Republicans aren’t content with blocking anyone and everyone from leading the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Next week, they’re planning to attach a series of anti-Dodd-Frank amendments to a noncontroversial economic development bill. One amendment would neuter the CFPB, of course. Gotta keep trying, I guess. Another would repeal the whole law. A third would stop the government identifying too-big-to-fail firms and regulating them more tightly. And that doesn’t even get into the ongoing efforts to defund the agencies that need to implement the various regulations, or the language in the GOP budget repealing the government’s authority to dismantle firms that are about to detonate the financial system.

One possibility here is that I Rip Van Winkled it for a bit and banks got really popular while I was snoring under a tree. So I asked Gallup. The answer? Nope. Wall Street’s got the sort of poll numbers usually reserved for the guy who ran over your dog when you were a kid, or the boss who fired you from your first job. Almost 70 percent of Americans think they’ve got to much power in Washington. That’s four points below the much-beloved lobbyist class and tied with “major corporations.” Allying with the banks is not how you get ahead in American politics.

Perhaps this just shows that so long as your issue isn’t atop the polls, you can take whatever position you want. Perhaps it shows that substantive positions are meaningless — Republicans often pretend that their agenda is anti-bank, even though it echoes the banks’ agenda almost precisely, and even though they’ve not proposed an alternative package of financial regulations to take its place. Perhaps it just shows what the aforementioned Gallup poll shows: Banks are very powerful in Washington.

 

But those are all political explanations. What about among Republicans themselves? The tea party doesn’t much like the banks. The Republican legislators who had to vote for TARP and listen to Ben Bernanke talk up the chances of armageddon can’t want to go through that again, right? My only hypothesis here is that the Fannie Man/Freddie Mac/CRA explanation, though discredited, has become such conventional wisdom on the Republican side of the aisle that they think, though can’t clearly say, that regulation of Wall Street isn’t really needed. The problem was Washington, and you can’t solve that with more Washington.

Nevertheless, it’s depressing. If anything, Dodd-Frank didn’t go nearly far enough. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau isn’t strong enough. But it barely took three years for the pendulum in Washington to swing from “it’s time to get a handle on Wall Street” to “leave Wall Street alone!” Even if Dodd-Frank survives this round of attacks, it’s pretty obvious that any approach that relies on regulators is an approach that, sooner than later, Congress will undermine.

Republican Attack On Financial Reform – Klein


 

In the present system, the more unrestricted the banks are, the more money they can generate “out of thin air,” and the more damage they can inflict upon the wealth-generation process. FULL ARTICLE by Frank Shostak

 

Satyajit Das, who knows more about derivatives than I know about anything, has a guest post on naked capitalism about derivatives regulation. The quick summary? Don’t bet on it.

“‘Holy water’, ‘hosanna’s’ or other utterances (based on particular religious convictions) will be sprinkled or said in the form of initiatives to improve disclosure, increase capital and a new centralised counterparty (’CCP’) to reduce the risk of a major dealer failing. Fundamental issues – the use for derivative for speculation, mis-selling of instruments to less sophisticated market participants, complexity, valuation problems – will not be substantively addressed.”

In particular, Das points out that the industry is already aiming to weaken what regulations Treasury has proposed, including centralized clearing of standardized derivatives.

“On 17 September 2009, Robert Pickel, ISDA’s CEO, argued before the U.S. House Agriculture Committee: ‘Not all standardized contracts can be cleared.’ He argued that that even if they have standardized economic terms many derivatives contracts will be ‘difficult if not impossible to clear’ because the CCP depends on such factors as liquidity, trading volume and daily pricing. This would, Pickel argued, make ‘it difficult for a clearinghouse to calculate collateral requirements consistent with prudent risk management.’

“Dan Budofsky, a partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, who testified on behalf of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, agreed that ‘it may be more appropriate for products that trade less frequently to trade over-the-counter.’”

How these debates work out will depend on a few Congressional committees and the regulatory agencies that end up writing the actual rules. That’s why it is important for these debates to happen in the full glare of public attention. Unfortunately, public attention has moved on, which is exactly what the industry is counting on.

By James Kwak

Financial Regulation, the Pessimistic View by James Kwak

 

It is hard to argue that deregulation of the financial services industry was rampant in Washington when the spending on finance and banking regulatory agencies kept growing so fast. Let’s look at the numbers.

Is This What Deregulation Looks Like? – Veronique de Rugy, The American

Also,

Regulation and Its Unintended Consequences

Most bankers deserve the backlash they are experiencing right now. The absurd mistakes and sheer stupidity we have seen in the financial markets in the last decade are not what we were supposed to expect from the Masters of the Universe. And the cost of the bailouts gives a whole new meaning to the concept of “bank robber.”

But bankers are not the only ones we should look at in a new light. Another casualty of the crisis should be belief in the powers and virtues of government regulators, because their fingerprints are all over the crime scene as well.

Regulation & Unintended Consequences – Johan Norberg, RealClearMarkets

 

House Passes Executive Compensation Bill

The House Friday passed legislation to expand regulatory oversight of executive compensation and give shareholders a bigger say over what corporate executives are paid. [Read More]

 

Some view the issue from the standpoint of protecting free markets.  Is constraining speculation in commodities any different than controlling investment in stocks and bonds?  However, commodities are not traditional investment assets and their markets need governance that differs from that of the capital markets.   We readily accept limitations in capital market transactions:  prohibitions on insiders trading, for example.  Commodity markets have different but equally important rules, rules meant to ensure that speculators can’t overwhelm efficient market pricing.  It’s time for our regulators to enforce them.

Why Commodity Speculation Is Different – Jeff Korzenik, Financial Times

 

More than half the investors who go through a Wall Street arbitration get nothing at all, and those who do win get about half what they claim to have lost. Once they are in a hearing room, investors typically face a panel of three judges that includes someone from the very industry that got them into the mess in the first place — Wall Street.

Kangaroo Courts for Investors Continue – Susan Antilla, Bloomberg

 

An analysis of the U.S., the E.U. and Switzerland.

Regulatory Reform: A Primer – Nouriel Roubini & Elisa Parisi-Capone, Forbes

 

Obama’s Regulatory Reform Isn’t Enough – Clive Crook, Financial Times

Barack Obama’s Regulatory Changes Are Hopeless – John Tamny, Forbes

 

What does it tell you when banks, investment houses, insurance companies and derivatives traders are so pleased with their regulators that they are prepared to pull out all the stops to keep them?

What it tells me is that the current system of financial regulation has been thoroughly captured by the companies it was meant to restrain — and that the only way to put things right is to bring in new rules, a new structure and tough new regulators. Anything short of that, and you can almost guarantee that the inmates will be back in charge of the asylum by the time the next bubble starts to develop.

Judged by that standard, the proposals the Obama administration put forward this week to reform the regulatory apparatus were a bit of a disappointment.

If you have to set up a council of regulators just to harmonize the rules used by different bank regulators, why not bite the bullet and consolidate them into a single agency?

How are safety and soundness of the financial system furthered by allowing regulated banks to run “proprietary trading desks” that are nothing more than in-house hedge funds?

Should oversight of giant markets in financial futures and derivatives continue to be regulated by an agency set up to regulate hog prices and corn futures just because members of the congressional agriculture committees can raise political funds from Wall Street fat cats?

Regulatory Reform That Falls Short – Steven Pearlstein, Washington Post

Also:

Wall Street Fights New Regulations – Editorial, Investor’s Business Daily

Obama’s Regulatory Reform: Our Money In Danger – Peter Morici, NPR

We Need Greater Global Governance – Peter Mandelson, Wall Street Journal

 

Simon Johnson, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, is the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund.

There is much to worry about in President Obama’s financial regulation proposal, officially unveiled on Wednesday. It’s a long wish list, but intense and nontransparent financial sector lobbying already ensured that four out of the five sets of measures are unlikely to have any lasting positive impact.

As Stephen Labaton reports:

“In the last two weeks alone, the administration has heard from top executives from Goldman Sachs, MetLife, Allstate, JPMorgan Chase, Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Barclays, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley, Travelers, Prudential and Wells Fargo, among others. Administration officials also discussed the president’s plan with the top lobbyists at major financial trade associations in Washington.”

What is the outcome of all this behind-the-scenes maneuvering to get the financial sector fully on board? Not much change that we can really believe in.

For example, take the points that President Obama himself stresses (e.g., in this interview). First and foremost, he says the Federal Reserve will become the official “system risk regulator” (section 1 of his proposal). But in principle the Fed had exactly this kind of leadership role before — and under both Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke it was a reckless cheerleader and facilitator for the unsustainable real estate boom.

If the Fed had been stronger before, the crisis now would be worse.

Hedge funds and other private pools of capital have to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, also in section 1. But the once-proud S.E.C. has fallen on hard times, effectively just as much captured by the intellectual bubble of Wall Street as all our other regulators.

Originators of securitized products will be required to retain some stake in what they issue (section 2). But the major shock of early 2008 was when we learned that Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and others had done exactly that. There is no serious attempt here to recognize that our leading financial firms have completely failed in their efforts to measure and control risks.

In addition, the administration will now seek a “resolution authority” that makes it easier to take over and shut down large financial companies (section 4 in the proposal). But effectively they had this power before — Continental Illinois, for example, was handled as a negotiated conservatorship in the 1980s, and Citigroup could have been taken over at various points in the past nine months. The government blinked in the face of financial sector complexity and scale. “Too big to fail” is “too big to exist,” but the president’s document goes nowhere near this fundamental principle.

And while the proposal is no doubt right to emphasize the need for international cooperation in re-regulation, section 5 is so vague as to be meaningless.

There is, however, one interesting piece — the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (section 3). The president himself seems to recognize that previous consumer protection was scattered and ineffectual. A strong agency could help protect us all both in boom times and during crises.

But protecting consumers is not the same thing as protecting investors and taxpayers. Major financial players will once again be able to float bubbles, creating the illusion of growth and the reality of further expensive bailouts.

Our financial sector has become very powerful politically — and these proposals are a further sad reminder of that fact.

The Defanging of Obama’s Regulation Plan – Simon Johnson, Economix

 

From Bloomberg:

May 20 (Bloomberg) — The Obama administration may call for stripping the Securities and Exchange Commission of some of its powers under a regulatory reorganization that could be unveiled as soon as next week, people familiar with the matter said.

The proposal, still being drafted, is likely to give the Federal Reserve more authority to supervise financial firms deemed too big to fail. The Fed may inherit some SEC functions, with others going to other agencies, the people said. On the table: giving oversight of mutual funds to a bank regulator or a new agency to police consumer-finance products, two people said.

The 75-year-old SEC, chartered to oversee Wall Street and safeguard investors, has seen its reputation tarnished as some lawmakers blamed it for missing the incipient financial crisis and failing to detect Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion Ponzi scheme. Any move to rein in the agency is likely to provoke a battle in Congress, which would need to approve the changes, and draw the ire of union pension funds and other advocates for shareholders.

“It would be a terrible mistake,” said Stanley Sporkin, a former federal judge and enforcement chief at the SEC. “Whatever the SEC has done or didn’t do, it is still the premier investor protection agency around.”

Schapiro Determination

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro’s agency has been mostly absent from negotiations within the administration on the regulatory overhaul, and she has expressed frustration about not being consulted, according to people who have spoken with her. She has pledged to fight any attempt to diminish the SEC, they said.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner was set to discuss proposals to change financial regulations at a dinner last night with National Economic Council Director Lawrence Summers, former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, ex-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and Elizabeth Warren, the Harvard University law professor who heads the congressional watchdog group for the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program.

Levitt, in an interview today with Bloomberg Television, said it’s unlikely the SEC will ultimately be stripped of its responsibilities.

“I don’t think it’s a great idea nor do I necessarily think it’s going to happen,” Levitt said. The SEC “is a pretty powerful unit and to substitute that for a new bureaucracy is a mistake. I don’t think policy makers are likely to go down that path.”

 

Regulators are supposed to tell you to obey the law, not to disobey the law. If you’re the CEO, your first obligation is not to your regulator, it’s to your institution and shareholders.”

-Jonathan R. Macey, deputy dean of Yale Law School

I have not commented on the allegations by Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis that he was forced into making a disastrous acquisition of Merrill Lynch.

Why? Because they appeared to me be utter and shameless nonsense, an attempt to worm out of responsibility.  Indeed, the very statements by Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis appeared to be excuse-making for a lousy acquisition (which Bof A has quite the history of). Its the sort of weasely responsibility evading CEO speak we have come to expect these days. To be blunt, I was astonished anyone took them very seriously.

Yet they were taken seriously, by quite a few people — including a huge front page Wall Street Journal article. The mere accusation means that we are likely to see former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson — a major cause of the credit crisis and a horrific bailout steward — up for a major grilling in Congress.

This morning, in the same WSJ venue, we learn that many of the statements Ken Lewis made under oath were directly contradicted by former Merrill CEO John Thain (but not under oath). Thain claims these understandings were in in writing.

One of these  two CEOs is lying, and if its the guy who was doing so in sworn testimony, he may have a very big problem on his hands.

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