I’ve seen some eye-poppin’, credulity-stretchin’ accounts in my time. The report “The Budgetary Impact and Subsidy Costs of the Federal Reserve’s Actions During the Financial Crisis,” just released by the Congressional Budget Office, ranks with the most extreme. It claims that the budgetary cost (which corresponds roughly to expected losses) of the Fed rescue facilities launched during the financial crisis is approximately $21 billion. Moreover, its peculiar formulation (”fair value subsidies”) conveys the misleading impression that this was the extent of the central bank’s support to the financial services industry.

In a (weak) defense to the CBO, my understanding (and readers are welcome to correct me) is that the office is tasked to execute analyses as they are framed. In other words, if the CBO is asked to opine on a particular matter, it has to deal with only the questions posed to it. It is not permitted to tweak the inquiry or broaden the focus to provide more insight.

The closest thing to a statement of scope and objectives comes in the Preface and it is remarkably thin. The most important remark:

The report also presents estimates of the risk-adjusted (or fair-value) subsidies that the Federal Reserve provided to financial institutions through its emergency programs.

CBO Issues Fed-Flattering Propaganda

 

Obama’s financial reform will fail because all the masters of the universe know how to do is make money.

Wall Street’s Big Fish Stink From The Head Down – Robert Lenzner, Forbes

 

Larry Summers is reportedly leaving later this year, and Andrew Cockburn reports that Rahm Emanuel, Obama’s acutely verbal Chief of Staff is said to be looking for other employment, preferably a high paying job on Wall Street with little work and enormous perks and privileges.

This is the sort of thing that one would expect to be happening at the end of the first term of a President, five years into the job. Perhaps that event is being moved up because Obama is likely to be a one term president, in one of the most spectacular flame outs from high, and in retrospect misplaced, expectations since the Segway.

Obama was clearly the wrong man for the job. He might have been the kind of reformer for the good times, when you really do not need him, dedicated to getting the various squabbling parties to hold hands and sing Kumbaya. Unfortunately, a crisis demands leadership, and Obama is all fluff in that department. Leaders lead, they do not hold other people up as the leaders, and take them to task for their failure to do the risky things when their leader hides behind a non-existent consensus. I hate to say this, but both Clinton and W were far superior leaders, unfortunately with deeply flawed visions and moral compasses.

The Democrats are most likely looking at a November massacre in the election, unless some event occurs to pull the nation together such as an externally focused crisis.

The problem of course is that if one looks at the alternatives, there are none too attractive in the Republican Party which is also deeply tarnished with the financial corruption that actually came to full flower under their stewardship with George W. And part of the reason that legislation for reform languishes is that the Republicans are openly in the camp of the corporatocracy, and obstructing any nascent reform attempts from a small core of independent minded legislators.

Is it time for a Third Party as some have suggested? Maybe, although it seems more likely to me that it will take a much greater degree of pain and collapse for America to wake up and reform its system, from the Media to Washington to Wall Street. Splinter parties at the extremes appear probable in the short term.

And then who knows what might be slouching towards Pennsylvania Avenue, its moment come round at last?

http://jessescrossroadscafe.blogspot.com/2010/04/failed-presidency-and-country-adrift.html

 
Otherwise-obscure central bankers spent an unprecedented amount of time in the global limelight last year. As the crisis brought down not only banking behemoths, but also macroeconomic axioms, the expansionary measures enacted by the Fed’s Ben Bernanke, the European Central Bank’s Jean-Claude Trichet, and the Bank of England’s Mervyn King have been credited, at least for now, with preventing a second coming of the Great Depression. And for that they have been hailed: Bernanke is both Time’s Person of the Year and Foreign Policy’s top global thinker, while Trichet wields tangible power in an otherwise diffuse EU and King has expressed ideas that are likely to influence future financial architecture more than those emanating from 10 Downing Street. But an epic battle unleashed last week between the Argentine government and its central bank is an apt reminder that the most challenging times for central bankers may lay not in the recent past, but in a more problematic future.

Argentina is usually singled out in textbooks as an example of what not to do with a country. Coup d’états and contradictory economic models have turned the fifth richest economy a century ago into the largest-ever sovereign debt defaulter in 2001. It is a tragic story. Since their accession to power in 2003, Néstor and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the country’s former and current president, respectively, seemed intent on changing Argentina’s direction post-default. Yet they soon revealed themselves to be another pair of messiahs turned into despots.

As in most developed nations, Argentina’s central bank is, by charter, independent of the country’s executive. The Harvard-educated, intellectually impressive current governor, Martín Redrado, has largely stood behind the Kirchners’ heterodox economic program, which favors export-driven growth as well as interventionist policies, including price controls and active resistance against peso revaluation. He was so supportive that in 2006 he provided central bank reserves to pay back all of Argentina’s outstanding debts with the IMF. As the country has remained largely cut off from capital markets since the default, paying back loans that accrued low single-digit interest (the IMF’s) while continuing to pay double-digit interest rates for “patriotic” bonds financed by their closest regional ally (none other than Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez) was clearly a political decision. For the Kirchners, hatred of the Washington Consensus weights more than the burden of interest.

In their second administration, however, the Kirchners’ authoritarian style has run them into trouble; in the midst of the global crisis, they sought to secure future sources of government spending in what became a true “asset grab.” First, they tried to radically increase taxes on agro-exports (rather sensationally, it was the government’s own vice-president who defeated the bill after a Senate tie). Then, in late 2008, the president pushed for the nationalization of all private pension funds, bringing an additional $25 billion under government control. Everyone saw it for what it was: a scramble for liquidity. Such moves have destroyed what was left of the ruling couple’s international reputation, and also much of their domestic political capital.

But it was only last week that the Kirchners’ hubris provoked a fully-fledged institutional crisis. Sidestepping an increasingly critical Parliament, the president took advantage of a legislative summer recess to issue a decree ordering Redrado to transfer $6.5 billion of bank reserves (around a quarter of the total, depending on the calculation) to the Treasury’s “Bicentennial Fund.” The purpose of such a euphemistically-baptized vehicle was to guarantee outright all 2010 foreign debt payments, in the hope that capital markets would welcome back the government and that fresh funds would revitalize the administration ahead of the 2011 presidential elections.

Reflecting changing political tides, however, Redrado refused to wire reserves to the Treasury, warning that they may be subject to confiscation abroad. After all, many of those bondholders hurt by the 2001 default have yet to settle their cases in international courts. But while the opposition attempted to convene an extraordinary parliamentary session to shoot down Kirchner’s decree, the administration doubled down: Through another decree, it fired the central bank governor. Hence they made a former key ally into a political martyr (and, odds are, a future paladin of the opposition).

How NOT to Manage a Central Bank Pierpaolo Barbieri


Related article:

What Bernanke’s Confirmation Hearing Tells Us About the Future of the Fed

 

In recent months, there has been a good deal of discussion of change in the United States. Sadly, over the last two centuries, the direction in which this country has been changing seems to be away from liberty and towards more control. The present changes are hardly unprecedented and certainly not unforeseen. In this essay I will examine two authors, Hilaire Belloc and F.A. Hayek, who present a useful analysis of our present situation.

In 1912, Hilaire Belloc published The Servile State, in which the Englishman prophesied that the world was moving to a reestablishment of slavery. This book made quite an impression on a number of thinkers, including F.A. Hayek. Hayek makes favorable mention of Belloc’s work in The Road to Serfdom, which depicts the modern world as reversing its advance from slavery to liberty.[1]

Belloc defines the Servile State as “that arrangement of society in which so considerable a number of the families and individuals are constrained by positive law to labor for the advantage of other families and individuals as to stamp the whole community with the mark of such labor.”[2] Belloc notes that “the servile condition remains … an institution of the State”[3] and that

the free man can refuse his labour and use that refusal as an instrument wherewith to bargain; while the slave has no such instrument or power to bargain at all, but is dependent for his well being upon the custom of society, backed by the regulation of such of its laws as may protect and guarantee the slave.[4]

Throughout history, until about the middle of the 18th century, mass poverty was nearly everywhere the normal condition of man. Then came capitalism. read more…

 

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_H2DePAZe2gA/SwVeYK_iRhI/AAAAAAAAKfo/1cF46qmVe0Q/s1600/mask_-_weil.JPG

 

One of the federal government’s most opaque methods for bailing out the banking system allowed a handful of giant institutions to save up to $25 billion on their borrowing costs, a Congressional panel estimated on Friday.

Seven companies received about 82 percent of those benefits, the panel estimated. General Electric Capital was able to reduce its borrowing costs by about $1.9 billion, while Goldman Sachs saved an estimated $606 million. The other big beneficiaries were Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo & Company.

The savings came in the form of federal guarantees on more than $300 billion of bonds issued by banks and other financial institutions, and they were merely one component of a $4.3 trillion safety net of guarantees orchestrated last year by the Treasury Department, Federal Reserve and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

In one of the first systematic efforts to analyze the maze of guarantees and hidden subsidies, the Congressional panel that oversees the Treasury’s $700 billion rescue program said the guarantees had provided a cheap but risky tactic for fighting the financial crisis last year.

The good news for taxpayers, the panel said, is that the government has actually turned a profit thus far on the guarantees. The government has collected $9 billion in fees for guaranteeing bonds issued by the big financial institutions and a total of $17 billion in fees for all its emergency guarantees. Thus far, it has lost only about $2 million.

At the height of the financial crisis late last year, the government provided guarantees to financial institutions, from money-market funds to expanded deposit-insurance for banks and $300 billion in troubled assets held by Citigroup. By providing guarantees instead of direct loans, the Treasury could avoid spending money upfront.

But Elizabeth Warren, director of the oversight panel, warned that the guarantees also exposed taxpayers to potentially huge costs and had created new risks by encouraging financial institutions to count on future bailouts and take bigger risks.

“The guarantees, when they work, provide big market stability at very low cost,” Ms. Warren said. “But they come with a very high risk to the taxpayer and a powerful distortion of market pricing and moral hazard.”

The panel’s most striking finding was about the size of the effective subsidy that G.E. Capital and Wall Street giants like Goldman reaped in the form of below-market borrowing costs.

The panel estimated that the federal guarantees lowered those firms’ borrowing costs by about 39 percent. Using two different approaches to measure the value of the subsidy, the panel said the savings ranged from $12.8 billion to $25 billion.

The oversight panel said it found “no significant flaws” in how Treasury officials and banking regulators designed the guarantees. But Ms. Warren warned that they were a “dangerous tool,” adding that “next time we may not be so lucky.”

Big Breaks for Companies in Bailout’s Fine Print – New York Times

 

I think Calvin Trillin–or at least his bar-room companion–is really on to something here:

“The financial system nearly collapsed,” he said, “because smart guys had started working on Wall Street.” …

I reflected on my own college class, of roughly the same era. The top student had been appointed a federal appeals court judge — earning, by Wall Street standards, tip money. A lot of the people with similarly impressive academic records became professors. I could picture the future titans of Wall Street dozing in the back rows of some gut course like Geology 101, popularly known as Rocks for Jocks. …

“Two things happened. One is that the amount of money that could be made on Wall Street with hedge fund and private equity operations became just mind-blowing. At the same time, college was getting so expensive that people from reasonably prosperous families were graduating with huge debts. So even the smart guys went to Wall Street, maybe telling themselves that in a few years they’d have so much money they could then become professors or legal-services lawyers or whatever they’d wanted to be in the first place. That’s when you started reading stories about the percentage of the graduating class of Harvard College who planned to go into the financial industry or go to business school so they could then go into the financial industry. That’s when you started reading about these geniuses from M.I.T. and Caltech who instead of going to graduate school in physics went to Wall Street to calculate arbitrage odds.”

I’d put it just slightly differently (and I realize Trillin is only about three-quarters serious): The key change on Wall Street was more sociological than intellectual. That is, it wasn’t so much that the smart guys went to Wall Street–though the intellectual caliber of the financial sector certainly increased with all those quants running around. The relevant change was that a lot of “outsiders” suddenly came to Wall Street, which had previously been dominated by insiders.

Was Wall Street Safer in the Hands of Stodgy WASPs? Noam Scheiber

 

As political pressure has reduced the price tag of expanding coverage to below $1 trillion over ten years, many observers assumed Democrats would react by trimming financial assistance for the middle class–that is, people making between twice and four times the poverty line, or between $44,000 to $88,000 for a family of four.

The assumption was that if Democrats had to make tough choices about what to cut, they’d protect the the poor and most vulnerable. After all, they’re Democrats.

But now it appears that assumption may be wrong–or, at least, not entirely right.

Are Democrats Taking Money From the Poor to Help the Middle Class?! Jonathan Cohn

 

I AM SO SICK OF THE INEFFICIENCY AND CORRUPTION BUT HERE IS AN UPDATE TO A CAMPAIGN BETWEEN TWEEDLE DEE AND TWEEDLE DUM(B)…..ACTULLY CHRISTIE LOOKS MORE LIKE DUMPTY-DUMPTY.

The Newark Star Ledger reports that “Republican gubernatorial candidate Chris Christie has tried to escape the shadow of former President George W. Bush, whose support for Christie has become a major line of attack by Democratic Gov. Jon Corzine. But in an interview Tuesday and in congressional testimony last month, longtime Bush advisor Karl Rove said he had conversations with Christie about a possible run for governor while Christie was serving in the non-political position of U.S. attorney.”

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