Policymakers are running out of options. Currency devaluation is a zero-sum game, because not all countries can depreciate and improve net exports at the same time. Monetary policy will be eased as inflation becomes a non-issue in advanced economies (and a lesser issue in emerging markets). But monetary policy is increasingly ineffective in advanced economies, where the problems stem from insolvency – and thus creditworthiness – rather than liquidity.

Meanwhile, fiscal policy is constrained by the rise of deficits and debts, bond vigilantes, and new fiscal rules in Europe. Backstopping and bailing out financial institutions is politically unpopular, while near-insolvent governments don’t have the money to do so. And, politically, the promise of the G-20 has given way to the reality of the G-0: weak governments find it increasingly difficult to implement international policy coordination, as the worldviews, goals, and interests of advanced economies and emerging markets come into conflict.

As a result, dealing with stock imbalances – the large debts of households, financial institutions, and governments – by papering over solvency problems with financing and liquidity may eventually give way to painful and possibly disorderly restructurings. Likewise, addressing weak competitiveness and current-account imbalances requires currency adjustments that may eventually lead some members to exit the eurozone.

Restoring robust growth is difficult enough without the ever-present specter of deleveraging and a severe shortage of policy ammunition. But that is the challenge that a fragile and unbalanced global economy faces in 2012. To paraphrase Bette Davis in All About Eve, “Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy year!”

Fasten Your Seatbelts For Rough 2012 – Nouriel Roubini, Project Syndicate

Nouriel Roubini is Chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor at the Stern School of Business, New York University. His detailed 2012 global growth outlook is available at www.roubini.com

 

It’s official: The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) plan announced at the EU summit on October 27th is essentially dead prior to arrival.

As a consequence, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy appear to be betraying signs of throwing in the towel on the Euro project as it exists today. They appear to be actively contemplating ways to engineer an orderly breakup of the Euro.

As financial market participants gets wind of their intentions – albeit tentative – expect financial markets to accelerate the unfolding of events. The entire Euro edifice could collapse before the New Year.

EFSF Chief: The Insurance Plan Is Dead Prior To Arrival

When the Chief of the EFSF is pessimistic about the capacity of the EFSF to be leveraged to an extent that is adequate to the task at hand, then you might as well kiss the whole thing goodbye.

In a little noted article in Thursday’s FT, Klaus Regling, head of the EFSF essentially admitted that the plan agreed upon at the EU summit on October summit to use the EFSF as collateral for a first-loss insurance scheme is essentially dead.

As I predicted would occur in an article of mine several weeks ago entitled “Europe’s Inane Idea: Fake Brady Bonds,” the EFSF chief has acknowledged that there is no interest on the part of investors to purchase PIIGS bonds with a first-loss guarantee of only 20%.

Regling believes that a first-loss guarantee of 30% may be required to garner any interest.

Personally, I have serious doubts that there would be sufficient interest. Any issuance that actually requires a 30% loss guarantee in order to be viable simply has an implicit default risk profile that will be unable to garner sponsorship of sufficient size.

Since there are only about 250 billion euros available for the EFSF first-loss insurance scheme, that means that, even assuming 30% were sufficient, the mechanism would only be adequate to cover about 800 billion euros worth of debt issuance by Italy and Spain — and any other euro area country that needed funding.

It has been estimated that roughly two trillion euros of funding are needed to simply merely meet projected roll-over and fresh financing needs through mid 2013. Therefore, the 800 billion projection is totally insufficient to the task at hand.

If $800 billion in guarantees are all that Europe can come up with, Europe would probably better off wasting precious resources on this scheme at all.

That is why the EFSF first-loss guarantee proposal seems to be dead on arrival. The plan is totally insufficient, and therefore is unlikely to be implemented at all.

I believe that this realization is thoroughly discouraging the Eurocrats that are charged with structuring the EFSF insurance facility and selling it to investors. These Eurocrats are relaying their pessimism back to Merkel and Sarkozy in real time. This in turn, is prompting Merkel and Sarkozy to begin to contemplate “exit strategies.”

Imminent Fiasco

Because Merkel and Sarkozy are unwilling or are unable to support the only viable option available to them that is to fund bond purchases via the ECB, they appear to be engaging in preliminary speculations regarding a possible exit plan. The problem is that there is no viable exit plan that would not entail a total economic and financial disaster.

It will be impossible for Merkel, Sarkozy and other European leaders to prepare an exit strategy without their intentions being leaked to the press. Financial markets will therefore unravel any and all plans that they contemplate before they can even commit them to paper.

As soon as markets realize that the original EFSF scheme is being abandoned and that the entire Euro project will be restructured, the Euro will be crushed, the European banking system will become insolvent and global financial markets will freeze up.

Merkozy Musings

Sarkozy is already openly musing about a “two-speed” Europe. He envisions a group of countries that will quickly move towards tight fiscal and economic integration and another group of countries that will remain fiscally and monetarily independent.

Sarkozy has stated that he believes that a tight federation is impossible for a large group of economically, politically and culturally disparate countries. The implication is that the group of 16 nations that currently comprise the Euro is probably too large to be manageable.

At the same time, Merkel is already dreaming about a “New Europe.” Exactly what Germany’s Chancellor means by this is ambiguous. However, it is clear that Merkel has in mind much tighter fiscal and economic integration. In this regard Merkel must know that several current Euro members may be unable or unwilling to join in such a tight federation.

The problem with Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s musings is that they are completely irrelevant and even counterproductive to the current task at hand. The issues that they are touching on were issues that needed to have been resolved at the inception of the Euro. At this point, the question is how the damage can best be undone, not to debate what should have been.

Conclusion

Merkel and Sarkozy will soon learn that an orderly break-up of the Euro is not possible. Even the slightest hint that a breakup is being contemplated will cause a global financial disturbance that is so great that any perceived benefits of a break-up will be completely overwhelmed by the costs that will be imposed by the market.

Prepare For Europe Collapse Before New Year by James A. Kostohryz


 

Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and other governors at the Fed eventually departed from Reagan’s injunction that monetary policy focus on maintaining stable prices, and started trying to stimulate the economy through old Keynesian policies of easy money.  The Bush Treasury supported that, favoring a cheap dollar in response to ubiquitous business lobbyists in Washington more than willing to sacrifice the long term economy to their short term export goals.  The central role of the resulting Fed policies in causing the financial crisis was most authoritatively explained by Stanford Economics Professor and monetary policy guru John Taylor in his timely book, Getting Off Track.  Taylor begins:

The classic explanation of financial crises, going back hundreds of years, is that they are caused by excesses  — frequently monetary excesses — that lead to a boom and an inevitable bust.  In the recent crisis we had a housing boom and bust, which in turn led to financial turmoil in the United States and other countries.  I begin by showing that monetary excesses were the main cause of the boom and the resulting bust.

Economics Professor Lawrence H. White now of George Mason University elaborates:

In the recession of 2001, the Federal Reserve System…began aggressively expanding the U.S. money supply.  Year-over-year growth in the M-2 monetary aggregate rose briefly above 10 percent, and remained above 8 percent entering the second half of 2003.  The expansion was accompanied by the Fed repeatedly lowering its target for the federal funds (interbank short term) interest rate.  The federal funds rate began 2001 at 6.25 percent and ended the year at 1.75 percent.  It was reduced further in 2002 and 2003, in mid-2003 reaching a record low of 1 percent, where it stayed for a year.  The real Fed funds rate was negative…for two and a half years.  In purchasing power terms, during that period a borrower was not paying but rather gaining in proportion to what he borrowed.  Economist Steve Hanke has summarized the result: This set off the mother of all liquidity cycles and yet another massive demand bubble.

From early 2001 until late 2006, as White further explains, “the Fed pushed the actual federal funds rate below the estimated rate that would have been consistent with targeting a 2% inflation.”  That estimated rate is determined by what is known in economics as the Taylor Rule.  Steve Forbes adds, “In 2004, the Federal Reserve made a fateful miscalculation.  It thought the U.S. economy was much weaker than it was and therefore pumped out excess liquidity and kept interest rates artificially low.”

White continues:

The demand bubble thus created went heavily into real estate.  From mid-2003 to mid-2007, while the dollar volume of final sales of goods and services was growing at 5 percent to 7 percent, real estate loans at commercial banks were growing at 10-17 percent.  Credit fueled demand pushed up the sale prices of existing houses and encouraged the construction of new housing on undeveloped land, in both cases absorbing the increased dollar volume of mortgages.  Because real estate is an especially long-lived asset, its market value is especially boosted by low interest rates.

Sustained below-market interest rates distort huge flows of investment into housing in particular because the lower rates most favor the longest term investments.

But low interest rates by themselves do not mean monetary policy is excessively loose.  That depends on what market prices are saying, as reflected by the dollar, gold and inflation.  The Fed’s loose monetary policies during the Bush Administration, however, also generated sharp declines in the dollar.  The dollar was worth 1.15 euros near the start of 2002, but it declined by close to 50% near to 0.6 Euros by the start of 2008.  The price of gold soared from $350 near the end of 2002 to almost $1,000 by the start of 2008.  Even inflation, defeated 25 years previously, started to come back, increasing from 1.55% at the end of 2001, to as high as 5.6% in July 2008.

The cheap dollar monetary policy further inflated the housing bubble because it generated flight into real assets to escape the depreciating greenback.  This also explains why the housing crisis showed up virtually worldwide.  The Fed managing the world’s reserve currency effectively exported its weak currency policy globally.  Other countries loosen their monetary policies to avoid the negative short term trade implications of appreciating currencies relative to the dollar.  Moreover, the dollar’s weakness masks the looseness of their monetary policies, misleading them into even looser policies.

When the Fed finally realized it had to rein in its loose monetary policy, soaring housing prices slowed, flattened out and then tipped into declines.  The steep decline in housing prices produced chaos throughout the financial industry in the U.S., and ultimately the world, as widespread financial assets based on housing collapsed in value.  As Taylor concluded, “[The] extra-easy [Fed monetary] policy accelerated the housing boom and thereby ultimately led to the housing bust.”

How Our Government Created the Financial Crisis – Peter Ferrara, Forbes

 

The last 10 years have been the worst for Western civilization since the 1930s. At the onset of the new millennium North America, Europe and Oceania stood at the cutting edge of the future, with new technologies and a lion’s share of the world’s GDP.  At its end, most of these economies limped, while economic power – and all the influence it can buy politically – had shifted to China, India and other developing countries.

This past decade China’s economic growth rate, at 10% per annum, grew to five times that U.S.; the gap was even more disparate between China and the slower-growing  E.U.,  Yet periods of slow economic growth occur throughout history — recall the 1970s — and economies recover. The bigger problem facing Western countries, then, is a metaphysical one — a malady that the British writer Austin Williams has dubbed “the poverty of ambition.”

This lack of ambition plagues virtually every Western country. The ability to act has become shackled by a profound pessimism that according to a recent Gallup survey

Attitudes have consequences. The rising stars of the non-Western world — from the United Arab Emirates to Singapore and China — are building cities with startling new architecture and bold infrastructure. Their entrepreneurs are expanding their operations across the planet. contrasts with the optimism found not only in rising states like China, India and Brazil, but also deeply impoverished places like Bangladesh.

Of course, you can chortle at the outrageous overbuilding in places like Dubai, but the Western world might do better to appreciate the scope of their ambition. Indeed, for years New York’s Empire State building, erected  during the Depression, was derided as  ”the empty state building.” Today it’s visionary developers like Iraqi-born Istabraq Janabi who are planning unlikely  new structures even  in  troubled places like Ramadi, Iraq.

The difference in ambition can be seen clearly at airports, which now serve as the entry halls of the global economy. A traveler to John F. Kennedy Airport, Heathrow, Charles De Gualle LAX or Dulles passes through decayed remnants of fading late 20th century buildings and technology. In contrast, airports in Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore offer clean, ultra-modern facilities with often impressive design.

The West’s retreat from space exploration further underscores its metaphysical poverty. Today, Europe and the U.S., the world’s historic leader in the field, are cutting back on plans to explore the cosmos, which has included a manned operation to the moon. President Obama wants NASA to focus more on issues regarding climate change instead. In contrast, the rising countries of Asia, notably China and India, have begun plans for manned flights to the moon and beyond.

This divergence is not about resources; it is about the growing conviction in the West that moving forward is an illusion or, as the British academic John Gray’s puts it, “progress is a myth.”  Victorian empire-makers and intellectuals, like their republican American successors, believed perhaps naively in the potential of humanity, economic and technological progress. Today our intellectual and political classes have gone to the other extreme.

The West’s politics are in the grips of two profoundly retrograde mentalities. One, a small-minded conservatism, harks back to the “golden” age of the 1950s when Western power faced only a flawed Soviet challenge. The idealistic but flawed commitment to imposing democracy by force of the Bush years has faded; it has been replaced by an obsession with taming a bloated public sector. While this focus may be justified, it is fundamentally more reactive than proscriptive.

The Left, which once portrayed itself as the bastion of scientific rationalism, increasingly embraces neo-druidism, a secular form of nature worship. This tendency’s roots can be traced back to the “Limits to Growth” ideology of the early 1970s which projected, mostly mistakenly, that the planet was about to run out of everything from food to oil. Concerns over climate change have transformed this dismal sentiment into a theology, with carbon emissions treated as a form of original sin.

The anti-progress nature of the new Left is unmistakable. Rather than seek ways to control climate change, suggests The Guardian’s George Monbiot, environmentalism is engaged in “a battle to redefine humanity.” Monbiot believes the era of economic growth needs to come to an inevitable denouement; that “the age of heroism” will be followed by the decline of the “expanders” and the rise of the “restrainers.”

Europe, particularly the U.K., suffers acutely from metaphysical angst.  Once touted as the new great power by its leaders and their American claque, the E.U. is quickly dissolving along cultural and historical lines; this is especially evident in the division between the  resilient countries of the north (something like the Hansa trading states of the late Middle Ages) and the weaker countries along the periphery. For the most part, Europe no longer seems capable of doing much more than finding ways to control an unaffordable welfare state without tearing about its social net. The once cherished notion of a multi-racial “new” Europe largely has dissolved as immigration has devolved from a source of demographic and cultural salvation to a widely perceived threat to the E.U.’s economic and social health as well as security.

Such defeatism usually has less success in the United States. But America’s “progressive” left increasingly resembles its European cousins.  Obama’s science advisor, John Holdren, has been a long-time advocate of the idea of “de-development,” the purposeful slowing of growth in advanced countries in order to protect the environment. The critical infrastructure needed to accommodate upward of another  100 million Americans — new dams in the west, intelligent development of our vast natural gas reserves and building new cities, airports and ports  – are not at the center of either party’s platforms. These could be financed largely with private sources, given the right incentives.

Read it all: Poverty of Ambition: Why the West Is Losing to China – Joel Kotkin, Forbes

 

MAD MEAT! How Securitized Lending Collapsed the Financial System, Eric Von Berg (a commercial property mortgage banker and was the President of the California Mortgage Bankers Association during the heat of the market who has been watching “Regulatory Reform” as a member of the Commercial Board of Governors of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America). This is an absolutely must read! It has a few pages of set up to a fable of sorts, but when you get to page 6 of the slide presentation, it becomes laser sharp and funny. To wit:

The disclosures were typically so numerous and far fetched that the real risks were overlooked…

Sponsor Disclosure. Sponsor has various conflicts of interest. Not printed: We set up a book making operation taking bets on whether you will get sick and die from this product. Are we also making bets? “You betcha!” Which side are we betting on? According to the SEC, we are allowed to tell you, “None of your business!”

Hat Tip to Naked Capitalism

 

Washington’s Blog

Greenspan’s big defense is that the financial crisis was caused by a “once-in-a-century” event.

Forget about the fact that the “once-in-a-century event” couldn’t have happened if Greenspan’s Fed hadn’t:

  • Acted as cheerleader in chief for unregulated use of derivatives at least as far back as 1999 (see this and this)
  • Allowed the giant banks to grow into mega-banks. For example, Citigroup’s former chief executive says that when Citigroup was formed in 1998 out of the merger of banking and insurance giants, Greenspan told him, “I have nothing against size. It doesn’t bother me at all”
  • Preached that a new bubble be blown every time the last one bursts
  • Kept interest rates too low
  • And did alot of other hinky things

More importantly, as Nassim Taleb repeatedly points out, financial experts who don’t plan for rare events are like pilots who don’t know about storms.

There are storms out there, Taleb says, and any pilot who doesn’t know how to deal with storms shouldn’t be flying. Similarly, no one should be in a position of financial leadership if they don’t know about – and plan for – the infrequent event:

Greenspan: The Financial Crisis Was Caused By A ‘Once-In-A-Century’ Event • Taleb: Any Pilot Who Doesn’t Know About Storms Shouldn’t Be In the Cockpit

 

Richard Smith, a London-based capital markets information technology manager, was kind enough to provide an advance copy of his review for the book ECONned: How Unenlightened Self Interest Undermined Democracy and Corrupted Capitalism by Yves Smith, the author of the well-known financial blog Naked Capitalism.

Mr. Smith (real name, and no relation to Yves) helped in the proofing of the copy and fact searches, so he was already well familiar with the text. Perhaps this makes him a not entirely dispassionate source, given the regard that even copy editors can obtain for their associated works. But I thought it was a very nice summary of many of the salient points, and that you would enjoy having the opportunity to read it.

I intend to read the book in order to both learn something, and to be entertained as well. I love reading accounts of this period of time that are both authoritative and well-written, and understandable by the non-expert. Given the author’s performance on her blog, and her detailed industry knowledge and experience, it looks to be a ‘must read’ for those following the financial crisis and its associated developments.

Reading ECONned
By Richard Smith

http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/03/guest-post-econned-book-review.html

Sic transit America?

 A Growing List Of One Term Presidents, A State of Distress, A Time To Repent, AIG and all that....., “the Greenspan doctrine”, Back to the basics, Collateral Damage, Coming Social Unrest, Commercial Real Estate Bust, Consumption Ran the Old Economy, Coup d'etat in America, Death of the Dollar, Deflation-Inflation-Stagflation, Devaluation, Dismal Science-Ignorant Scientists?, Even the Terminator Can't Help California, Federal Reserve-Discussion, Figures don't lie but Liars can figure, Integrity and Responsibility, Is The Market Rally Real?, It Is Nice To Be Part of the Elite!, It starts with a foundation, IT'S ALL ABOUT POWER AND MONEY, Monetary Policy - Discussion, Our phony middle class, Patience is a virtue...Delusion is a vice, Political Chaos, Politicians, Prostitutes and Pimps All Rhyme, Small Business-Bedrock of America, Sub-Prime anytime, TARP fruit loops, The Arrogance of Power, The Consequences of Greed, The Democrats Blew It Again, The End of American Capitalism As We Know It? - Discuss, The excellent adventures of Ben Bernanke, The Financial Elite, The Global Economy, The Habits of Hedge Funds, The Importance of Strategic Planning, The Inherent Disorder of Empires, The Intrusion of UNLAWFUL Authority, The Judeo-Christian Political Coalition, The New American Socialism, The Sorry State Of American Manufacturing, Time For A New Third Party, Truth In Charity, Unemployment Catastrophe, US Trade Imbalance, USA Is the New Japan, We Are All Cooked, We Are All Guilty, We Have Become Beggars To The World  No Responses »
Jan 162010
 
An American sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington
Flagging: a US sailor stands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington

If a week is a long time in politics, a decade is starting to look like an age in geopolitics. Comparing the America that began the 21st century with the America of today is to witness a country that has in some ways quite radically altered its view of itself and its relationship to the world.

In short, the metallic rust of decline has crept into the American soul. “You could argue that the first decade of the 21st century was the last decade of the American century,” says David Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official and student of US foreign policy. “We are now entering the multipolar century.”

Self-doubt tarnishes Brand America

 

My essay in today’s American Spectator Online looks at why Ben Bernanke should not be confirmed to a second term as Chairman of the Federal Reserve:

Two planks in Bernanke’s recovery strategy: Expand the money supply like a banana republic dictator and throw sackfuls of cash at failed companies with a proven track record of mismanaging their assets. The justification? According to the late John Maynard Keynes, this is supposed to restore the “animal spirits” of the cowed consumer, the benighted creature who foolishly imagines that after a period of prodigality and mismanagement, maybe a country should rediscover its inner Dave Ramsey.

The full essay is here.

 

Assume you had put much of your savings into U.S. government bonds and then you learned the following. In just the last eight months, the Congressional Budget Office estimates of the amount of additional federal debt to be held by the public grew by an astounding $4 trillion for the 2010-19 period; and that the amount of federal debt held by the public grew from $5.9 trillion to $7.5 trillion in just the last 12 months.

In addition, you learned that the federal government (i.e., taxpayers) now owns (primarily through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) or insures (through the Federal Housing Administration and other government programs) about 80 percent of the $14.6 trillion of home mortgages outstanding in the United States. Last week, Congress passed a bill requiring all student loans be made by the federal government rather than banks, which means the taxpayers will be 100 percent liable for any student loan defaults.

You also learned that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is considering tapping its Treasury credit line for up to $500 billion. It needs to do this because of the high number of bank failures and because each bank account is insured by the government (i.e., taxpayers) up to $250,000. The president and many in Congress are calling for a roughly $1 trillion health care bill – paid for by additional debt and/or more taxes, which will further slow economic growth, eventually leading to even more debt.

Finally, you also became aware of the following facts: Federal government expenditures are growing far faster than the economy, and thus the government is becoming a larger and larger share of gross domestic product. Obviously, this cannot continue forever because eventually the government would totally drive out the private sector.

The entitlement programs (i.e., Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) all continue to grow faster than the economy, and they will take more than 100 percent of all federal tax revenue this year, requiring that virtually all of the other government spending programs, including defense and interest payments on the debt, be funded by more borrowing.

You are also aware that the government cannot tax its way out of the deficit situation, because increasing income tax rates on the upper income people will both slow the economy and cause them to find legal or illegal ways to avoid the tax increase, and the politicians have pledged to not increase taxes on those making less than $250,000, which includes all but a very few Americans.

Even if the politicians break their pledges not to increase taxes, they still cannot solve the deficit problem as long as they refuse to cut back on the growth in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid – because any new tax revenue will be quickly absorbed by the growth in spending. The best that any tax increase could do is delay the explosion of the debt bomb by, perhaps, a couple of years while further weakening the economy and job growth.

Now suppose you are not an individual bondholder but the Chinese government official responsible for the Chinese economy, and you know your government holds about $1 trillion in U.S. government securities. You have watched Congress and the administration become less and less fiscally responsible – more spending, more taxes, and more debt.

Then suddenly the administration puts punitive tariffs on your tire manufacturers while at the same time refuses to approve the trade treaties with Colombia, Panama and South Korea that have been negotiated.

You understand that these foolish and destructive actions by U.S. government officials indicate it does not understand the importance of free trade in fostering economic growth, and seem to be intent on replicating the mistakes of the 1930s.

The Chinese are not stupid, and they have been vocal in saying they are concerned that U.S. policies will lead to a further fall in the dollar and higher rates of inflation, both of which undermine the value of their investment in U.S. government securities.

The Chinese are now trying to diversify their holdings – and their recent activity in buying large quantities of tradable commodities is probably, in part, a hedge against a falling U.S. dollar. Thus, at the same time, the U.S. government needs to sell trillions of dollars of new bonds. It is by its own actions driving away foreign purchasers of bonds, which can only result in higher interest rates in the United States, which will further slow economic growth.

What is particularly frightening is that neither political party has offered a serious plan to defuse the debt bomb. The Democrats are just piling up more debt as if there were no limit, and the Republicans, to date, are only proposing measures to reduce the increase, rather than reverse it. When the debt bomb explodes – within the next one to three years – expect to see record high real interest rates and/or inflation, coupled with a collapse of many “entitlements.” It will be like the neutron bomb, the buildings will be left standing, but the people will not.

Richard W. Rahn is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and chairman of the Institute for Global Economic Growth.

The Growing Federal Debt Bomb – Richard Rahn, Washington Times

 

On the Peterson Institute for International Economics Monitor, Michael Mussa sits down with Steve Weisman and says that while Asia surges economically, the recession appears to be bottoming out in Europe as well as the United States, but it is too soon to determine the strength of the coming global recovery. See Economic Recovery in Europe?

 

Economic Freefall Ends in Germany and France

Germany and France, Europe’s two largest economies, on Thursday revealed they are officially no longer in recession. Signs of economic green shoots bolstered the euro — and surprised both policymakers and economists. The euro zone economy, however, continues to contract.

 


Export Jump Brings Hope for End of Crisis

German’s Federal Statistics Office released export figures for June on Friday, and they have a lot of people smiling. Exports grew to 68.5 billion euros, a 7 percent rise over May’s figure. The data is the latest in a string of positive economic news being released around the world.

 

In Spain: Bleak forecast puts unemployment at 22% in 2010, Edward Harrison relates that the recovery in Spain will be later than elsewhere in Europe because of the extent of deleveraging, and unemployment will continue to rise.

 

Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott provide detailed analysis in a policy brief on the Buy American provisions of the economic stimulus plan. They look into the three main issues that arise from the provisions in each bill: U.S. jobs, U.S. trade obligations, and U.S. foreign policy. Don’t miss Buy American: Bad for Jobs, Worse for Reputation

 

Bertrand Delgado and Italo Lombardi analyze economic events in Latin America for the weeks between July 20th and the 31st and their impact on macroeconomic conditions moving forward. They focus on monetary policy, inflation, economic activity, labor dynamics, trade accounts, industrial production, and fiscal data. Please read: Latin America – The Week Ahead July 27– 31.

 

As U.S. deficits increased, global investors edged away from the dollar into the German mark, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, the Euro, and more recently baskets of Asian currencies.

Which brings us to today. Only goodwill (defined both as an accounting term and as political deference to military might) now supports the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, which is what allows the United States to issue dollar-denominated bonds in world money markets.

It is this borrowing capacity that allows the Obama administration to bailout the banking industry, offer to pay for universal health care, fight colonial wars in the Middle East, stimulate the economy, send billions to Egypt and Israel, buy out General Motors, and subsidize every windmill start-up company in Nancy Pelosi’s home district. (Madoff’s problem was that he failed to set himself up as a country. He otherwise understood deficit spending.) But the shell game requires full faith in the dollar.

For those riding out financial storms by “sitting on cash,” here is what’s under your seat: in recent months U.S. federal debt has grown to $11.3 trillion, almost equivalent to gross domestic production. About one quarter of this indebtedness, or $2.8 trillion, is held abroad, and China and Japan hold just under half of those assets (liabilities to Uncle Sam).

Elsewhere on the American balance sheet is another $11.4 trillion in household debt, an annual trade deficit of about $725 billion, and a federal budget deficit that is estimated in 2009 to be approaching $1.8 trillion. That’s if the economy grows at 3 percent.

Off-balance sheet risks, what accountants call contingent liabilities, include about $10 trillion in new bailout guarantees (Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, and whatever the administration launches as its New Deal of the Day). None of the above includes the unfunded liabilities of Social Security ($41 trillion), which, by comparison, make the shares of Lehman Brothers and AIG look like Scottish bonds held for widows and orphans.

The geese laying the golden eggs of U.S. financial stability are the printing presses of the U.S. Treasury, and, for now, those collecting them in their Easter baskets include a number of countries and regions perhaps tiring of American arrogance, if not of the drop in the dollar’s value. Who would blame such popular targets of moral abuse as China, Russia, Switzerland, Arabia, or Latin America for dumping their dollar-denominated assets?

All that lies between the U.S. dollar and a financial Armageddon is the Faustian house of credit cards under which Asian economies invest their trade surpluses in U.S. Treasury instruments — to keep the dollar strong, their own currencies weak, and purchases brisk between the likes of Wal-Mart and the Asian Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Sooner than we think, China and Japan, like all nervous creditors, may send the United States a letter, suggesting that, henceforward, if Washington needs to borrow money, the bonds be issued in renmimbi, yen, or a basket of Asian currencies (a Pacific Euro).

Wall Street bankers did the same to the farm interests in the late nineteenth century, when they insisted that debt be based on a gold standard, as opposed to “free silver.” President Obama may be as eloquent as William Jennings Bryan. But at that point he will need to use all his oratory for the business of selling junk bonds.

The Dollar: Running On Reserve – Matthew Stevenson, newgeography

 

Is there a clandestine understanding between the world’s two most powerful central banks, the Federal Reserve and the People’s Bank of China?

Naturally, no one can talk about it, let alone confirm or deny anything. But it’s not too difficult to make out the broad outlines of how Chinese-American monetary cooperation may be working.

People’s Bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan and other figures in the Chinese leadership seem to use every opportunity to broadcast finely calibrated skepticism over the dollar’s future. Such Jeremiahs feed on and — in turn — feed doubts about potential American inflation caused by the Fed’s quantitative easing and exploding budget deficits.

But both Washington and Beijing appear to recognize — whatever the saber-rattling — that large-scale shifts in the currency composition of Chinese currency reserves are more or less impossible. Roughly two-thirds of Chinese reserves of more than $2 trillion are thought to be held in the greenback.

Heavy Chinese sales, or even a deliberate policy of diverting export proceeds into Euro or yen by re-dominating sales contracts, would depress the U.S. currency and lower the value of Chinese reserves. It’s the well-known Beijing dollar trap. And it has to be said: the Chinese have maneuvered themselves into it of their own volition, and in full knowledge of the potential problem.

So Governor Zhou’s strictures are, to a certain extent, shadow boxing. However, in return for a tacit standstill agreement on the currency composition of reserves, the Americans have to acknowledge that the renminbi’s value will rise only moderately.

If the Chinese continue taking in dollars, logic tells us the Chinese currency can hardly revalue strongly. A signal of the U.S. authorities’ acceptance of this state of affairs is that the word “manipulation” for Chinese currency management now clearly is banned.

There is another, still more intriguing, side to Chinese currency pronouncements. The doubts voiced from Beijing on the dollar’s stability, far from unsettling the U.S. monetary authorities, are actually manna from heaven for the Federal Reserve. The Obama administration hardly can go in for years of reckless deficit spending when the country’s largest creditor is emitting so many warning signals.

More importantly, the Fed is getting a certain amount of cover from Beijing for its eventual “exit strategy” — a reversal of quantitative easing and a rise in interest rates as soon as economic recovery gets under way.

The Chinese even are giving a strong tailwind to Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s bid for re-nomination after his initial four-year term ends in January. The reason? With the Chinese appearing to turn the knife through gloom-laden dollar prognostications, President Obama knows that appointing a heavily political successor to Bernanke would be fraught with great risks.

Any Fed chairman who looks less than squeaky-clean on currency stability is likely to send dollar holders heading for the exits — and could spark the full-scale currency collapse that Wall Street bears have been growling about for months.

So, if Obama wishes to replace Bernanke, he can do so only by bringing in a full-scale monetary hawk — a step that he must rule out on domestic political grounds. The conclusion is that the Chinese maneuverings leave Obama with no choice but to re-appoint Bernanke, whatever the doubts about his stewardship that have arisen in recent months.

When Bernanke a little later this year eventually is confirmed in a second term of office, what’s the betting that a laconic red-rimmed telegram from Governor Zhou will turn up in his in-tray?

The missive and its contents, of course, will remain secret. We can only guess at the possibility that the two men, just for a moment, will share the opportunity for a modicum of discreet self-congratulation.

David Marsh is chairman of London and Oxford Capital Markets. The Marsh on Monday column appears in German in the newspaper Handelsblatt.

A Deal Between the Fed and Bank of China? – David Marsh, MarketWatch

 
Despite the administration’s aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, there is trouble all around.

Barely six months in office, President Obama already finds himself in an economic box. For despite his aggressive and costly economic policy initiatives, the jobs market shows no sign of healing. At the same time, the housing market foreclosure crisis continues apace, while renewed questions are again surfacing about the soundness of the U.S. banking system. To complicate matters, financial markets are now starting to fret about the longer-run inflationary consequences of the unusually large budget deficits in prospect for as far as the eye can see.

In January 2009, on presenting its $780 billion fiscal stimulus package, the Obama administration assured the public that because of that stimulus package U.S. unemployment would not exceed 8 percent. Yet already by June 2009, unemployment had risen to 9.5 percent; including part-time workers, who would prefer to be working full time, unemployment rose to a staggering post-war high of over 16 percent. Worse still, the jobs market shows every sign of being far from bottoming out.

The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach.

The degree to which unemployment has exceeded the administration’s forecasts has to raise basic questions about the appropriateness and coherence of President Obama’s economic policy approach. These questions pertain not simply to the very poor design of the fiscal stimulus package. Rather they pertain to the adequacy of the measures aimed at stabilizing the housing market and at resolving the country’s most wrenching credit crisis in the post-war period.

At the most basic level, one has to question how much sense it made for President Obama to allow the fiscal package to become excessively back-loaded at time when the economy needed immediate large scale support. If a large fiscal stimulus was indeed needed, why has only $60 billion of that package been dribbled out by June? And why is less than a third of the package scheduled to come into effect in 2009, the year when the package is most sorely needed?

Similarly one has to wonder about the heavy price that the Obama administration paid for effectively outsourcing the package’s design to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and the rest of the Democratic congressional leadership. Should it really have come as a surprise to us that the resulting stimulus package would be laden with pork and with expenditures that are going to be very difficult to roll back? Or should we now be shocked that the package fell sadly short of including fast acting and effective fiscal stimulus measures that might have gotten the most bang for the buck?

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Obama fiscal stimulus package is the serious way in which it compromises the country’s long-run public finances and fans long-run inflationary expectations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Obama budget not only implies unusually large budget deficits over the next two years but it implies that, even when the economy eventually fully recovers, the deficit will remain in the region of between 4 and 6 percentage points of GDP. As a result, over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime, from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.

Over the next decade, the public debt will rise in a manner that has never occurred before in peacetime from around 41 percent of GDP in 2008 to 82 percent of GDP by 2019.

The rising tide of unemployment must also raise questions about the Obama administration’s efforts to stabilize the housing market, which the administration correctly views as a necessary condition for producing a meaningful economic recovery. One has to expect that a weaker job market will only exacerbate the country’s present foreclosure crisis, which is adding supply to an already glutted housing market. The Center for Responsible Lending estimates that 2.4 million homes could be in foreclosure in 2009 and as many as 8.1 million homes over the next four years. Yet, the Obama administration’s loan modification program announced earlier this year has to date only resulted in 190,000 offers at mortgage loan modification.

Rising unemployment also has to raise questions about whether the Obama administration is not being overly sanguine about the health of the U.S. banking system. For it would seem that unemployment will now well exceed the worst-case scenario in the bank stress test presented by the administration earlier this year. Yet, despite a weakening unemployment outlook that is sure to boost bank losses, the Obama administration is now cavalierly backing away from its earlier initiatives to reduce the toxic assets that remain on the banks’ balance sheets.

Less than six months into his term, President Obama already faces difficult economic policy choices. He can choose, as he now seems to be doing, to counsel patience and assure us that all is well at considerable cost to his credibility on economic policy management. Or he can own up to the facts that he misread the economy in January and that his economic team now needs to go back to the drawing board. For the sake of the U.S. economy, one has to hope that he has the courage to review the overall coherence of his policy approach before it is too late.

Desmond Lachman is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was managing director and chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney and a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s policy and review department.

FURTHER READING: Lachman wrote “Does Bernanke Really Deserve a Second Term?” and “Despite the Doubters, It’s Still Top Dollar” on the likelihood that the Chinese renminbi will eventually replace the U.S. dollar as the world’s preeminent international reserve currency. He also penned “Can the IMF Really Save the World Economy?” and “The World Economy’s Europe Problem.” His article “Don’t Repeat Japan’s Mistakes” warns against the policies Japanese authorities followed during their financial crisis in the early 1990s.

Obama Is Stuck In an Economic Box – Desmond Lachman, The American

 

Our current economic crisis has revived economic and political discussions about the Great Depression. One reader wrote to me that Google citations for both the “Great Depression” and the “New Deal” have increased by several million since just last year. And while our current crisis remains far milder than the Depression, many nevertheless compare the two episodes, particularly when it comes to discussions about what the government should–or should not–do to promote economic recovery. And comparisons between today and the Great Depression will not end soon, as our crisis continues, and as some have called for a second round of federal spending to promote recovery.

A number of commentators and some in Congress have cited some of my research on the New Deal to caution against large-scale government programs to spur recovery, while research by other economists, including Dr. Christina Romer, chair of President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, is cited by others in Congress for the need for large-scale stimulus programs. (Both Dr. Romer and I presented our views during recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Banking Committee. Hers can be found here and mine here. )

Why Are Economists Divided About the Depression? – Lee Ohanian, Forbes

 

What’s the best way to express just how bad the job market is? You could look at the soaring unemployment rate, or perhaps the ever-shortening work week. How about this: Total nonfarm payrolls, notes economist James Hamilton, are now back to where they were in mid 2000, and in a few months they’ll certainly be back to pre-2000 levels. 21st century job creation: gone.

All Jobs Created in the 21st Century Are Now Gone – Clusterstock

 

uly 3 (Bloomberg) — So you think China’s 6 percent growth will power a global recovery. Think again.

Economists, for example, can’t put a gloss on how ugly Japan’s data are getting. Exports and output are plunging, unemployment is at a 25-year high and those all-important summer bonuses are evaporating. The best we can say is that sentiment among large manufacturers was less gloomy in June than expected.

Where is that smidgen of hope coming from? China, which rarely misses a chance to declare victory over the global recession. Officials in Beijing say stimulus spending and record lending are sparking a recovery in the third-biggest economy.

Export-led Japan would seem perfectly placed to benefit. That is, until you check the evidence. Shipments to Japan’s biggest trading partner fell 29.7 percent in May, more than April’s 25.9 percent. It suggests China’s growth isn’t helping the rest of Asia very much.

China acted quickly to shield its economy from the global crisis. Manufacturing in May expanded for a fourth month. Central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan says things may keep improving in the third and fourth quarters.

It’s also worth noting that Japanese exports to China are falling less severely than elsewhere. Shipments to the U.S. fell 45.4 percent in May. Exports to Europe slid by the same amount.

No Engine

China isn’t turning out to be an engine of growth for Asia.

One possible explanation is protectionism, as China works to encourage exports while curbing imports. The country objects to the “Buy American” provisions in U.S. stimulus efforts, yet it is using similar tactics. Another reason may be that China’s revival is more spin than reality.

Either way, talk that China would feed the “green shoots” dynamic that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke introduced into Wall Street’s lexicon four months ago isn’t working out. Nor will the Asia-decoupling theory that’s being resurrected.

Yes, Asia is less reliant on the U.S. than it was a decade ago. Its fortunes are still intricately tied to what happens in the $14 trillion U.S. economy. The longer the U.S. is on its back, the harder it will be for Asia to maintain modest growth.

One reason for a resurgence of the decoupling argument so convincingly debunked last year is actual growth. Even with the U.S., Europe and Japan mired in recession, economies in China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia are still expanding. That’s impressive given the state of credit markets.

Fast Forward

Fast-forward one year, though. If the U.S. economy is still weak in July 2010, Asia will have a hard time supporting growth from within. At the moment, stimulus efforts are starting from a low base. Over time, government spending and low interest rates may get less traction.

The Asian market won’t close the gap. Much of the region’s internal trade involves intermediate goods used in the production of other products — many of which go to the U.S. and Europe. A world without growth will force Asia to retool economies toward greater domestic consumption without the cushion of robust demand.

What’s more likely is an inward-looking period as opposed to regional cooperation. Groups such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations talk a lot about linking their combined fortunes and outlooks. Meetings, photo opportunities and communiques don’t hide the stark reality that Asian economies compete more with each other than join hands.

‘Buy China’

China has been expanding efforts to help exporters with bigger tax benefits, loans from state-owned banks and other steps. Many “Buy China” directives are coming from Beijing. And don’t expect China to allow the yuan to appreciate much in the second half of 2009, regardless of market pressures.

Such policies suggest China is losing confidence in its 4 trillion-yuan ($585 billion) stimulus plan. They are also a reminder of the limits to governments’ ability to boost growth with public largess alone.

Growth may slip as stimulus spending wanes amid political opposition to a widening fiscal deficit, says Ma Jun, Deutsche Bank AG’s Hong Kong-based China economist. That casts doubts on predictions that Chinese gross domestic product will expand 8 percent in 2010.

The omnipotent reputation many assign to leaders in Beijing is being challenged. Take this week’s Internet fiasco. China postponed the deadline for personal-computer makers to include state-backed anti-pornography software on new PCs after U.S. officials and business groups urged it to scrap the rule.

China is normally a model of implementation. The speed with which it builds state-of-the-art airports, high-speed rail lines and Olympic stadiums is impressive by any scale. Its censorship efforts were exactly the opposite: sloppy and ill-considered.

Economic-stimulus efforts appear to be benefiting from greater competence. That may be a boon for 1.3 billion Chinese trying to get a share of the nation’s growth. The benefits for those outside China are much more limited.

China Will Not Power a Global Recovery – William Pesek, Bloomberg

 

Last Tuesday, Brazil, Russia, India, and China–the so-called BRIC nations–met in Yekaterinburg, Russia, for what was supposed to be an anti-American gabfest. The main agenda item for the first formal meeting of the four largest developing economies was the future of the dollar. In recent months, Beijing and Moscow have led a global charge against the greenback, and Brasilia has been a willing co-conspirator in the effort. The BRIC post-summit communiqué referred to the world’s currency problems but, to the surprise of observers, did not attack the dollar head on.

What happened? Beijing, apparently, stopped the other nations cold. The Chinese called the tune at the Moscow meeting–their economy is almost as large as the other three combined–and so the surprisingly nonconfrontational tone of the BRIC official statement mirrored Beijing’s recent climbdown on the currency issue.

The Chinese government in the last few weeks seems to have radically changed its tune on this issue. In March, Zhou Xiaochuan, the head of China’s central bank, called for the replacement of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency in a widely reported text released to the public. In May, however, Beijing officials took a different tack, going out of their way to talk about the dollar’s unique status.

Beijing: The Dollar’s New Best Friend – Gordon Chang, Weekly Standard

UPDATE:  1:28 PM EDT

China Reiterates Call for New World Reserve Currency

FROM BLOOMBERG:

June 26 (Bloomberg) — China’s central bank renewed its call for a new global currency and said the International Monetary Fund should manage more of members’ foreign-exchange reserves, triggering a decline in the U.S. dollar.

“To avoid the inherent deficiencies of using sovereign currencies for reserves, there’s a need to create an international reserve currency that’s delinked from sovereign nations,” the People’s Bank of China said in its 2008 review released today. The IMF should expand the functions of its unit of account, Special Drawing Rights, the report said.

The restatement of Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s proposal in March added to speculation that China will diversify its currency reserves, the world’s largest at more than $1.95 trillion. Chinese investors, the biggest foreign owners of U.S. Treasuries, reduced holdings by $4.4 billion in April to $763.5 billion after Premier Wen Jiabao expressed concern about the value of dollar assets. That reduction came a month after China boosted its holdings by $23.7 billion to a record.

“Zhou Xiaochuan sees the current international financial system is flawed, putting too much emphasis on the dollar as a reserve currency,” said Kevin Lai, an economist with Daiwa Institute of Research in Hong Kong.

President Barack Obama needs the support of China as the U.S. tries to spend its way out of recession. The Dollar Index that measures the currency’s performance against six trading partners fell as much as 0.8 percent to 79.779 at 1:11 p.m. in London. U.S. Treasuries were little changed with the 10-year yield at 3.53 percent.

‘Unlikely’ Shift

“It’s extremely unlikely the dollar will be replaced as the reserve currency,” said Glenn Maguire, chief Asia-Pacific economist at Societe Generale SA in Hong Kong. “A currency needs to be internationalized and that requires a fully convertible capital account, which China doesn’t have. The second is that it needs to be adopted.”

At the end of 2008 the dollar accounted for 64 percent of global central bank reserves, down from 73 percent in 2001, according to the IMF in Washington.

On June 13, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin reassured investors of the country’s confidence in the greenback by saying it was “still early to speak of other reserve currencies.” Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega said on June 10 the government’s decision to switch some reserves into IMF bonds wasn’t aimed at weakening the dollar.

Federal Reserve holdings of Treasuries on behalf of central banks and institutions rose by $68.8 billion, or 3.3 percent, in May, the third most on record, Bloomberg data show.

Diversifying Holdings

China has started to pare its holdings, trimming them by $4.4 billion to $763.5 billion in April, the first monthly reduction since February 2008, according to U.S. Treasury Department data. Figures for May have yet to be released.

“There may be signs here of tensions mounting between the PBOC’s economic concerns over China’s holdings of dollars and the Chinese government’s diplomatic reasons for doing so,” Stephen Gallo, head of market analysis at Schneider Foreign Exchange in London, wrote in an e-mail.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Chinese President Hu Jintao, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva called for a “more diversified” monetary system to reduce dependency on the greenback at a June 16 meeting in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg. In May, China and Brazil began studying a proposal to move away from the dollar and use yuan and reais to settle trade instead.

Group of 20

Group of 20 leaders on April 2 gave approval for the IMF to raise $250 billion by issuing Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs, the artificial currency that the agency uses to settle accounts among its member nations. It also agreed to put another $500 billion into the IMF’s war chest. This month, Russia and Brazil announced plans to buy $20 billion IMF bonds, while China said it is considering purchasing $50 billion.

“Special drawing rights of the IMF should be given full play, and the international body should manage part of its members’ reserves,” the central bank report said.

IMF First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky said on June 6 it’s possible to take the “revolutionary” step of making SDRs a reserve currency over time.

SDRs were created by the IMF in 1969 to support the Bretton Woods exchange-rate system that collapsed in 1971. They act as a unit of account rather than a currency. The cash is disbursed in proportion to the money each member nation pays into the fund.

Widening the Basket

The value of SDRs are based on a basket of currencies, shielding them from swings in a single currency. One SDR is valued at $1.54. China is proposing the basket be broadened. The current weighting is: 44 percent for the dollar, 34 percent for the euro and 11 percent each for the yen and the pound. It doesn’t include the yuan.

The dollar’s dominance of global finance buffeted developing nations last year. Investors abandoned emerging markets after the September bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. eliminated demand for all but the safest, most easily traded assets, such as Treasuries and the dollar. A shortage of the U.S. currency forced central banks to pump reserves into their economies.

“The excessive reliance on the credit of several sovereign currencies have added to the extent of risks and crises,” the central bank report said. “A currency with stable value in the long term is required.”

Last Updated: June 26, 2009 08:35 EDT

 

Keith Bradsher’s New York Times story on the recent evolution of China’s foreign portfolio gets — at least in my view — the story right. Of course, that may be because I was — rather obviously — a source for the story. Check out the charts that accompany the article!

The basic story of China’s foreign portfolio is simple: it is trying to reduce the amount of (credit) risk in its fixed income portfolio while simultaneously taking on more commodity risk.

China’s purchases of Treasuries (especially short-term bills) have gone up even as China’s reserve growth has slowed, as China shifted money out of Agencies and — in all probability — out of money market funds that are taking credit risk and other privately managed accounts. The failure of Reserve Primary had a big impact on China. Bradsher:

“Financial statistics released by both countries in recent days show that China paradoxically stepped up its lending to the American government over the winter even as it virtually stopped putting fresh money into dollars. This combination is possible because China has been exchanging one dollar-denominated asset for another — selling the debt of government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in a hurry to buy Treasuries. ….

China was the world’s biggest buyer of [securities issued by government-sponsored enterprises] a year ago, splashing out more than $10 billion a month. But in the 12 months through March, it actually had net sales of $7 billion, and ramped up purchases of Treasuries instead. China has also changed which Treasuries it buys. It has done so in ways calculated to reduce its exposure to inflation or other problems in the United States. As recently as a year ago, China actively bought long-dated bonds, seeking the extra yield they could bring compared to Treasury securities with short maturities, of which China bought virtually none. But in each month since November, China has been buying more Treasury bills, with a maturity of a year or less, than Treasuries with longer maturities. This gives China the option of cashing out its positions in a hurry, by not rolling over its investments into new Treasury bills as they come due should inflation in the United States start rising and make Treasury securities less attractive.

At the same time, China has sought to ramp up its exposure to commodities. China’s government clearly is adding to its strategic stockpiles — and perhaps encouraging state firms to build up inventory as well. China’s government is encouraging Chinese state firms to invest more abroad, especially in the mining sector. And China’s government is providing financing to cash-strapped commodity exporters (Russia, Kazakhstan, Brazil and no doubt others) to help tide them through a rough patch and, China hopes, to secure future supplies. Bradsher:

“This spring China has also been stepping up its purchases of commodities, which are usually bought in dollars. Iron ore has been piling up on Chinese docks, government stockpiles of crude oil and grain are being expanded and stockpiles are being started for products like gasoline, diesel and sugar.”

The basic story of China’s foreign portfolio is simple: it is trying to reduce the amount of (credit) risk in its fixed income portfolio while simultaneously taking on more commodity risk.” (Brad Setser)

 

This recession is now the worst since at least 1958, which is as far back as the index of coincident indicators stretches back.

The Conference Board reported today that the index, which is intended to measure how the economy is doing on an overall basis, slipped a little in April. The decline was smaller than in previous months, and two of the four indicators edged up, which could be taken as a sign that the economy is at least getting worse at a slower pace.

As I noted last month, the index was nearing the 5.6 percent decline that it experienced in the 1973-1975 recession. Now it is down 5.7 percent.

One way to put that into perspective is that the decline so far in this recession is more than the maximum falls combined in the two previous recessions, in the early 1990s and then in 2001.

“..the decline so far in this recession is more than the maximum falls combined in the two previous receptions, in the early 1990s and then in 2001.” (Floyd Norris)

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