It’s official: The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) plan announced at the EU summit on October 27th is essentially dead prior to arrival.

As a consequence, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy appear to be betraying signs of throwing in the towel on the Euro project as it exists today. They appear to be actively contemplating ways to engineer an orderly breakup of the Euro.

As financial market participants gets wind of their intentions – albeit tentative – expect financial markets to accelerate the unfolding of events. The entire Euro edifice could collapse before the New Year.

EFSF Chief: The Insurance Plan Is Dead Prior To Arrival

When the Chief of the EFSF is pessimistic about the capacity of the EFSF to be leveraged to an extent that is adequate to the task at hand, then you might as well kiss the whole thing goodbye.

In a little noted article in Thursday’s FT, Klaus Regling, head of the EFSF essentially admitted that the plan agreed upon at the EU summit on October summit to use the EFSF as collateral for a first-loss insurance scheme is essentially dead.

As I predicted would occur in an article of mine several weeks ago entitled “Europe’s Inane Idea: Fake Brady Bonds,” the EFSF chief has acknowledged that there is no interest on the part of investors to purchase PIIGS bonds with a first-loss guarantee of only 20%.

Regling believes that a first-loss guarantee of 30% may be required to garner any interest.

Personally, I have serious doubts that there would be sufficient interest. Any issuance that actually requires a 30% loss guarantee in order to be viable simply has an implicit default risk profile that will be unable to garner sponsorship of sufficient size.

Since there are only about 250 billion euros available for the EFSF first-loss insurance scheme, that means that, even assuming 30% were sufficient, the mechanism would only be adequate to cover about 800 billion euros worth of debt issuance by Italy and Spain — and any other euro area country that needed funding.

It has been estimated that roughly two trillion euros of funding are needed to simply merely meet projected roll-over and fresh financing needs through mid 2013. Therefore, the 800 billion projection is totally insufficient to the task at hand.

If $800 billion in guarantees are all that Europe can come up with, Europe would probably better off wasting precious resources on this scheme at all.

That is why the EFSF first-loss guarantee proposal seems to be dead on arrival. The plan is totally insufficient, and therefore is unlikely to be implemented at all.

I believe that this realization is thoroughly discouraging the Eurocrats that are charged with structuring the EFSF insurance facility and selling it to investors. These Eurocrats are relaying their pessimism back to Merkel and Sarkozy in real time. This in turn, is prompting Merkel and Sarkozy to begin to contemplate “exit strategies.”

Imminent Fiasco

Because Merkel and Sarkozy are unwilling or are unable to support the only viable option available to them that is to fund bond purchases via the ECB, they appear to be engaging in preliminary speculations regarding a possible exit plan. The problem is that there is no viable exit plan that would not entail a total economic and financial disaster.

It will be impossible for Merkel, Sarkozy and other European leaders to prepare an exit strategy without their intentions being leaked to the press. Financial markets will therefore unravel any and all plans that they contemplate before they can even commit them to paper.

As soon as markets realize that the original EFSF scheme is being abandoned and that the entire Euro project will be restructured, the Euro will be crushed, the European banking system will become insolvent and global financial markets will freeze up.

Merkozy Musings

Sarkozy is already openly musing about a “two-speed” Europe. He envisions a group of countries that will quickly move towards tight fiscal and economic integration and another group of countries that will remain fiscally and monetarily independent.

Sarkozy has stated that he believes that a tight federation is impossible for a large group of economically, politically and culturally disparate countries. The implication is that the group of 16 nations that currently comprise the Euro is probably too large to be manageable.

At the same time, Merkel is already dreaming about a “New Europe.” Exactly what Germany’s Chancellor means by this is ambiguous. However, it is clear that Merkel has in mind much tighter fiscal and economic integration. In this regard Merkel must know that several current Euro members may be unable or unwilling to join in such a tight federation.

The problem with Sarkozy’s and Merkel’s musings is that they are completely irrelevant and even counterproductive to the current task at hand. The issues that they are touching on were issues that needed to have been resolved at the inception of the Euro. At this point, the question is how the damage can best be undone, not to debate what should have been.

Conclusion

Merkel and Sarkozy will soon learn that an orderly break-up of the Euro is not possible. Even the slightest hint that a breakup is being contemplated will cause a global financial disturbance that is so great that any perceived benefits of a break-up will be completely overwhelmed by the costs that will be imposed by the market.

Prepare For Europe Collapse Before New Year by James A. Kostohryz


 
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10/09/10 Stockholm, Sweden – Just this week an inevitable milestone came to pass, the Federal Reserve surged ahead of Japan as the second largest owner in the world of US debt… second only to China. Of course, the funds used to generate that massive debt position have only been made possible through the smoke and mirrors of quantitative easing. Zero Hedge notes this, and two other generally under-reported US debt facts, in a recent post.

Here’s the short version:

“#1: The US Fed is now the second largest owner of US Treasuries… Setting aside the fact that this is abject lunacy, this policy is trashing our currency which has fallen 13% since June… as in four months ago…

“#2: ‘There are only about $550 billion of Treasuries outstanding with a remaining maturity of greater than 10 years.’ [...] the US has entered a debt spiral: a time in which fewer and fewer investors are willing to lend to us for any long period of time… at the exact same time that we must roll over trillions in old debt and issue an additional $100-150 billion in NEW debt per month in order to finance our massive deficit… So we’re talking about TRILLIONS of old debt coming due in the next decade…

“#3: The US will Default on its Debt… either that or experience hyperinflation. There is simply no other option. We can NEVER pay off our debts. To do so would require every US family to pay $31,000 a year for 75 years… Obviously that ain’t going to happen…”

The last point should be no surprise to any regular…Read more…

Related Article:

 

A story up on Bloomberg may be far more significant than its bland headline, “China to Spur Domestic Demand to Stabilize Economy, Wen Says,” suggests.

In recent posts, we’ve inveighed about the dangers of the path China is now on. Its economy is unbalanced to an unprecedented degree. Exports plus investment account for a full 50% of GDP, an unheard of level. And the investment share, which is now larger than the export contribution, is increasingly unproductive. It now takes $7 of borrowing to create every $1 of GDP growth in China. That’s a terrible ratio for a supposedly emerging economy. Even the US is only $4 or $5 of borrowing for every $1 in GDP growth.

Creditor nations (the ones in China’s position) suffer the most in financial crises. That has not happened yet because the world (including China) has engaged in massive monetary stimulus and China has kept its currency artificially low via currency manipulation. That means it has maintained its trade surplus at the expense of others (most notably Japan, but other developing economies have suffered too).

The rest of the world tolerated China’s mercantilism when everyone was in growth mode. But China has made a monstrous mistake, and it is a fundamental, strategic error. At least until now, it gave no sign of planning to change from a mercantilist model. All the signs from China have been that its leaders think that if it can avoid what happened to Japan , ie being forced to revalue its currency (per the 1985 Plaza accord), all will be well. It actually has been moving to a LOWER consumption share of GDP post crisis, the reverse of what you’d see if it were trying to rebalance the economy.

This movie has ended badly for everyone who has tried China’s game plan. As Michael Pettis has pointed out, China has the largest foreign exchange reserves relative to GDP of any country in modern history. Next two are the US on the eve of the Great Depression and Japan at the end of its bubble era.

So Wen’s remarks, if they are sincere, may signal a fundamental shift in posture, which would be very welcome indeed. As much as the US also badly needs to rebalance its economy too, we cannot get very far if the Chinese do not cooperate.

But Wen’s remarks may simply be another gambit. Recall that China announced its intention to move to a more market based currency on the eve of a G-20 meeting at which it was set to encounter a firestorm of criticism over its sharp rise in exports in the previous month. The move was widely hailed as a major shift; we were virtually alone in dismissing it as a headfake. Events have proven our assessment to be correct. Thus there is good reason to suspect that Wen’s remarks are mere posturing.

First, Wen’s comments are very conveniently timed; they come on the eve of another semi-annual Treasury deadline and in the runup to the Congressional mid-terms, when political scrutiny is at a high level. Even though the House voted to give the President more latitude to impose tariffs on countries that keep their currencies artificially low, Geithner made remarks to try to defuse the situation. Wen’s comments may simply be an empty concession.

  • Is China Getting Religion on Restructuring Its Economy? – 10/03/2010 – Yves Smith
  •  

    The Nobel Prize committee has never withdrawn a prize. It might want to consider it. In Tuesday’s New York Times, prizewinner in economics, Paul Krugman reveals either that he knows nothing about economics…or that there is nothing worth knowing in it. We’re beginning to think it’s the latter.

    “From an economic point of view,” he writes, “World War II was, above all, a burst of deficit-financed government spending, on a scale that would never have been approved otherwise. Deficit spending created an economic boom – and the boom laid the foundation for long-run prosperity….”

    In the 1938 US elections, voters showed what they thought of the New Deal; Democrats lost 70 seats in the House. Then as now, the public had lost faith in public spending, says Krugman. Nearly two out of three of those polled said they were opposed to stimulus efforts. Roosevelt buckled under the pressure; he drew back from further spending to fight the slump.

    Thank God for WWII! No one opposes military spending in time of war. Krugman made his position clear in 2008 in his New York Times blog.

    “The fact is that war is, in general, expansionary for the economy, at least in the short run. World War II, remember, ended the Great Depression.”

    According to this line of thinking, the best form of stimulus spending is money spent on the military. It creates consumer demand without creating consumer supply. Consumer prices rise; people spend. The slump is soon over.

    But if WWII helped the US economy, think what it must have done for Japan; proportionally, its stimulus efforts dwarfed those of the US…and began much earlier. Just this week, Ichiro Ozawa, running for prime minister of Japan, vowed to take “every measure” to lower the yen and promised a stimulus package more than twice as big as the current program. He was just following in the footsteps of Japan’s leaders from the ’30s. It was “economic security” they said they were after. And they thought they could get it by central planning and government spending. Military spending rose from 31% of the budget in the early ’30s to nearly 50% five years later. By the early ’40s it was around 70% and nearly 100% later on. Deficits and debt soared.

    Did that create a boom? You bet it did. Japan was the first nation to get out of the global slump. It boomed…and boomed…and ka-boomed. When it came to warships, planes, and soldiers, Japan was soon among the richest nations in the world. Yes, Americans had more electric fans, automobiles, central heating, aspirin, ice cream, and the rest of the paraphernalia of civilized life at the time. In the mid-’30s, the US produced 40 times as many autos per person as did Japan. Even during the Great Depression, the US out-produced Japan by a factor of 7 and its workers earned 10-times as much money.

    Economists can’t even measure real prosperity, let alone fiddle it. So they put on the GDP and employment numbers the way a bald man puts on a cheap wig. It makes him look ridiculous and fraudulent, but it’s the best he can do. Unemployment disappears in a war economy. Japan put a million men in uniform. Two million more were part-time reservists. Those who weren’t in the army were put to work building tanks and planes. By 1941, Japan could produce 10,000 planes a year. If you were a swallow you wouldn’t want to build your nest in Japan’s factory chimneys; they belched smoke night and day.

    And talk about fiscal stimulus! Krugman would have loved it – stimulus unfettered by real money or even a casual regard for real prosperity. Takahashi Korekiyo was known as the “Japanese Keynes.” Gillian Tett notes in The Financial Times that he was assassinated in 1936 after he came to his senses and tried to bring state finances under control. He was done in by army officers who did not want the stimulus to stop. Not that we’re being judgmental about it. As far as we know, the quality of central banking could probably be improved by an occasional assassination.

    Takahashi wasn’t the first. Before him Junnosuke Inoue had held out for the gold standard and balanced budgets. He was out of office by 1931 and out of luck in 1932, when he was murdered. The gold-backed yen was abolished the day he left office. Then, public spending, deficits, central planning, debt, and inflation ran wild. By 1939, the Japanese were spending $5 million a day on their war with China – a huge sum for the Japanese at the time.

    Was the economy improved by all this spending? No, it was perverted…hammered into a grotesque imposter – a parody of a real economy. Most of the nation’s resources were put to work building things almost no one wanted. Then, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the stimulus efforts were redoubled. Rations were reduced further. Working hours were extended. What few consumer items were available were three times as expensive at the end of the war as they had been when it began. Men were conscripted into factories and the army. Women were expected not only to make the tanks, but to join the home-guard and prepare themselves to repulse the American invaders with sharpened bamboo sticks. What a marvelous economy – operating at full capacity and full employment until General MacArthur finally put it out of its misery.

    You say Obama; I say Ozawa! You say boom; I say ka-boom!

     

    While the G20 leaders make reassuring noises about international trade, I think the risk of rising trade tensions have not abated at all. As I see it, everything depends on whether or not domestic Chinese polices had any role in creating the global imbalances, and if they did, then we are still in the early stages of a difficult process of assigning the costs of the global adjustment through trade.

    Beijing hates when anyone suggests that Chinese policies were partly at fault for the current global imbalances, and doesn’t even like people to use the phrase “global imbalances,” but like it or not, we have to figure out whether in fact Chinese policies mattered. As I see it, China’s consumption rate, the lowest ever recorded, and it’s trade surplus, the largest as a share of global GDP ever recorded, could not help but have been caused by policies – such as an undervalued currency regime, excessively low interest rates, sluggish wage growth, unraveling social safety nets, and manufacturing subsidies – that were almost wholly under domestic control.

    According to my understanding of Chinese growth, it was policies that systematically forced households implicitly and explicitly to subsidize often-otherwise-unprofitable investment and manufacturing that led to wide and divergent growth rates between production and consumption, and of course the gap between the two is the savings rate. If that is true, the stimulus package is only likely to exacerbate the domestic imbalance.

    This matters because as the US begins the too-slow but irresistible process of raising its savings rate, something else must change too. At the global level savings must of course balance with investment, and with general expectations that investment will at best remain steady and probably actually decline over the next few, a rising US savings rate must result in one or more of three outcomes:

    1. Total US savings do not rise – which means US GDP must contract as the savings rate rises

    2. The savings rate in the rest of the world declines, or at least grows much more slowly than in the past. Since China is the country with the highest savings rate and the largest trade surplus, this means China’s savings rate will decline, and this is just another way of saying that consumption growth will surge.

    3. China’s GDP grows much more slowly.

    So we are left with the almost inescapable fact that if the US savings rate increases, either China (and the rest of the world, technically, but in practice mainly China) must see much faster consumption growth or the world must experience a slowdown in GDP growth.

    Don’t miss More Trade Tensions, and the Very Limited Advantage of Relative Poverty.

     

    Assume you had put much of your savings into U.S. government bonds and then you learned the following. In just the last eight months, the Congressional Budget Office estimates of the amount of additional federal debt to be held by the public grew by an astounding $4 trillion for the 2010-19 period; and that the amount of federal debt held by the public grew from $5.9 trillion to $7.5 trillion in just the last 12 months.

    In addition, you learned that the federal government (i.e., taxpayers) now owns (primarily through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) or insures (through the Federal Housing Administration and other government programs) about 80 percent of the $14.6 trillion of home mortgages outstanding in the United States. Last week, Congress passed a bill requiring all student loans be made by the federal government rather than banks, which means the taxpayers will be 100 percent liable for any student loan defaults.

    You also learned that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is considering tapping its Treasury credit line for up to $500 billion. It needs to do this because of the high number of bank failures and because each bank account is insured by the government (i.e., taxpayers) up to $250,000. The president and many in Congress are calling for a roughly $1 trillion health care bill – paid for by additional debt and/or more taxes, which will further slow economic growth, eventually leading to even more debt.

    Finally, you also became aware of the following facts: Federal government expenditures are growing far faster than the economy, and thus the government is becoming a larger and larger share of gross domestic product. Obviously, this cannot continue forever because eventually the government would totally drive out the private sector.

    The entitlement programs (i.e., Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, etc.) all continue to grow faster than the economy, and they will take more than 100 percent of all federal tax revenue this year, requiring that virtually all of the other government spending programs, including defense and interest payments on the debt, be funded by more borrowing.

    You are also aware that the government cannot tax its way out of the deficit situation, because increasing income tax rates on the upper income people will both slow the economy and cause them to find legal or illegal ways to avoid the tax increase, and the politicians have pledged to not increase taxes on those making less than $250,000, which includes all but a very few Americans.

    Even if the politicians break their pledges not to increase taxes, they still cannot solve the deficit problem as long as they refuse to cut back on the growth in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid – because any new tax revenue will be quickly absorbed by the growth in spending. The best that any tax increase could do is delay the explosion of the debt bomb by, perhaps, a couple of years while further weakening the economy and job growth.

    Now suppose you are not an individual bondholder but the Chinese government official responsible for the Chinese economy, and you know your government holds about $1 trillion in U.S. government securities. You have watched Congress and the administration become less and less fiscally responsible – more spending, more taxes, and more debt.

    Then suddenly the administration puts punitive tariffs on your tire manufacturers while at the same time refuses to approve the trade treaties with Colombia, Panama and South Korea that have been negotiated.

    You understand that these foolish and destructive actions by U.S. government officials indicate it does not understand the importance of free trade in fostering economic growth, and seem to be intent on replicating the mistakes of the 1930s.

    The Chinese are not stupid, and they have been vocal in saying they are concerned that U.S. policies will lead to a further fall in the dollar and higher rates of inflation, both of which undermine the value of their investment in U.S. government securities.

    The Chinese are now trying to diversify their holdings – and their recent activity in buying large quantities of tradable commodities is probably, in part, a hedge against a falling U.S. dollar. Thus, at the same time, the U.S. government needs to sell trillions of dollars of new bonds. It is by its own actions driving away foreign purchasers of bonds, which can only result in higher interest rates in the United States, which will further slow economic growth.

    What is particularly frightening is that neither political party has offered a serious plan to defuse the debt bomb. The Democrats are just piling up more debt as if there were no limit, and the Republicans, to date, are only proposing measures to reduce the increase, rather than reverse it. When the debt bomb explodes – within the next one to three years – expect to see record high real interest rates and/or inflation, coupled with a collapse of many “entitlements.” It will be like the neutron bomb, the buildings will be left standing, but the people will not.

    Richard W. Rahn is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and chairman of the Institute for Global Economic Growth.

    The Growing Federal Debt Bomb – Richard Rahn, Washington Times

     

    The expansion of international “supply chains” from Asian factories to American consumers has certainly created global trade imbalances and international currency flows that are not necessarily sustainable over the long run. A readjustment of the world economy, not a slackening demand for inexpensive consumer products, strikes me as the greatest threat to the Wal-Mart business model. And, for its part, the chain is already adapting to new circumstances. In recent years, Wal-Mart has expanded well beyond the borders of North America into Europe, Mexico and Asia. It imports factory goods from China and also operates its own retail stores there. But the stores look very different from their American counterparts. In Kunming, near the border with Myanmar, Wal-Mart rents space inside its store to independent vendors, who pay $1.20 per day to hawk Yunnan coffee, tobacco bongs filled with local rice wine and condiments made from eggplant, soybeans and ginger. The atmosphere is “festival-like, even chaotic,” as vendors shout out their wares, sometimes through loudspeakers or while pounding on drums, and customers crowd a stall to fish pears out of a solution of sugar, salt and licorice root–”a Wal-Mart store sans Wal-Martism,” according to sociologist Eileen Otis. Another Chinese employee explains his loyalty to the company by suggesting that Sam Walton was, in fact, a student of Chairman Mao who “adopted the revolutionary strategy of ‘the countryside encircling the city.’&nthinsp;” And so the revolution continues.

    How Wal-Mart’s Ruthlessness Led to Its Undoing – Jefferson Decker, Nation

     

    Yves Smith looks at China’s real estate market and reports that developers are getting bank loans with fake deals, which might pose a serious credit risk in the long-run. Read China: Buildings to Nowhere Looking Increasingly Shaky.

     

    As U.S. deficits increased, global investors edged away from the dollar into the German mark, the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, the Euro, and more recently baskets of Asian currencies.

    Which brings us to today. Only goodwill (defined both as an accounting term and as political deference to military might) now supports the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, which is what allows the United States to issue dollar-denominated bonds in world money markets.

    It is this borrowing capacity that allows the Obama administration to bailout the banking industry, offer to pay for universal health care, fight colonial wars in the Middle East, stimulate the economy, send billions to Egypt and Israel, buy out General Motors, and subsidize every windmill start-up company in Nancy Pelosi’s home district. (Madoff’s problem was that he failed to set himself up as a country. He otherwise understood deficit spending.) But the shell game requires full faith in the dollar.

    For those riding out financial storms by “sitting on cash,” here is what’s under your seat: in recent months U.S. federal debt has grown to $11.3 trillion, almost equivalent to gross domestic production. About one quarter of this indebtedness, or $2.8 trillion, is held abroad, and China and Japan hold just under half of those assets (liabilities to Uncle Sam).

    Elsewhere on the American balance sheet is another $11.4 trillion in household debt, an annual trade deficit of about $725 billion, and a federal budget deficit that is estimated in 2009 to be approaching $1.8 trillion. That’s if the economy grows at 3 percent.

    Off-balance sheet risks, what accountants call contingent liabilities, include about $10 trillion in new bailout guarantees (Fannie Mae, Bear Stearns, Countrywide, and whatever the administration launches as its New Deal of the Day). None of the above includes the unfunded liabilities of Social Security ($41 trillion), which, by comparison, make the shares of Lehman Brothers and AIG look like Scottish bonds held for widows and orphans.

    The geese laying the golden eggs of U.S. financial stability are the printing presses of the U.S. Treasury, and, for now, those collecting them in their Easter baskets include a number of countries and regions perhaps tiring of American arrogance, if not of the drop in the dollar’s value. Who would blame such popular targets of moral abuse as China, Russia, Switzerland, Arabia, or Latin America for dumping their dollar-denominated assets?

    All that lies between the U.S. dollar and a financial Armageddon is the Faustian house of credit cards under which Asian economies invest their trade surpluses in U.S. Treasury instruments — to keep the dollar strong, their own currencies weak, and purchases brisk between the likes of Wal-Mart and the Asian Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere.

    Sooner than we think, China and Japan, like all nervous creditors, may send the United States a letter, suggesting that, henceforward, if Washington needs to borrow money, the bonds be issued in renmimbi, yen, or a basket of Asian currencies (a Pacific Euro).

    Wall Street bankers did the same to the farm interests in the late nineteenth century, when they insisted that debt be based on a gold standard, as opposed to “free silver.” President Obama may be as eloquent as William Jennings Bryan. But at that point he will need to use all his oratory for the business of selling junk bonds.

    The Dollar: Running On Reserve – Matthew Stevenson, newgeography

     

    Returning from China last month, U.S. Congressman Mark Kirk had a bearish take on a high-level visit by American officials.

    Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner claimed the U.S.’s biggest creditor voiced great confidence in its debt. Kirk, an Illinois Republican, came back with the opposite impression.

    “China is beginning to cancel Congress’s credit card,” he told Fox News on June 10. It “doesn’t want to lend much more money to the United States and especially is worried about the Fed’s policy of printing money to buy new debt.”

    A month later, there’s no doubt about whose assessment was more accurate. Chinese leaders are clearly very concerned about the dollar. How they will react is a key question hanging over markets, and it’s time to take the discussion to the next level.

    Everyone knows China wants to reduce its dollar holdings. Little is known about how that process may unfold and how much work and preparation needs to go into it. Lots, in fact.

    Think of China and the U.S. in history’s most expensive divorce. The two economies total $17 trillion of output, and polls in China show little support for adding to almost $800 billion of U.S. Treasuries.

    This argument can be broadened to the rest of Asia. The idea that China or Japan — with $686 billion of Treasuries — can just start selling massive blocks of dollars is ridiculous. It would devastate markets the world over and the fallout would boomerang back on Asia. If you think markets are shaky now, just wait until word of a central-bank fire sale gets around.

    Copycat Selling

    Sure, Singapore (with $40 billion of Treasuries), India ($39 billion) or South Korea ($35 billion) could try to dump dollars on the stealth. Good luck in this highly connected, around-the-clock world. News that a key economy seeks a first- mover advantage over peers would inspire copycat selling. Expect investors and traders to respond with massive sell orders.

    Warren Buffett can discreetly trim Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s interest in a company or a currency. How a central bank divests itself of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars on the sly is another matter.

    Governments that may be concerned about getting stuck with their dollars for good have a point. And by curtailing investments in dollars today, Asia is ensuring that the U.S. currency will be worth less a year from now. Bernard Madoff can tell you a thing or two about how this process works.

    Dollar Accord

    What may be necessary is a global framework or pact to end the dollar’s dominance. A “Plaza Accord” of sorts may be needed to dismantle the so-called Bretton Woods II system of tying currencies to the dollar that emerged after the global crises of 1997 and 1998. A Dollar Accord, anyone?

    Just as stocks take a hit when additional shares are issued, Asia faces a debt-dilution dynamic for which it never bargained. The Federal Reserve’s zero-interest-rate policies don’t help. And Asia can’t do a lot on its own here.

    This process will require considerable cooperation, be it through the International Monetary Fund, the Group of 20, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or a yet-to-be-created entity. Goals must be set, mechanics discussed and timing negotiated. If ever there were a time for a currency summit, it’s now.

    Politics will be a stumbling block. It’s hard to envision the U.S. signing on to scrap the dollar as the reserve currency. Neither the euro nor the yen is ready to replace it. And China’s designs on currency domination are a decade away — or longer.

    IMF Solution

    The amount of scrutiny the dollar’s successor would face makes you wonder who would want to print the reserve currency. That explains why the most credible argument making the rounds involves the IMF’s so-called Special Drawing Rights, or SDRs.

    They are really an account of exchange, rather than legal tender, and are calculated according to a basket of currencies consisting of the dollar, euro, yen and pound. Chinese central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan wants the IMF to move toward creating a “super-sovereign reserve currency.”

    Or, here’s another suggestion: Brady bonds for less- troubled economies. The idea behind bonds created in the 1980s as part of Latin America’s debt restructuring was to let investors swap their claims on nations in turmoil for tradable instruments. A similar process may work with the dollar.

    Rumors of the dollar’s demise are no longer exaggerated. What is being exaggerated, though, is how easy it will be for Asia to get out of the quandary it’s in. Cutting off the U.S. government’s credit card, for example, means American consumers can’t buy your goods. And any sudden divorce between the world’s two main economic powers won’t be pretty. Far from it.

    It’s time to figure out what the next step is, and policy makers need to get serious. Complaining about our dollar-based system won’t get us there. Some brainstorming about where to go from here would be far more constructive.

    (William Pesek is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are his own.)

    Our $17 Trillion Chinese Split Won’t Be Pretty – William Pesek, Bloomberg

     

    In a recent Wall Street Journal/NBC poll, 49% of Americans said they were concerned a great deal about federal deficits and government involvement in the economy.

    America’s gross government debt is expected to climb from 62% of national income to 106% by 2015 — a level not seen since the aftermath of World War II. Meanwhile, gas price volatility is in full swing.
    Wondering Why The Chinese Laughed at Geithner? – Michael Lynch, IBD
    Yuan Small Step: Faith in the Greenback is Waning – The Economist
    Western Awe & Domestic Anxiety: Tale of Two Chinas – Philip Stephens, FT

     

    The Great Haul of China Slate

     

    uly 3 (Bloomberg) — So you think China’s 6 percent growth will power a global recovery. Think again.

    Economists, for example, can’t put a gloss on how ugly Japan’s data are getting. Exports and output are plunging, unemployment is at a 25-year high and those all-important summer bonuses are evaporating. The best we can say is that sentiment among large manufacturers was less gloomy in June than expected.

    Where is that smidgen of hope coming from? China, which rarely misses a chance to declare victory over the global recession. Officials in Beijing say stimulus spending and record lending are sparking a recovery in the third-biggest economy.

    Export-led Japan would seem perfectly placed to benefit. That is, until you check the evidence. Shipments to Japan’s biggest trading partner fell 29.7 percent in May, more than April’s 25.9 percent. It suggests China’s growth isn’t helping the rest of Asia very much.

    China acted quickly to shield its economy from the global crisis. Manufacturing in May expanded for a fourth month. Central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan says things may keep improving in the third and fourth quarters.

    It’s also worth noting that Japanese exports to China are falling less severely than elsewhere. Shipments to the U.S. fell 45.4 percent in May. Exports to Europe slid by the same amount.

    No Engine

    China isn’t turning out to be an engine of growth for Asia.

    One possible explanation is protectionism, as China works to encourage exports while curbing imports. The country objects to the “Buy American” provisions in U.S. stimulus efforts, yet it is using similar tactics. Another reason may be that China’s revival is more spin than reality.

    Either way, talk that China would feed the “green shoots” dynamic that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke introduced into Wall Street’s lexicon four months ago isn’t working out. Nor will the Asia-decoupling theory that’s being resurrected.

    Yes, Asia is less reliant on the U.S. than it was a decade ago. Its fortunes are still intricately tied to what happens in the $14 trillion U.S. economy. The longer the U.S. is on its back, the harder it will be for Asia to maintain modest growth.

    One reason for a resurgence of the decoupling argument so convincingly debunked last year is actual growth. Even with the U.S., Europe and Japan mired in recession, economies in China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Australia are still expanding. That’s impressive given the state of credit markets.

    Fast Forward

    Fast-forward one year, though. If the U.S. economy is still weak in July 2010, Asia will have a hard time supporting growth from within. At the moment, stimulus efforts are starting from a low base. Over time, government spending and low interest rates may get less traction.

    The Asian market won’t close the gap. Much of the region’s internal trade involves intermediate goods used in the production of other products — many of which go to the U.S. and Europe. A world without growth will force Asia to retool economies toward greater domestic consumption without the cushion of robust demand.

    What’s more likely is an inward-looking period as opposed to regional cooperation. Groups such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations talk a lot about linking their combined fortunes and outlooks. Meetings, photo opportunities and communiques don’t hide the stark reality that Asian economies compete more with each other than join hands.

    ‘Buy China’

    China has been expanding efforts to help exporters with bigger tax benefits, loans from state-owned banks and other steps. Many “Buy China” directives are coming from Beijing. And don’t expect China to allow the yuan to appreciate much in the second half of 2009, regardless of market pressures.

    Such policies suggest China is losing confidence in its 4 trillion-yuan ($585 billion) stimulus plan. They are also a reminder of the limits to governments’ ability to boost growth with public largess alone.

    Growth may slip as stimulus spending wanes amid political opposition to a widening fiscal deficit, says Ma Jun, Deutsche Bank AG’s Hong Kong-based China economist. That casts doubts on predictions that Chinese gross domestic product will expand 8 percent in 2010.

    The omnipotent reputation many assign to leaders in Beijing is being challenged. Take this week’s Internet fiasco. China postponed the deadline for personal-computer makers to include state-backed anti-pornography software on new PCs after U.S. officials and business groups urged it to scrap the rule.

    China is normally a model of implementation. The speed with which it builds state-of-the-art airports, high-speed rail lines and Olympic stadiums is impressive by any scale. Its censorship efforts were exactly the opposite: sloppy and ill-considered.

    Economic-stimulus efforts appear to be benefiting from greater competence. That may be a boon for 1.3 billion Chinese trying to get a share of the nation’s growth. The benefits for those outside China are much more limited.

    China Will Not Power a Global Recovery – William Pesek, Bloomberg

     

    June is the month for mid-year revisions to economic forecasts by the major international financial organizations and other forecasters.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released its new forecasts Wednesday, predicting that the deep global recession is nearing a bottom. It’s projections of world real GDP growth of -2.2% for 2009 and +2.3% for 2010 represent the first upward revisions in OECD’s growth projections since June of 2007.  In remarks last week, the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, John Lipsky, said he expects that his institution will be revising its projections “modestly upward, mainly with regard to 2010.”  The sister organization of the IMF, the World Bank, took a contrary stance at the beginning of the week, setting back global equity markets with a downward revision of its projection for the global economy this year to -2.9%, coupled with strong negative comments on the effects of the global credit crisis on developing countries.

    We are in broad agreement that a turning point in the global economy is likely in the coming months.  This follows a period of particularly sharp contraction (“falling off a cliff”) in the six-month period to March of this year.  A recovery appears to be already underway in many of the emerging-market economies.  Among the advanced economies, the United States and Japan appear likely to begin to recover in the course of the second half, driven by what the OECD characterizes as “massive policy stimulus and progress in stabilizing financial institutions and markets.”  Continued balance-sheet problems for consumers, aggravated by further increases in unemployment, will likely put a damper on the pace of recovery in the US.  Continued heavy deflationary forces will continue to be a challenge to policy makers in Japan, following what was probably that country’s most severe recession in its post-war history.

    While there are some “green shoots” also appearing in the euro area, the eventual recovery looks likely to lag that in the US and Japan.  External demand for the region’s exports has collapsed; and tight financial conditions, rising unemployment, and financial-sector problems have constrained domestic demand.  Positive growth probably will not appear until the fourth quarter of this year at the earliest.

    There is broad agreement on the positive economic outlook for the Chinese economy, which appears to be on course for strong growth.  The World Bank raised its 2009 forecast for China from 6.5% to 7.2%.  The OECD expects 7.7% growth for China this year and 9.3% in 2010.  We would not be surprised to see Chinese economic growth top 8% this year and be close to 10% in 2010.  The government’s fiscal stimulus of $590 billion, along with sizable monetary stimulus, has clearly been successful in helping the economy ride out the global recession.  This is quite an achievement in a year in which world trade growth is on track to register a 16% decline.  In May there were notable advances in urban fixed investment (largely government-sponsored), real estate investment, and retail sales.  Industrial production accelerated to an 8.9% rate.  Declining exports have been a depressing factor in the first half.  This trend should reverse with the expected recovery in the global economy.

    Global equity markets, as is often the case, anticipated the end of the global financial crisis, the coming recovery and advanced strongly in recent months after bottoming in early March.  International investors’ appetite for risk evidently returned to more normal levels as fears of “worst-case scenarios” lessened substantially.  The very rapid pace of the advance in equity markets over the March through May period has been followed by a modest 6% pullback in global equities since early June.  Markets clearly had gotten somewhat ahead of themselves.  While risk appetite seems to have moderated in this period, there are no indications that it has turned negative.  Investor flows into equity markets, particularly emerging markets, are continuing.  Cumberland’s equity portfolios remain fully invested.

    China’s strong performance on the economic front is reflected in its equity markets.  The MSCI Index for China is up 28% year-to-date through June 23rd.  An important reflection of the continuing strength of China’s market is the fact that this index drew back only -1.8% thus far in June while the MSCI Index for Emerging Markets dropped by -6.4%.

    We utilize three ETFs to provide exposure to the Chinese market.  The first is the iShares FTSE/XINHUA China 25, FXI.  This ETF is by far the most popular China ETF, and therefore is the most liquid, an important consideration.  It invests in just 25 ultra-large-caps, mostly government-sponsored Chinese firms.  It is heavily concentrated in the financial sector (45.5%) and has 0% in the technology sector.  The second is the SPDR S&P China, GXC.  It has reached an adequate level of liquidity, with net assets of $315 million (although much less than FXI’s $9.2 billion).  It provides considerably more diversified exposure to China than FXI, investing in some 130 firms, mixing large caps and small caps.  It also has a high exposure to financials (32%) and includes some tech exposure (8.1%).  Thirdly, we also use the Claymore/AlphaShare China Small Cap, HAO.  Here we have to limit our position because the net assets of this fund are only $70 million.  We are attracted by the differences in its sector exposure as compared to the previous two ETFs, including 16% exposure to information technology and only 7.7% to financials.

    China’s strong performance is an important positive factor for other economies in the region, including Hong Kong (iShares MSCI Hong Kong Index Fund, EWH), Taiwan (iShares MSCI Taiwan Index Fund, EWT), and Singapore (iShares MSCI Singapore Index Fund, EWS), all of which we are overweighting in our International, Global Multi-Asset Class, and Emerging Markets ETF portfolios. China’s huge appetite for commodities is also boosting the markets for commodity-exporting economies, including Australia (iShares MSCI Australia Index Fund, EWA), Canada (iShares MSCI Canada Index Fund, EWC, and the Claymore/SWM Canadian Energy Income Index, ENY), Brazil (iShares MSCI Brazil Index Fund, EWZ) and Chile (iShares MSCI Index Fund, ECH).

    Thus far we have not seen any evidence of a reemergence of the previous speculative excesses in China.  Valuations continue to look relatively attractive.  The price-to-trailing 12-month earnings ratio is 14.5, still below its 10-year average of 15.9%, whereas the same measures for Korea, Hong Kong, India, and Brazil are now all higher than their 10-year averages.  Nevertheless, as the last 12 months have amply demonstrated, the Chinese market, like other emerging markets, can be highly volatile and requires careful monitoring.

    Bill Witherell, Chief Global Economist

    Global Recovery In Sight, China at the Wheel – Bill Witherell, Cumberland

    © 2012 New Jersey CFO Suffusion theme by Sayontan Sinha