but the parties choose the candidates, and too often they resemble competing crime families of special interests more than pillars of a representative government, saying one thing to get elected and doing another thing once in office.

    This is the approach of trouble when hubris is at its height, and the few feel they have everything to gain and nothing to lose, if only they can gain more power, and necessarily become more ruthless. They are trapped in a cycle of fear and greed. The fear provokes the lies and the cover ups, but the greed promotes the extension of the fraud and the theft, requiring even more lies and cover ups. The operative word is ‘over reach,’ in a classic late stage Ponzi scheme. This will undoubtedly add to the confusion as the truth is assaulted by the big lie.

    The last vestiges of polite society are often shed as the downfall reaches it final conclusion, at the end, when all is revealed, at last. And so there will be great danger.

    Jesse’ s Cafe http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/07/committee-to-defraud-world.html

     

    carl_levin.bl.top.jpg Interview by Paul Smalera, senior editor

    (Fortune) — At Tuesday’s epic Goldman Sachs hearing, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan led a public grilling of Wall Street not seen by a government panel since the Depression-investigating Pecora Commission. Fortune wanted to know what Levin thought of the answers he got from executives, including CEO Lloyd Blankfein, whether Goldman can save its reputation, and what his committee has learned from its hearings on the financial crisis.

    It was surprising how much the Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500) executives talked. How did you get them to reveal what they did?

    By confronting them with their own documents. A lot of time and work goes into getting huge amounts, literally millions, of documents … I think when people are confronted by their own documents by someone who’s really studied those documents; it’s easier to force them to respond.

    They obviously were trying to delay and evade answering. We had a willingness to take them on and not let them talk forever, telling them, “Hey we’ll stay here all night if we have to, but we’re going to get the information we want.”

    And when they did answer?

    When they did answer, some people have asked me, “Were they telling you the truth?” The answer is yeah, and that’s what’s even more troubling than the evasions — they are defending what most people would say are indefensible actions. They shouldn’t be betting against what they’re selling at the same time they’re telling you: “Here, these are our securities, our names are on the prospectus.”

    I think people think that someone selling something believes their product needs to succeed in some general way; that they want it to succeed. But [Goldman Sachs] are betting against [their product] and basically say they are going to profit from its failure. At that point, in most people’s minds, clearly in mine, there’s a conflict of interest. You’re betting against a product that you’re holding out to the public, by fair assumption, as a good product.

    They were trying to turn this into, “We can’t guarantee that people are making money,” but that’s not the point. The point is that at the same time you’re holding this thing out as something that presumably you’d like to see provide something good for your customer, you’re betting against it and making a heck of a lot of money by its failure. And you’re not disclosing that.

    To add insult to injury, in those emails that call it “junk” that they’re selling, “crap,” and I won’t get into the “shitty” word but anyway, that adds insult to injury. When you’re putting together a product, hold that out and then are betting against that same product, I think it’s a conflict and at minimum you have to tell people, not some boilerplate that you might be on the other side, but in clear language that you’re betting against [the security].

    Regulators have taken a lot of blame for the crisis but doesn’t part of this come from the laws — or lack of laws — surrounding these activities? Goldman seemed to testify that its actions were unseemly but not illegal.

    The reaction of one guy when I asked about his reaction to his emails was, “That shouldn’t have been in an email.” There are two different worlds here. My reaction was, “You shouldn’t believe that, you shouldn’t feel that.”

    I could have understood the reaction [by Goldman] that they should not be selling stuff that they’re betting against and think is junk, but they don’t say that because they don’t believe it. They think they can do anything they want, that it’s a dog-eat-dog market and all these sophisticated buyers know they disagree. The sophisticated buyers see an AAA rating on something: they’re not then going to go into the 500 mortgages referred to in a synthetic CDO. There’s no way they can. They’re not the underwriter, they haven’t put it together Of course with Abacus, when you have the fact that [John Paulson]., who was betting against it, helped put the referenced mortgages together, that’s just a second insult.
    It’s not just Wall Street, it’s upstream: We spent a long time getting into the Washington Mutual issue as an example of lenders putting together shoddy mortgages, securitizing them and getting them off their books. These are mortgages, which never should’ve been issued where the regulator failed to enforce the laws in this case.

    The regulators pointed out things in emails and visits to the bank … but they never enforced it. There’s a failure to stop the abuses. Then you have credit rating agencies susceptible to pressure, acknowledge it in emails, and are involved in an inherent conflict of interest. They’re being pressured to put higher ratings on financial documents by the people who will benefit from those ratings and they’re being paid by those people. You have the problem of the person who pays the fiddler calling the tune.

    Then you get down to Wall Street with their vacuuming up these securities and getting the risk off their books without disclosing it. It’s not limited to Wall Street’s unbridled greed, it comes all the way from upstream.

    How Carl Levin Got Goldman Sachs’s Goat – Paul Smalera, Fortune

     

    In the present system, the more unrestricted the banks are, the more money they can generate “out of thin air,” and the more damage they can inflict upon the wealth-generation process. FULL ARTICLE by Frank Shostak

     

    “I have to think this train is probably going to leave the station soon and we need to focus our efforts on explaining the story as best we can. There were too many people involved in the deals — too many counterparties, too many lawyers and advisors, too many people from AIG — to keep a determined Congress from the information.” James P. Bergin, NY Fed, in an email to his Fed colleagues


    ‘Though it is hard to divine much understanding from the unredacted filing, it has become clear that Goldman had more involvement than previously believed: In addition to the credit default swaps it bought from AIG, the filing shows that Goldman Sachs also originated many of the underlying assets that AIG and the New York Fed bought back from Société Générale.

    The American people have the right to know how their tax dollars were spent and who benefited most from this back-door bailout,” said Kurt Bardella, spokesman for Issa. “Now that it’s public, let’s see if the sky really does fall as the New York Fed said it would to justify its coverup.”

    Other lawmakers believed that the New York Fed was trying to hide its ties to Goldman Sachs.’ AIG Reveals the Story – CNN


    “Wednesday’s hearing described a secretive group deploying billions of dollars to favored banks, operating with little oversight by the public or elected officials.

    We’re talking about the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, whose role as the most influential part of the federal-reserve system — apart from the matter of AIG’s bailout — deserves further congressional scrutiny…

    By pursuing this line of inquiry, the hearing revealed some of the inner workings of the New York Fed and the outsized role it plays in banking. This insight is especially valuable given that the New York Fed is a quasi-governmental institution that isn’t subject to citizen intrusions such as freedom of information requests, unlike the Federal Reserve.

    This impenetrability comes in handy since the bank is the preferred vehicle for many of the Fed’s bailout programs. It’s as though the New York Fed was a black-ops outfit for the nation’s central bank

    New York Fed staff and outside lawyers from Davis Polk & Wardell edited AIG communications to investors and intervened with the Securities and Exchange Commission to shield details about the buyout transactions, according to a report by Issa.

    That the New York Fed, a quasi-governmental body, was able to push around the SEC, an executive-branch agency, deserves a congressional hearing all by itself.” Secret Banking Cabal Emerges From AIG Shadows – Reilly – Bloomberg

    Hat Tip to : Jesse

    NY Fed Conspired to Hide Details of AIG Bailouts from Public and Congress

     

    http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_H2DePAZe2gA/SwVeYK_iRhI/AAAAAAAAKfo/1cF46qmVe0Q/s1600/mask_-_weil.JPG

     

    “Hindsight is a wonderful thing,” said Timothy W. Long, the chief bank
    examiner for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. “At the height of
    the economic boom, to take an aggressive supervisory approach and tell people to
    stop lending is hard to do.” Post Mortems Reveal Obvious Risks at Banks, NY Times

     

    With so much complexity, and uncertainty about future performance, it is not surprising that the securities are difficult to price and that trading dried up. Without market prices, valuation on the books of banks is suspect and counterparties are reluctant to deal with each other.

    The policy response to this problem has been circuitous. The Federal Reserve originally saw the problem as a lack of liquidity in the banking system, and beginning in late 2007 flooded the market with liquidity through new lending facilities. It had very limited success, as banks were still disinclined to buy or trade such securities or take them as collateral. Credit spreads remained higher than normal. In September 2008 credit spreads skyrocketed and credit markets froze. By then it was clear that the problem was not liquidity, but rather the insolvency risks of counterparties with large holdings of toxic assets on their books.

    The federal government then decided to buy the toxic assets. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was enacted in October 2008 with $700 billion in funding. But that was not how the TARP funds were used. The Treasury concluded that the valuation problem seemed insurmountable, so it attacked the risk issue by bolstering bank capital, buying preferred stock.

    But those toxic assets are still there. The latest disposal scheme is the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). The concept is that private asset managers would create investment funds of half private and half Treasury (TARP) capital, which would bid on packages of toxic assets that banks offered for sale. The responsibility for valuation is thus shifted to the private sector. But the pricing difficulty remains and this program too may amount to little.

    The fundamental problem has remained untouched: insufficient information to permit estimated prices that both buyers and sellers find credible. Why is the information so hard to obtain? While the original MBS pools were often Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered public offerings with considerable detail, CDOs were sold in private placements with confidentiality agreements. Moreover, the nature of the securitization process has made it extremely difficult to determine and follow losses and increasing risk from one tranche and pool to another, and to reach the information about the original borrowers that is needed to estimate future cash flows and price.

    This account makes it clear why transparency is so important. To deal with the problem, issuers of asset-backed securities should provide extensive detail in a uniform format about the composition of the original pools and their subsequent structure and performance, whether they were sold as SEC-registered offerings or private placements. By creating a centralized database with this information, the pricing process for the toxic assets becomes possible. Making such a database a reality will restart private securitization markets and will do more for the recovery of the economy than yet another redesign of administrative agency structures. If issuers are not forthcoming, then they should be required to file the information publicly with the SEC.

    Mr. Scott is a professor of securities and corporate law at Stanford University and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr. Taylor, an economics professor at Stanford and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of “Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged and Worsened the Financial Crisis” (Hoover Press, 2009).

    Why Toxic Assets Are So Hard to Scrub – Kenneth Scott & John Taylor, WSJ

     

    t’s a game of far more than two halves: more tactical than cricket, more stomach-churning than boxing and more complex than bridge. Throughout a magnificent summer of sport, one competition has lasted longer than any other, and generated the most heated debate. Its goal? To guess when the recession will end.

    Every week, it seems, has brought new economic indicators, good or bad. Indeed, the whole thing has recently descended into farce: first, economists were tripping over themselves to declare that we were heading for a “V-shaped” recovery, in which we soared out of the downturn at speed. Then they realised that the economy had contracted in the first three months of the year at the fastest rate since, most probably, the 1930s (the quarterly figures don’t go back that far), and started talking about “double dips”.

    When Recovery Comes, It Won’t Feel Like It – Ed Conway, Daily Telegraph

     

    The weekend G8 communiqué, coming after four months of stabilisation in most financial markets, seemed to mark the official end of the financial crisis. If so, what lessons should be learnt for economic and financial policies in the months ahead? The history of the crisis in the next few paragraphs may not be the standard version presented by most commentators and economists, yet recent events suggest it to be a plausible account of what went wrong.

    The blunders that produced last autumn’s financial crisis had nothing to do with the supposedly inflationary monetary policies of Alan Greenspan, or the fiscal profligacy of Gordon Brown, or with Mervyn King’s lack of practical market experience, or Hu Jintao’s mercantilist approach to currencies and exports. All these and many other factors contributed to the vulnerability of the world economy, but none of them would have been enough to cause its near-collapse last autumn. For that we can blame the unforced errors of a man almost forgotten since he slipped quietly out of office at the beginning of this year: Henry Paulson, the former US Treasury Secretary and ex-chairman of Goldman Sachs.

    To understand how a localised financial problem in one segment of the US mortgage market turned into a near-collapse of the global financial system we need to recall Mr Paulson’s astonishing misuse of mark-to-market accounting standards to expropriate the shareholders of Fannie Mae and then to bankrupt Lehman Brothers. What made matters even worse was his inability to understand the systemic consequences of what he was doing. Anyone who doubts the importance of individuals in economic history should recall that the single worst day of last autumn’s entire financial crisis, as measured by the widening of risk spreads on interbank credit, was September 23. That was the day Mr Paulson appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to explain what he wanted to do with the $700 billion he had requested from Congress. This was the moment when everyone realised the world’s most powerful economic official did not know what he was doing.

    Once the key role of personalities and financial policies is recognised, it is hardly surprising that things began to improve almost as soon as Mr Paulson was replaced by a competent Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner. A collapse of share prices on Wall Street triggered by the Lehman bankruptcy in September ended the very day after President Obama responded to attacks on Mr Geithner’s personal probity by offering his unqualified support. A week later, the suicidal mark-to-market accounting regulations were dismantled. And it is no coincidence that the financial crisis, at least in America and Britain, effectively ended that week. From that point onwards, the US Government found itself collecting tens of billions of dollars in repayments from supposedly insolvent banks. Far from being forced to nationalise almost every bank and running out of money with which to refinance toxic assets, as predicted by panic-mongering Nobel Laureate economists, the US Treasury now finds itself almost embarrassed by the hundreds of billions of dollars it has budgeted for supporting a banking system that no longer needs state support.

    Paulson Caused the Financial Crisis – Anatole Kaletsky, Times of London

     

    It’s starting to look like the spring awakening in bank stocks may not be enough to save the CEOs of America’s biggest troubled banks, Citigroup’s Vikram Pandit and Bank of America’s Ken Lewis.

    A top banking regulator is agitating for Pandit’s removal, according to a report Friday in the Wall Street Journal. The clash between Pandit and Sheila Bair, the head of the Federal Insurance Deposit Corp., comes just a month after restive shareholders at Charlotte-based BofA (BAC, Fortune 500) stripped CEO Lewis of his chairmanship.

    The FDIC told CNN it had no comment on the story. Citi (C, Fortune 500) says it stands behind Pandit, who took over as CEO at the end of 2007 and has spent much of his tenure trying to clean up the messes left by his predecessors Chuck Prince and Sandy Weill.

    In a statement to CNN Friday, Citi chairman Dick Parsons said the company was “confident in our management.”

    BofA has similarly endorsed Lewis, and the three-month-long rally in bank stocks has quieted talk of wholesale government takeovers of these firms.

    But given the massive investor losses at these banks and the failure of their top managers to anticipate the industry’s meltdown last year, few would shed a tear at either executive’s departure.

    “These companies are sort of the poster children for the excesses that created this crisis,” said Eric Jackson, an activist investor and managing member of Ironfire Capital in Naples, Fla. “I think it’s appropriate for the regulators to push for substantial changes in management and on the boards.” Jackson’s firm does not own shares of either bank.

    Citi and BofA have been the two biggest bank recipients of federal aid since the financial crisis erupted last fall. Together they have taken some $500 billion in federal aid, the lion’s share of which has come in the form of federal guarantees of their troubled assets.

    Recently, both firms have shown some signs that they have broken out of what earlier this year looked like terminal decline.

    Shares of Citi have tripled since Pandit surprised Wall Street by saying Citi was on track for its first quarterly profit since mid-2007. BofA’s stock price has quadrupled during the same time frame.

    Both banks went on to report better-than-expected first-quarter results in April. Those surprises further boosted the shares even as many observers warned the numbers were padded by one-time gains and legal but incredible accounting maneuvers, such as profits tied to the declining value of the banks’ own debt.

    The hopes of a banking sector recovery only intensified after regulatory stress tests showed banks didn’t need that much more money. The findings helped spur a surge of capital raising from the private sector that has bolstered the balance sheets of many big institutions.

    Citigroup’s Vikram Pandit Is On the Hot Seat – Colin Barr, Fortune



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